

international security

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PEACE OR WAR: IS THERE A BRITISH POLICY?

IN the House of Commons, on November 7th, Sir John Simon made, by implication, a noteworthy admission. He was discussing the chances of getting an international agreement on disarmament "to which, of course, Germany must be a party." He claimed that "we have given a lead," and went on:

The point, however, is that what we are seeking to bring about is an agreement between nations—an agreement, and you do not necessarily produce an agreement by striking an attitude, by proclaiming that you are willing to disarm. Still less do you produce an agreement by pointing to the fact that we ourselves have disarmed and that therefore we should like other people to do the same. From some points of view the actual negotiation of an agreement acceptable to other Powers would be rendered simple if we were able to say, "If you will do this or do that, this is what we will do."

It seems to follow—and, indeed, is clear from the record of our so-called disarmament policy—that we have not said, and cannot say, to other Powers, "If you will do this or that, this is what we will do." Short of resistance to attack upon our territory or our "vital interests," there is hardly an aspect of our external relations upon which a British Foreign Secretary could say, with the certainty of being able to keep his word, that we should behave in one way rather than in another.

This lack of knowledge of what Great Britain really stands for is, and has long been, a main cause of European and international unrest. As a people we hate having to make up our minds. We prefer that events, or the action of others, should make up our minds for us. We do not like being committed in advance to any kind of policy or plan. We think we have a shrewd notion that if and when things come to the pinch we shall know what to do. Rarely do we reflect that, if we made up our minds beforehand, and if others knew that our minds were made up, things might not come to the pinch at all.

The withdrawal of Germany from the Disarmament Conference and from the League of Nations on October 14th shocked many of us severely. I heard the news from a well-informed British Member of Parliament soon after midday ; and having given it to the editor of a Sunday newspaper, was asked to write some comment upon it. I wrote by 3 p.m. that the German decisions were serious but not surprising, and that they could not " surprise any competent observer who has followed the course of events in Germany during the past few years, especially since the establishment of Hitlerism in power." This was the simple truth. Yet I gather that it was not felt to be such and that, in some quarters which should have known better, it was thought almost shocking that I should not have been shocked.

Why ? Because we lack a firm and consistent British peace policy. Some of the principal members of our " National Government " suddenly saw that their excursions into the field of foreign affairs had landed them in a blind alley. They entered the blind alley last December when, without any clear notion of what might be involved, they promised Germany " equality of status " as the price of her return to the Disarmament Conference. No such promise ought ever to have been made without cool-headed perception of what it might imply, or without a binding agreement that it should entail definite obligations as well as rights for Germany, or without a British policy to meet the contingency of any departure from the agreement. Any other course, the course which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald followed, was bound to be equivocal, and to furnish Germany with the appearance if not the reality of a legitimate grievance should effective equality in armaments be withheld from her, as, in view of her steady rearmament, even before the advent of Hitlerism, it was certain to be withheld.

There was little room for doubt on this score last December, when General von Schleicher had just succeeded Herr von Papen as Chancellor, and there was no room at all after General von Schleicher had given place to Herr Hitler on January 30th this year. Up to a point, Mr. Lloyd George was entitled to remind Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, in the House of Commons on November 7th, that " It is no use saying that there has been a change in the conditions in Germany. Herr Hitler and his Nazis and Brown Shirts came into power in

January with all their policy. They talked about rearmament and they paraded the streets with their Brown Shirts. The Prime Minister proposed his [disarmament] plan in March, two months later. There has been no change of any sort in the conditions since the right hon. Gentleman proposed his plan." But Mr. Lloyd George went too far in saying that "there has been no change of any sort," for the Nazi persecution of the Jews, Socialists, Pacifists and Liberals, and the suppression of the Catholic Centre and other parties, do constitute a change. And he failed to urge that the draft of the Four-Power Pact which Mr. MacDonald received from Signor Mussolini at Rome a few days later—a draft which the Prime Minister "welcomed" and recommended to the House of Commons on March 23rd as offering a basis for disarmament and as being, potentially, "the most effective work for peace which has been done since the War"—could only be construed as an attempt to undermine the League of Nations and to give Hitlerite Germany an undue share of control over European affairs. If the Mussolini-MacDonald draft was presently turned inside out and prevented from becoming an instrument of war through its advocacy of "Treaty revision," it was thanks to the sturdy resistance offered by some of the smaller Powers of Europe and to their keen sense of the dangers involved.

The plain truth is that the British National Government, like its predecessors, has never had either a foreign policy worthy of the name, or a coherent disarmament policy. None of them has ever said what it would do for "the enforcement of international obligations by common action," in case other countries should fulfil the corresponding proviso of Article 8 of the League Covenant and reduce their "national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety." By the mouth of Sir John Simon the National Government claims that "Britain has set the example, has led the way." This is one of those half-truths that may be more perverse than a blunt falsehood. For our own, mainly financial, reasons, and not in order to "set an example," we have reduced our armaments to "the edge of risk," or, rather, below the level of what is, in view of our lack of a sound peace policy, "consistent with national safety." Under these conditions the Disarmament Conference could not succeed, for no British Minister was in a position to say to other

Powers, "if you will do this or do that, this is what we will do."

The substantial failure of the Disarmament Conference was thus a foregone conclusion. This I have the less hesitation in saying now because I wrote in a London weekly journal, on February 19th, 1931, nearly a year before the Disarmament Conference met, that its chances of success were poor and would be hopeless unless there were a change in British policy during the next twelvemonth. I added :

In my view the only British policy that could make a success of the Disarmament Conference would be to declare that, in renouncing war, this country renounced neutral indifference to the misdeeds of any warmaker ; that it stands firm upon the principle that, whatever international adjustments may be necessary for the sake of peace, war shall not be the means of bringing them about ; and that Great Britain looks upon the security which the general adoption of this principle would create as the only adequate basis for international disarmament.

Such a policy would bring the main issue into the foreground. This main issue, in a world which has renounced war, is to define the function of national armaments as a police function, and, therefore, to decide that they shall not exceed what may be required for the efficient discharge of that function.

And to Mr. Arthur Henderson, then Foreign Secretary—who had just launched a " National Disarmament Campaign " at the Queen's Hall, and had said : " To us the Pact of Paris (or Kellogg Pact) is the renunciation of force in international affairs, and we believe that the renunciation of force should carry with it the renunciation of the means of war "—I put then the question whether he would also say : " To us, as citizens, the renunciation of robbery and murder means the renunciation of force in private affairs, and we believe that this should carry with it the abolition of Scotland Yard " ?

This was in February 1931. In the following autumn any serious hope of disarmament was killed by the failure of the League Council, under the influence of Great Britain and France especially, to call Japan to order at the moment of her aggression in Manchuria, and to insist that, whatever her rights and wrongs might be, her methods were incompatible with her treaty obligations. Not until the summer of 1932 did the French Government begin to understand that the peace of Europe had been at stake in the Far East. In October

1931 the United States had offered officially to support the League in any means of persuasion or of pressure it might employ to ensure a peaceful settlement of the Manchurian dispute; yet so lacking was the British National Government in any semblance of a foreign policy, that it failed to lay hold of this American undertaking, and condemned itself impotently to watch the triumphant course of Japanese aggression. Eighteen months too late, after long tergiversation over the Lytton Report, it did unwillingly join in the unanimous condemnation of Japan by the League Assembly—and had its reward in seeing Japan walk out of the League, as Japan would not have dared to do in September 1931. And it is not too much to say that Hitlerism would have had little chance of coming into power in Germany, and that Germany would never have had a Japanese example to imitate, had Japan not been allowed to prove that a strong military Power is able, notwithstanding its economic vulnerability, to flout the League and the Kellogg Pact with impunity.

These were some of the considerations that moved me to write, on October 14th last, that the German decisions to withdraw from the Disarmament Conference and from the League could not surprise any competent observer. After the advent of Hitlerism it was as vain to expect that France and other neighbours of Germany would or could close their eyes to its menace as it was to suppose that Hitler could agree to any diminution, by “probationary period” or otherwise, of the “equality of status” which Mr. Ramsay MacDonald had secured for General von Schleicher last December. It had long been obvious that the aim of Germany was not disarmament but rearmament. Mr. MacDonald knew, as his predecessors in office had known, and had kept secret, the truth that Germany was never disarmed to the level fixed by the Peace Treaty, and that the only real question was how far German rearmament should be winked at if not sanctioned. But to have told these truths frankly and openly would have raised, with uncomfortable urgency, the problem of what British policy would and should be. And rather than face that problem squarely, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, to do him justice, will impose upon himself the strictest of self-denying ordinances in the matter of thought.

Now we have Herr Hitler's emphatic declaration that “the

German people cannot continue to live under the shadow of the Treaty of Versailles, which was built on the impossible thesis of 'Woe to the vanquished.' It was built on the impossible idea that for eternity one set of nations were the victors and one nation the conquered. . . . We are ready to enter into any conference, we are ready to be a party to any Treaty, but it must be as equals. We will not be treated as bootblacks or inferiors. No, we must have the same rights as other countries, or the world will never see us again in an international conference."

Though I have read Hitler's *Mein Kampf* too often, and have studied his system of propaganda too thoroughly, to credit any of his statements, public or private, apart from the purpose they may be meant to serve, the logic of his position and the passions which his dynamic catchwords have aroused in the German people suggest that these declarations should be taken literally. Germany is determined to carry her own rearmament to a point at which she will be a military Power at least as formidable as she was in August 1914. Opinions differ upon the time she would need to reach this point. My own information, derived from German Nationalist sources (though not intended for me), is that Germany could be ready for war within six months of placing the necessary orders for war material, and that everything is prepared for the placing of those orders. The General Staffs of some of her neighbours, which have their own intelligence services, are, on the other hand, inclined to doubt whether Germany could be ready in much less than a year. They are, however, convinced that, whenever Germany decides to strike, she will strike hard and without warning, mainly by air.

With all her shortcomings, Germany does not lack a consistent policy. It is outlined with singular unanimity in the writings of Herr Gottfried Feder, Herr Rosenberg, Professor Ewald Banse and in those of Herr Hitler himself. So far is Hitler's book *Mein Kampf* from having been withdrawn or suppressed that, under official command, more than 1,200,000 copies of it have been sold since the spring, and its influence upon German minds is far greater than that of Hitler's peace speeches, which are designed, on his well-known principles, as propaganda for "the lowest intelligence," in this case abroad. None of the omissions from the English version of his book is more significant than his "Political Testament" for

the German nation, which appears on pages 754-755 of *Mein Kampf*. It runs :

“The Political testament of the German nation in its dealings (with countries) abroad shall and must forever, in accordance with its meaning, be as follows :

Never allow two Continental Powers to arise (*entstehen*) in Europe. Look upon every attempt to organise a second military Power on the frontiers of Germany, even though it be only in the form of a State susceptible of becoming a military power, as an attack upon Germany, and think it not only a right but a duty to prevent such a state from arising, or to smash it if it has arisen, by every means, including armed force. Have a care that the strength of our people should be founded not upon colonies but upon the soil of the European home. Never deem the Reich assured if it cannot give all the offspring of our people, for centuries to come, a bit of land of their own. Never forget that the holiest right in this world is the right to the soil which one may till for oneself, and that the holiest sacrifice is the blood shed for this soil.”

From Hitler's book, and from Nazi literature in general, it is clear that the soil of Germany's neighbours is meant. Herr Gottfried Feder, the official custodian of the Nazi programme, shows in his work, *The German State*, that the political principle of this State is the formation of a homogeneous German Reich, embracing all of German race, whether they now live under French, Danish, Polish, Czech, Italian, Austrian or other sovereignties. And it is in keeping with this principle that not only Austria but German Czechoslovakia, German Switzerland, Danish Slesvig, Holland, Luxemburg and Belgian Flanders, should already have been theatres of a Nazi agitation so extreme that vigorous measures have had to be taken against it.

Save for one allusion in Sir Austen Chamberlain's speech, the whole debate on disarmament in the House of Commons on November 7th ignored this aspect of Nazi policy. Most of the speakers, including Mr. Lloyd George, seemed to be thinking of a possible conflict between Germany and one or more of the Great Powers, and to imagine that, because Germany is supposed to possess no big guns, all talk of such a conflict is moonshine. But the most imminent danger lies in the threat of Nazi policy to the smaller neighbours of Germany. These neighbours believe that *their* “holiest right” is to their own soil, and they are quite unconvinced

that there exists a superior "Aryan" Germanic right to take it from them. If Hitler succeeds, as he may, in embodying Austria in his "Third Empire," this side of Nazi policy will become prominent. Have Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and Sir John Simon seriously thought about it? If so, what is their policy to be? Any British Government would doubtless be "severely shocked" were it to find that the independence of Southern Denmark had vanished, or that Nazis—Dutch, Flemish or German—were in effective control of the Dutch and Belgian coasts. Is it proposed to wait until these things happen before we think about them?

Fortunately some of the threatened European nations have not waited for us before making up their own minds. Soviet Russia and her neighbours have concluded pacts of non-aggression which provide against every conceivable form of hostility. The countries of the Little Entente have consolidated themselves into a political unit, and relations between Czechoslovakia and Poland are growing daily closer. Switzerland is strengthening her defences, and Denmark, which is almost totally disarmed, is getting ready to do likewise. Belgium, forewarned, thinks it well to be forearmed. Even Washington and Moscow are coming together. On the other hand, China is steadily making her peace with Japan, that is to say, is falling under effective Japanese control. "Geneva" has lost the struggle for the soul of Eastern Asia—with consequences in India and elsewhere which may one day cause us to curse the memory of the men who "let us down," together with the League, in the autumn of 1931. Trouble in Europe may come, should Great Britain continue to lack a peace policy, by repercussion from a clash in the Far East; and we may take it as an axiom that, just as the Japanese example in first flouting and then withdrawing from the League influenced decisively both the course of affairs in Germany and the German withdrawal from Geneva, so a very close understanding will be maintained between Berlin and Tokio throughout the calculable future.

What, then, should British policy be? Should it be "Yet a little sleep, a little slumber, a little folding of the hands to sleep," or should it at last be wide awake and resolute? The partisans of rearmament are beginning to cry aloud. Others recommend an alliance with France. Others, again, aver that we "stand by Locarno" and shall keep our plighted word—

as though anybody knew exactly how a British Government would, or could, interpret the Locarno Treaty, were it ever to be invoked! The Labour Party which, in its present plight, has a positive genius for combining wrongheadedness with furtive gleams of sense, put into its motion of censure upon the Government demands for "international inspection and control of armaments in all countries," "the creation of an international police force," and "the definition of aggression." Except with the greatest goodwill on the part of the inspected, "the inspection and control of armaments in all countries" cannot be effective. In Germany, at any rate, the goodwill does not exist, and inspection may, therefore, be ruled out as a preventive of rearmament. As for the "definition of aggression," which so many British statesmen have declared to be impossible, the thing has been done in the non-aggression pacts between Russia and her neighbours, and could have been done at any moment since the War if we and the United States had not blocked the way. There remains "the creation of an international police force" which, unless it be much more thoroughly studied in all its bearings than heretofore, may be at once a counsel of perfection and a trap for the unwary.

I have long favoured and advocated the idea of an international police, because I believe it to contain, in germ, the only means of outlawing war as an instrument of national policy. But I have always criticised and opposed the notion that an international police force could be created in readiness for emergencies, kept "in being" and stationed somewhere in somebody's land at the disposal of the League of Nations. Apart from technical difficulties and the rivalries, jealousies and suspicions that would surround the organisation of such a force, no answer has ever been found to the shrewd question which M. Léon Daudet put to M. Tardieu when the latter, as Prime Minister of France, proposed, at Geneva, the creation of such a force: "What is to happen if your police force is beaten?" Beaten it certainly would be by any great country that thought itself able to defy the League victoriously. Then there would be a hurry-scurry among the members of the League and either the total collapse of the League itself or a haphazard general war on a vast scale.

The sanest approach to the police force idea lies through recognition that nations which have renounced war have also

renounced neutrality towards the crime of war-making. By this recognition they would admit that the sole lawful function of all their armed forces is a police function, individual as regards the defence of their own countries against attack, international as regards co-operation with the victim of attack. The co-ordination of the peace forces of non-neutral countries against any threat of war would not present insuperable difficulties; and behind those peace forces, at whatever level they might need to be maintained, would lie all the resources of their respective nations. It is the police principle, based on non-neutrality in the presence of crime, that needs to be clearly stated and firmly upheld. Disarmament, or rearmament to whatever level might be necessary to deter any prospective disturber of the world's peace, would then follow in proportion as security against war was felt to be real or the reverse.

Short of attempting suicidal isolation or of relapsing into specific alliances and international rivalry in armaments, I am persuaded that there can be no British foreign policy worth speaking of, nor security for the British Commonwealth, until this country has made up its mind not to be neutral in favour of any assailant, actual or prospective, of the world's peace, be that assailant strong or weak, and to take the lead in organising the forces of peace on this basis. We cannot police the world alone. As our armaments now stand, and in the absence of a foreign policy, we might not even be able to police the British Commonwealth in the sense of defending it successfully against attack. But in taking the lead of the nations that hate war, and may in time learn to love peace, Great Britain could, and should, save Europe and the world from the threat embodied in the consistent policy of Nazi Germany, and bring that policy to naught. For, at a moment when much is uncertain and few things are plain, two truths stand out. The first is that Germany will not dare to carry out her programme if there is a reasonable prospect that the attempt would fail. The second is that, unless there be a British foreign policy of the sort I have described, publicly stated and nationally supported, we and the other nations of Europe will drift towards disaster only to find, on the morrow, that Western liberal civilisation belongs to the past.

WICKHAM STEED.

LIBERALISM, SOCIALISM AND FASCISM.

IN an article published in the CONTEMPORARY REVIEW for October I set forth the view that the primary cause of the economic depression, of the growing tension about armaments, and of the apparent eclipse of free institutions and liberal civilisation, was international anarchy in a world rapidly shrinking in terms of time and space. I gave reasons for thinking that capitalism, as an economic system, had not failed at all, especially when regulated by Social Reform imposed upon it by democracy, but was merely being prevented from working by anarchy. And I went on to urge that the dictatorships, whether Fascist or Communist, which justified themselves on the ground that we were passing into an "autarchic" era in which the state must plan and direct everybody and everything, were simply the natural reactions to international chaos and that the real remedy was not dictatorship in any form but the ending of anarchy by the development of a collective system both in politics and economics. In this paper I want to consider a second reason for the decline of the authority of Liberal civilisation in the modern world, the challenge of Socialism and Communism and now of Fascism to the basic principles upon which it rests.

The foundation thesis of both Socialism and Communism is the same, that the system of private property in the means of production, distribution and exchange whereby the community lives is fundamentally immoral and unjust because it involves the division of the population into two classes, those who live by owning the instruments of production, the capitalists, and those who live by selling their labour in the market if they can find a capitalist to hire it, the proletariat. They consequently urge that it should be replaced by one in which the land and all the instruments of production, distribution and exchange, are owned by the community as a whole. The Socialist parties and especially the British Labour Party believe that the transition to the Socialist Commonwealth can be made gradually and by democratic and parliamentary means. Communists believe that competitive capitalism is inexorably driving the proletariat towards greater poverty, imperialism and war, and that the only, indeed the inevitable, way in which Communism will be established will be through a revolutionary dictatorship which will forcibly appropriate

all capital without compensation and so "liquidate" forever the capitalist class by forcing it into the ranks of the proletariat. And they fortify this conviction by accepting the materialist interpretation of history formulated by Karl Marx, whereby all forms of idealism, religion, culture, civilisation, are regarded at bottom as being the resultant of economic conditions, and not of any contact with any truth or spiritual reality outside the reach of the five senses.

The Liberal has a natural sympathy with the Socialist ideal of economic equality and security for all. But he cannot accept the basic Socialist diagnosis that capitalism is a mere system of "exploitation." In his view the fundamental fact of capitalism is that it has liberated an unparalleled flood of individual creative energy all over the world, and that this energy is devoted to satisfying human needs by providing better or cheaper commodities or better or cheaper services to all, with ultimate profit to the entrepreneur or the lender of capital as the reward. In vast numbers of cases these new enterprises fail to yield any profit. Probably at least half the capital invested in new enterprises is eventually lost. Yet every experiment teaches some lesson and gives employment while it lasts. The marvellous rise in the general standard of living, in the ever-increasing variety of commodities and services now available for all who are earning good wages, is the outcome of the liberation under the system of private enterprise, of this enormous individual creative energy and its canalisation into raising the standards of living of mankind.

Nor do Liberals accept the Communist argument of the "inevitability" of the break-down of capitalism. Karl Marx based much of his argument on the conviction that under capitalism the poor must inevitably get poorer and the rich richer. Actually experience up to 1914 proved exactly the contrary, especially in democratic countries. Similarly Lenin and his modern followers like Mr. John Strachey, comfort and fortify their faith by persuading themselves that modern capitalism must become monopoly capitalism, and end in imperialism and world wars, and the creation of a proletariat recruited from the middle class which will have the ability and organising power to seize dictatorial power by revolution. But our present troubles are not the result of capitalism at all, but of an anarchic nationalism which is wrecking capitalism

and which is the outcome of race and culture and history long antedating the capitalist era. Capitalism, as such, dislikes war, and is a unifying factor in the world to-day, for it trades, invests capital and develops industry impartially all over the globe. It is no doubt true that capitalists (like labour) try to capture the machinery of the sovereign state for their own ends, and that commercial rivalries are then added to other sources of international discord. But the remedy is not to abolish capitalism, which is essentially an international system, and is suspected accordingly by all strong nationalists, but to abolish anarchy by creating some sort of political unity in the world, when wars will cease.

The only real alternatives before mankind are full-blooded Communism and capitalism tempered by democratic control. Communism, as Russia has proved, can be made to work provided a community is willing to be turned into an economic army, under military discipline and obeying implicitly (under penalty of imprisonment, starvation or death) the orders of the supreme command, as to what it should produce and what it should consume. It is practically certain that even if it could be established in the more complicated and advanced countries of the West, no society that has tasted individual liberty will stand the discipline and dictatorship and terrorism by which alone it can be established and maintained in being.

But whatever the practicability of Communism may be, it is certain that Socialism—as it is preached by non-Communists—will never work. For the root of the modern economic problem is not production but the distribution of consuming power, and that depends entirely on the adjustment of supply and demand in an intensely progressive and rapidly changing world, so that only those are unemployed who are in transition from one industry to another. Under Communism the state settles everything, dictatorially. Under capitalism, through the agency of price in the competitive market, the consumer ultimately decides what is to be produced. Every hour private competitive enterprise is setting something new and better before him—in food, in clothes, in housing, in education, in amusement, for business, for leisure, for recreation. If his choice moves in a certain direction the market for those products or services increases, raising the price and drawing more capital and enterprise and workers

into providing for it, while the market for the superseded products and services contracts, forcing the closing of factories and the cessation of services, and the transfer of labour to meeting the new demand.

Capitalism, indeed, is as inherently democratic on the economic side as it is on the political, for it ensures that it is the choice of the housewife and the ultimate consumer which decides what shall be produced and sold, while Socialism is essentially autocratic, for in economics as in politics it must be the supreme command which will direct both what the individual shall consume and think and what agriculture, industry, and the newspapers shall produce.

Under an individualist economic system price in the market, if allowed to function freely, does succeed (subject to the fluctuations of the trade cycle) in keeping supply and demand in adjustment and the people in employment, however rapidly changes in invention and in public taste may come, as the history of the pre-war era shows. But the adjustment begins to break down if there is undue interference with the free operation of the market. We have already seen the consequence to mankind of upsetting the world balance between supply and demand through the anarchy of economic nationalism in the shape of tariffs, subsidies, embargoes, and quotas, and through war—namely unemployment and loss of capital, and the general decline in standards of living. But the proposals of non-Communist Socialists will have exactly the same effect. The Socialist programme never seems to consider the problem of securing adjustment between supply and demand in the half-Socialist, half-individualist state. Most of his proposals paralyse enterprise or make adjustment more difficult. In a changing world penal taxation and legislation designed to stabilise jobs can only multiply unemployment. What has the nationalisation of the railways or the mines to do with our present-day problems? It will not cheapen transport or increase the sales of coal or put one man back into economic employment. If carried out when proposed in 1922 it would have involved the community in gigantic losses, and have resulted in an immense addition to the numbers of rentiers whose income is guaranteed by taxpayers induced to purchase two industries which are both suffering from new forms of competition instead of leaving shareholders to carry the risk of losing their capital

and interest upon it because their industry is moribund or has not been efficiently run. And what is the use of nationalising the "Big Five" Banks unless the deposits are nationalised also, for it is the depositors and not the banks who ultimately decide whether loans are to be made or credit given? And so with all the other plans for gradual nationalisation. They never face the central problem of a non-Communist world, how unemployment is to be abolished by the balancing of supply and demand in a world of constant progress and change.

It is through the distribution of the ownership of the means of production and exchange, and not their nationalisation, that the Liberal sees the answer to the problem presented by the contrast between the rich and the poor. In the past great numbers of the working-class have not experienced "freedom," because they have had no financial reserves to meet the cost of sickness, unemployment, old age or leisure. It is not enough that these should be provided by bureaucratic means, vital as the whole system of social insurance is. Real "freedom" comes from variety in the possibilities of employment and the possession of adequate savings in the Bank. It is not always realised what a gigantic change has come over the distribution of the yield of national wealth in recent years.

On the one hand, the rich are nothing like as rich as they used to be. They may nominally own great fortunes, but their income is enormously reduced. Large estates pay as much as 50 per cent. of their value in cash to the state on the death of the owner, thus rapidly reducing them to moderate proportions. Of the income from what is left as much as 11s. in the £ may be taken for income tax and surtax, quite apart from indirect taxation and county and municipal rates. The "big houses" of the past, both in town and country, the old basis for social ostentation, are rapidly being closed or turned to institutional purposes, and the old rich are moving into labour-saving houses and flats—thereby narrowing the gulf in the personal standard of living of all classes.

On the other hand the figures recently published by Mr. Walter Runciman to the effect that no less than £3,000,000,000 was owned by between 14,000,000 and 15,000,000 small investors in the Post Office Savings Bank, Savings Certificates, Building Societies, and so on, show how widespread is the

ownership of "property" to-day, and therefore economic as well as political freedom. The vast majority of the nation over thirty now has a substantial "stake" in the country. The immense increase in the use of small cars, the development of suburban and bungalow houses, the spread of the universal small brilliantly lighted shop, in all areas where there is little unemployment, show how far from the truth is the old Marxian diagnosis of the inevitable effect of capitalism. They show, too, how immense has been the increase in economic well-being which private enterprise tempered by Social Reform has produced—an increase which can be indefinitely maintained if only the unemployment caused by international anarchy and ill-conceived and dislocating Socialistic legislation can be ended.

But if the Liberal rejects the Socialist and Communist dogmas he believes stoutly in what, before the war, used to be called Social Reform—that is the imposition by an intelligent democracy of ever-higher standards to which private enterprise must conform, and the use of the taxing power for national development to lessen the contrasts between rich and poor and to heighten the general standard of public amenity in the land. Factory Acts, universal education, trade unionism, insurance against old age, sickness and unemployment, town planning, mainly the result of Liberal thought and impulse, have removed many of the evils of the old age of *laissez-faire*. In fact, if it were not for unemployment and war debt charges due to anarchy and the consequent shortage of money for public purposes, Britain would already be a fair and pleasant land for all, with an increasing distribution of property and therefore of liberty among all classes. Even so, however, there is still an immense field for the development of Social Reform.

It is not enough, I think, to stand by the pre-war methods, successful as they were. There is no doubt that the public mind requires a far greater sense of public responsibility in the conduct of the economic life of the country than was the case in the days of competitive *laissez-faire*. Industry is more and more recognised to be a vital public service, both on the part of capital and labour, as it becomes larger in scale and all citizens become parts of a vast composite process of manufacture and distribution, and the number who, like the old peasants, are almost self-supporting, become negligible. Many

aspects of Social Reform still outstanding will be found in the Report of the Liberal Industrial Enquiry. There are to-day two new major issues.

The first is how far capitalism can be "planned." It all depends on what is meant by planning. If planning means Government interference with the responsibility of business executives, it would be fatal. For politicians and bureaucrats have already proved their utter incompetence to "plan" industry in that sense or to decide how supply and demand are to be adjusted. Almost everything they have done has aggravated dislocation and produced the characteristic disease of the age—unemployment. Moreover, planning, to be effective, must begin with demand, for if demand cannot be controlled or accurately forecast—a most difficult thing—production cannot be adjusted to it. But if planning means requiring business and agriculture to conform to ever-higher public and humanitarian standards, then the more planning the better, but on one essential condition. That condition is that the community must accept private enterprise as the main-spring of the economic system, and that regulation and taxation must not be carried beyond the point at which it begins to contract competitive activity and so create unemployment. The broad division is this. The function of private enterprise is to assure an ever-higher standard of living to the community by giving it, on a competitive basis, better and cheaper goods and services, while employing the whole community and thus assuring labour its real bargaining power. The function of the state is to deal with monopolies and to require that the standards within which private enterprise works should steadily improve. The dividing line between Socialism and Liberalism may well come on the question of the nationalisation of the land—the basis of all economic activity. The old landlord system has been broken down by legislation, and some new system needs to be put in its place. It may be that national management of land would be the best way out. But that is the limit to which Liberalism could go.

It is fashionable to-day to complain against "too much legislation" and "too much interference with business." Some of these criticisms are justified. For instance, whatever the need for money, the taxation of company reserves and improvements only checks enterprise and creates unemployment, and reduces in the long run the yield of taxation. But funda-

mentally it is not Social Reform which has been the trouble, but the consequence of international anarchy. The present scale of taxation, which is certainly destructive of enterprise, is due not to social reform but to the necessity of paying for past wars and preparing for new ones. And most of the present paralysis of business and shipping is due to tariffs, embargoes, quotas, and other nationalist interferences with world trade and the free operation of price in the world market. If the cost of the war could be eliminated, if world trade could be made to flow as freely as it did before the war, and if unemployment disappeared, there would be plenty of room for more expenditure on Social Reform coupled with an adequate reduction in taxation.

The second new question to-day under the head of Social Reform arises from the growing size of trusts and cartels and from the growing divorce between ownership and control of business. A recent American scientific study has shown that a very large and increasing proportion of American business is now controlled by some 200 giant corporations, and that the "control" of these corporations has, in effect, by various devices passed out of the hands of their owners into the hands of holding companies of professional entrepreneurs. Things have not gone as far in England, but they are moving in that direction. The whole tendency opens up an immense field for enquiry and consideration. There is no reason why the management of these great trusts and corporations should not become more and more professional and more and more animated by public standards, thereby keeping the advantages of private as opposed to public or bureaucratic enterprise, and of the distribution as opposed to the nationalisation of ownership.

I was once taken to the top of the Cunard Building in Liverpool by a distinguished leader in industry. He pointed to the vast and thriving city which lies across the Mersey. "Do you see that city," he said. "It is Port Sunlight. It is one of the most successful businesses in the world. It provides the public with cheap and entirely reliable soap. It pays high wages, maintains the highest conditions in its works, and gives the best housing and amenities to its workers. It is, in effect, the creation of one man, who was once an impecunious salesman in this city. The world will never get on unless it allows such men, and there are millions of them, to develop their talents and make fortunes through making better, or

more cheaply, the things the people want. What the state should do is to give them every encouragement, compel them to conform to the highest standards in Factory Acts and shop conditions and housing which it thinks are possible without checking industry and creating unemployment, and take as much money out of their pockets by taxation to spend on public purposes as it dares without weakening their enthusiasm and energy or depriving them of the resources which are necessary to their activities."

In that story is really summed up the alternative economic systems which lie before the world—Communism, nationalisation and dictatorship or capitalism using private property regulated by democracy through the instrument of Social Reform.

The reader may ask, What about Fascism as a third alternative? My reply is that Fascism is not an alternative to capitalism: it is what happens to a community which still believes in private enterprise, when anarchy has so dislocated the system that order can only be maintained and some internal economic balance can only be established by substituting dictatorship for democracy in both politics and economics. But so long as private property and private enterprise is preserved it will overthrow the dictatorship and restore democracy and Social Reform as soon as the effects of international anarchy disappear and price in the market has ended unemployment by restoring a balance between supply and demand. In the West, if Socialists imperil the working of the system of private enterprise by Socialist legislation, the Fascist state will appear long before the Communist, but only as a temporary phenomenon. For, in substance, the measures taken by Signor Mussolini in Italy, and being followed at a long distance by Mr. Walter Elliott in England, except in so far as they represent improved organisation for marketing, are simply the emergency remedies for world dislocation between supply and demand. As that dislocation disappears, as nations begin to realise that instead of all trying to sell the same things at the same time in the world market, they must once more exchange things with one another and modify tariffs and subsidies and quotas accordingly, the need for these emergency internal state controls will also disappear and democracy will return.

Does all this mean that there will be an early restoration

of a Liberal Government? That would only happen quickly if its rivals went over to Diehardism or Communist Socialism. The great weakness of the Liberal Party and the great strength of Liberalism is that, thanks to their own work in the past, two-thirds of the Conservative Party and two-thirds of the Labour Party are in fundamentals still liberally minded. None the less the party future is very uncertain, and the need for activity on the part of thinking Liberals and for a distinctly Liberal Party was never more needed than it is to-day. For their real task is to keep Great Britain itself in the Liberal fold.

On the one hand the Conservative Party is being pressed towards a narrowly nationalist policy, alike in the Empire, in foreign affairs and in economics. In an anarchic world events are strengthening the Diehards' hands. In India they are unwilling to come to terms with the powerful movement for national self-government. In foreign affairs they are pressing for a renewed competition in armaments and for abandonment of the League or collective idea. In economics under their pressure, they not only regard high tariffs, bilateral treaties and quotas as emergency measures, but as a permanent policy, and desire to make the state organise internal production and distribution on Fascist lines, on the ground that autarchy has come to stay. Yet acceptance of nationalism as a sufficient policy can only lead the country to permanent unemployment, imperilled democracy, indefinitely increased expenditure on armaments, lessened Social Reform and eventual dictatorship and war.

On the other hand the Labour Party is equally being drawn towards extreme courses by its revolutionary wing—also assisted by the consequences of anarchy. It is playing with the idea of dictatorship and committing itself to a half-baked programme which will make equally impossible either a Socialist or an individualist economy, and can only intensify poverty and unemployment. Yet, inherently, the Labour Party is hopelessly divided. It is held together to-day by the class feeling of the trade union and the Socialism of its intellectuals, as the Conservative Party is held together by regard for property and nationalist feeling. But directly it approaches power it must break in two, as it did in 1931, when it has to decide between the revolutionary and dictatorial Socialism that its left wing really believes in and the demo-

cratic Social Reform which its right wing really wants, though it calls it Socialism.

For Liberals the test is relatively simple. On the international side Liberalism requires that a vigorous nationalism should be balanced by international organisation to settle disputes by reason and justice and not by war, to give security to all through disarmament and mutual guarantees against aggression, and to restore balance to world supply and demand by eliminating the present anarchic obstacles to trade and investment.

On the domestic side, Liberalism is willing to co-operate in formulating by democratic means any programme of Social Reform however far-reaching, provided it recognises that private initiative rather than State control, both in politics and in economics, will remain the basic principle of civilisation, and that the guiding principle of public policy is no longer either merely to protect property rights or to nationalise them, but to see that private enterprise employs the whole population at rising standards, and that the "surplus" is taken for public purposes.

The future of civilisation lies with the fundamental Liberal creed. There is, in truth, no other basis for a civilised life. But that is not to say that it will triumph in the immediate future. The disease of anarchy has gone so deep, so many nations and peoples are committed to political and economic philosophies born of anarchy or the early evils of uncontrolled *laissez-faire*, that bitter experience of the fruits of false gospels, like Communism or Fascism, Racialism or Socialism, may be necessary before mankind, as a whole, returns to those first principles which alone can give it unity, freedom, prosperity and peace. But if Liberals are faithful to the ideas which underlie their faith, in time their truth will prevail, and we shall look back on this age of struggle and confusion as the prelude to the appearance of that World Commonwealth based on free thought and free institutions which has so long been the dream of the far-sighted among men.

LOTHIAN.

WHITHER GERMANY? WHITHER EUROPE?

THE superficial contrast between the Germany of 1932 and the Germany of 1933 is extraordinary. In 1932 there was a sense of almost unrelieved gloom, as if a blight of misery had descended upon the nation. The younger generation, especially, seemed to be without hope. The future held nothing for them: unemployment, want, uselessness; it would have been almost better not to be born. They seemed to have forgotten how to sing. In 1933 they are swinging along the streets to a new music, the music of marching songs. These songs have a curious character. Each line ends off sharply, as with a stamp of defiance; but it is more than that. It is an exultant note. Young Germany is on the march again, and her sons and daughters (sons especially) insist on proclaiming their rebirth to all the world.

The new-born faith seems to owe its inspiration to Wagner, and through Wagner to Siegfried and Odin. Young Germany is worshipping the Lord of Hosts, the old Hebrew God of Joshua, not the God of Jesus. None but the Chosen People are to enter the new Canaan. Only, the chosen people to-day are not Hebrews, but Aryans. Jewish culture is denounced in order that the ancient Hebrew religion may be reinstated. Such is the pagan faith that has brought a new hope to young Germany.

What is in some ways even more remarkable, the light of hope has been rekindled in the eye of the ordinary non-political citizen, and even in the eye of his *hausfrau*. An extraordinary change indeed, not easily to be explained. No one is appreciably better off. But whereas last year every fresh salary cut brought a fresh groan of misery, to-day the typical response seems to be: "Well, these continued cuts make things very difficult; but still, if it is really going to cure unemployment, it is worth it." And to-day there seems to be a widespread belief that unemployment *may* be largely cured: last year I found practically no such hope. So one asks, "Why?"

The best answer seems to be that, for great masses of Germans, the "Third Reich" denotes a new and badly needed sense of unity. At last the paralysing dissensions of recent years have been ended. Germany is one. It is as if a

magic wand, called Hitler, had suddenly been waved in the air, and the colour of the world is changed. Instead of "everyone for himself, and the devil take the hindmost," it is now "Everyone for the community [the community being the nation], and the devil take the individualist and the profiteer." So, everyone is commanded not to eat a Sunday dinner worth more than 6d. Do they obey? Certainly not all, but probably a great many do.

For many Germans the new hope may be nothing more than a passing fit of intoxication. For them the disillusionment is likely to be terrible. But for a number it is far more than this. If, then, we recognise that for many in Germany there has been a revolutionary change in mental outlook, its political significance demands closer analysis. It is common form amongst the Nazis and their friends to denounce or to ridicule the doctrines of the French Revolution and the doctrines of Liberalism. What is the real meaning of this revolt? Is it simply a blind reaction to the old idea of authority? I do not think so.

The danger of over-emphasis on rights, which figure so prominently in the doctrines of the American and French Revolutions, has been pointed out many times. It is nearly a century since Mazzini pleaded with his fellow countrymen to put duty before right. And anyone who recognises duty as paramount—whether to God, to humanity, to his nation or class or any other group or authority—must necessarily submit himself to discipline. Watching a group of "Hitler youth" marching round and round their school playground in leisure hours, under the orders of one of their own number certainly not over fifteen years old, one inclined to the view that these German boys were getting the same satisfaction, the same subconscious sense of *cameraderie* and healthy physical fatigue that English schoolboys find in a game of football.

A group of Englishmen took part for a week this summer in one of the work-camps (*Arbeitslager*) which the National Socialists are now running. Some of the group were pacifists, who were by no means uncritical of the Nazi régime, and their report on the camp is not undiluted praise. Here is one of their "findings." "We did not find that note of bellicose militarism attributed to these camps by certain sections of the foreign Press. It is quite clear to us that the main purpose

of these camps is not military, but educative in the broadest sense." They found the discipline strict, even, perhaps severe at times. This was partly due to the fact that, earlier leaders having been pushed out for political reasons, a good many military officers and sergeants have been brought in to discipline the camps, and their ideas of discipline are stereotyped.

It is extremely easy to misconstrue this German love of discipline and order. Germans, like other people, have seemingly contradictory characteristics. Almost every German seems to have a definite opinion of his own, and a strong individual personality. This has led, in recent years, to deplorable disunity and disharmony. So, to-day, there is a strong reaction to the other extreme: the innate love of discipline, and the love of symbolic acts to symbolise the newly found unity, are given full play. That such a situation might easily develop into a military menace is obvious: that some elements in the new German Government wish to exploit it for that end can hardly be doubted; but it is not essentially military in nature, and it could be and may be turned into a means of splendid creative activity.

Then, there is the popular denunciation of democracy in Germany to-day. What is really meant by this?

Although the Nazis say they have no use for democracy, it seems clear that their real quarrel is not with democracy as such, but with the parliamentary institutions by which democracy to-day is so often thwarted rather than expressed. Having failed to reform the machine that was hampering their progress, they have smashed it. It is idle to inquire whether a clear majority of the electorate really voted for a Nazi régime last February, or even whether, if it did so, it knew what it was doing. Probably no West European Government to-day has such widespread, ardent, enthusiastic support as the present German Government. This is more particularly true of Germany east of the Elbe. In this sense it can certainly claim to be a "democratic" Government. And part, at least, of Hitler's popularity is due to his humble origin and to the fact that he fought in the trenches, in the ranks, through the war. He is a man of the people. He may have embarrassing commitments to Thyssen; but he is certainly not paving the way—intentionally at least—to a Hohenzollern restoration. In the ardent support that it evokes, the Hitler

régime contrasts favourably with the type of Government so common, alas, in modern parliamentary democracies, which remains in office by a system of elaborate jugglery, precariously balancing on various combinations of groups and parties, each of which is itself in a state of unstable equilibrium, and whose programmes, sometimes nebulous, tend to cancel each other out.

A further unreality of modern politics is symbolised in the German revolt. It is in part a revolt against one aspect of the Marxist doctrine of class war. Now it may be true that, so long as the capitalist system subsists, employers and wage-earners cannot become one class, with no diversity of interest. But it is not true that they must at all times regard each other as enemies; nor is it true that present-day class feeling and class conflict are solely, nor perhaps even predominantly, due to the conflict of economic interest as between employers and workers. In the first place it is sufficiently obvious that in recent years the great majority of employers have been suffering acutely as victims of the same circumstances that have brought disaster to many workers. If the capitalist system involves the worker in constant economic insecurity, so it does the employer. In the second place, class conflict and class estrangement are largely due to discrepancies of education and of general outlook. In actual life, in spite of the Marxists, many employers in England at any rate mix freely and happily with their employees, whereas those same employees often find it almost impossible to get on with professional workers. It is surely one of the tragic ironies of the situation that a Social Democratic party, which had for years shown itself so willing to co-operate with the "bourgeois" parties in Germany that it had been regarded with something like contempt by the true Red Socialist or Communist, is to-day branded with the mark of the beast, because in theory it never forswore its adhesion to the Marxist doctrine of the class war; and this branding is done by a party calling itself "Socialist," which has resorted to measures of far greater violence than the average social democrat could ever have stooped to.

But to some extent the National Socialists are really attempting to create a classless society without an economic revolution. An English resident in East Prussia gave me a curious instance of this. The May Day processions this year

were under official control. Everybody was expected to take part in them. Accordingly, many ardent middle-class Nazis, who would never have dreamed of walking in procession with the "proletariat" in earlier years, did take part. And some, at least, of the habitual May Day marchers were so astonished to find them there that they said they would feel quite differently towards the professional classes if those classes were going to come out and join the workers' processions. One can almost hear the scornful comment of an orthodox Socialist on such an incident: "Poor sort of socialists," he would say, "if they could be duped as easily as that." But is such a comment justified? It may seem a small thing for a professional man to walk shoulder to shoulder with a wage-earner through the streets of their native town. But is it? It means breaking the habits of a lifetime. That first march through the streets may lead some middle-class men into a broad highway of revolutionary social thought and action.

Note, too, another section of the Englishmen's report on the East Prussian work camp: "We were very much impressed by the value of the camps as foundations of a new sense of national unity strong enough to transcend divisive loyalties to party and class and smaller territorial units. The isolation of the classes and the over-emphasis on the economic struggle for existence, which are to so great a degree responsible for the embitterment of class war, were evils which no longer existed in the comradeship of the camp. . . . There seemed to us to be good grounds for hope that with this experience behind them, young men would no longer persist in the mental attitudes which divide a nation into hostile camps."

It is not easy to predict where the attempt to break down class barriers will lead the new Germany. The time may soon come when many supporters of the new régime will demand the fulfilment of the Socialist part of the party programme. Such a demand may be especially strong in eastern Germany, where the peasants have almost all voted for the Nazi party. But the landlords have supported it too. Will it dare to defy the landlords and break up their estates to satisfy land hunger? And what will happen if it does? At present the policy seems to be to bring uncultivated lands—heaths and wasteland, marshes and even shallow lakes, into cultivation

by reclamation and other methods. Thousands of men who were unemployed are already working on reclamation schemes in the eastern provinces, and it is claimed that such work can employ hundreds of thousands for years to come, and will give scope for land settlement of many who are to-day leaving the towns. Small holdings and allotments are already a conspicuous feature on the outskirts of many German towns. This development dates, of course, from long before the Nazi revolution ; but if the National Socialists foster such activities with energy—and they seem to be doing so—the economic situation in eastern Germany might be eased for some years to come, even if not solved.

This brings us to another notable tendency. The civilisation of the west, for the past century especially, has been increasingly urban. There have been signs for years past that in some of the most highly industrialised countries the tide is turning. "Back to the land" is no longer a vain cry. It is becoming a real social tendency. Figures are given in Germany to-day which show that the population of several of the big cities, Berlin and Munich among them, is actually decreasing. And, as so often happens, as soon as a social tendency becomes manifest, those who see it begin to justify it and philosophise about it. Thus, it is noted that city life has tended towards deepening class barriers and towards social disintegration. Anyone who has lived in both city and country can appreciate the force of this. In a village or country town each inhabitant is aware of the existence of all the others, or at least of his immediate neighbours. This may lead to a great deal of petty gossip, and mean social barriers ; but there is at least a certain corporate loyalty, at best a neighbourliness which is the foundation of all healthy social life. In the city men and women hardly know their nearest neighbours by sight. They are content to associate with those of their own profession or those of congenial mind, chosen from a very wide area. This has many advantages, but it has grave disintegrating effects, too. The old question : Who is my neighbour ? assumes a new aspect in the modern world. Amongst so many neighbours who may have a claim on one how is a man to decide which claims to recognise ? Better, perhaps, thinks many a decent-minded townsman, to cut the claims of social obligation altogether, and live to himself and his family.

Again, it may be argued that city life has become over-intellectual, over-analytical, too far removed from the soil. Man's body has become stunted, so that he is afraid of it. Human beauty is almost forgotten. Men cannot call their souls their own. They have no time for inner communion, perhaps no capacity or desire for it. Better, surely, to have the simple lore of the peasant, whose mind goes round and round considering the crops, the sheep, his neighbours or his women folk, chewing the cud like his cattle, than to be so utterly incapable of browsing at all that without the artificial stimulus of football, cinema, boxing, betting and other aimless activities, life becomes a complete vacuum. In such an environment the soul of man must atrophy. True religion, in contrast to ecclesiastical mummeries, true art, in contrast to decadent artifice, cannot live.

Or again, though the city provides endless drugs to deaden the misery of man's diseased mind and body, it also provides the true means of culture. Here are the great storehouses of human creativeness, works of beauty and wisdom and adoration. These things, as well as all the more seductive "goods" that industrialism has produced, are enjoyed by the town-dweller. He is the lord of the earth. The countryman, who toils to produce the food and clothes and other necessities the townsman takes for granted, is forgotten; he is regarded as a curious survival of barbarism, slow-witted, clumsy, ill-mannered.

The theme is as ancient as human society itself. Town-life leads to material and intellectual progress, the countryman is exploited to give the townsman his holiday. At last the slow-moving giant of the country revolts. He tears off the ropes with which the puny townsmen have tried to bind him. Rousing himself to action, he blunders on to his feet, and crushes many of his Lilliputian enemies to death. In the name of religion, of the One True God, wholeness of life, he destroys the myriad idols the townsman has set up. He claims his due in the abundance of life.

In some respects the Nazi leaders have been very ready to copy the methods of Soviet Russia; but in this respect their outlook seems to be exactly opposite to that of the Soviet leaders. Communism is to prove itself in Russia by out-doing America in industrial development and efficiency. Even the village itself must submit to an industrial system. If the

Third Reich justifies itself, on the other hand, it will be by restoring the balance in favour of the countryside, by furthering a new social harmony rising from a universal touch with Nature. Hear the English campers' report again: "The *Arbeitslager* is an attempt to recover joy in physical work, to come to terms once again with the earth, with soil, stone, wood and iron, to try to get back our bodies and thaw a frozen flow of warmth, affection and physical unison." It must be repeated that in following this tendency, as in so many of their constructive activities, the Nazis are stealing some of their opponents' thunder; but it must at least be recognised that they have caused the thunder to resound to some purpose. Where they have had the imagination to throw their energy into the promotion of good things, still in their early stages, which their predecessors neglected or only encouraged fitfully, they must be given credit for it.

Nazi Germany is a reminder of one other vital factor in human society which Gandhi especially, and perhaps De Valera and other modern revolutionary leaders, should have taught us. Mr. Tawney and others have shown the disease of our society as the sickness of an acquisitive society. Now there are two ways of attacking the evil spirit of acquisitiveness, by changing those parts of the social fabric that encourage acquisitiveness, which is the Socialist way, or by setting an example of complete disinterestedness. It may be, indeed, that both attacks are needed. Europe, hitherto, has tended to regard the second method as mediæval, eccentric and of little practical value. And so we find that, again and again, as soon as Socialist leaders have tasted the sweets of office, the vision of the Socialist Commonwealth has become dim; self-comfort, ambition, vanity, take control, and the disappointed followers mourn another lost leader.

Ten years ago, just before the unsuccessful Hitler *Putsch* in Munich, a young German, himself in personal danger from the National Socialists, warned me not to overlook their fine characters. "Several of them," he said, "are men of complete disinterestedness and devotion, living ascetic lives of service to the community, like Gandhi." History may conclude that, in an acquisitive age, it was Hitler's proved disinterestedness, more than any other single quality, that opened the way to his success. Let it not be forgotten, however, that Chancellor Brüning, whom the Nazis call

"traitor," was no less ascetic, no less disinterested than Hitler. Such qualities may do much to raise a man in popular estimation. They will not serve alone to keep him in office. Effective leadership requires, too, a capacity for action, for giving results, a courageous and discerning opportunism.

The leaders seem to be directing the enormous volume of emotional enthusiasm they have aroused into some very fruitful channels, such as common action for adding to the country's productiveness; and into some harmless ones, comparable to the harmless and often useful activities of boy scouts. But there are other activities which are neither fruitful nor harmless. Nazi-ism, whatever may be its virtues, is a movement that has been built on violence and intolerance, and whose leader has openly declared his belief in these things in his published confession of faith. The degree of violence and intolerance varies greatly in different parts of Germany to-day. During the past few months the writer has learnt, for instance, of certain outstanding examples of Jews in prominent positions who are remaining in those positions, with the full consent and approbation of the local authorities. But a few cases of this kind cannot atone for the thousands of Jews and other excellent German citizens who have been and are being punished for crimes they never committed. Anyone living outside Germany to-day, meeting the stream of distinguished and patriotic Germans, men and women of the highest learning who have committed no crime against the State, but who are driven from their beloved Fatherland, is irresistibly reminded of the effects of the Inquisition in Spain and of the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in France. Will the same blight fall upon German culture, German intelligence, vital religion in Germany, that Spain and France brought upon themselves by those ancient persecutions?

Sooner or later some new Luther will arise in Germany, to challenge the National Socialist authority, in the name of conscience and truth. I have not been able to discover what the Nazi idealists expect to happen when that day comes. Perhaps it has come already. Does not the blood of Germany's new martyrs of freedom already cry to us from the ground? "One lesson that the Western nations teach the world in flaming letters, is that violence is not the way to peace and happiness," says Mr. Gandhi in one of his latest pronouncements. A generation that has witnessed the world war, and

that is still being forcibly fed on the bitter fruits of victory, ought to have learnt this truth. Germans, if any people, ought to realise it most of all. Unhappily, just because the Allies forced them into moral isolation, it has been possible for them to believe that they alone are victims of the unjust peace, and that the cause of all their misery was the Allied victory, the Treaty of Versailles, the burden of reparations. Most Germans could not see that the victors were suffering almost as acutely as the vanquished, that justice can come, not by turning the tables on the victors, but by a complete change of outlook on international affairs. Stresemann and others, indeed, did see it, and it is only fair to recognise that even to-day the official German demand is for equality, for the disarmament of the other powers ; it is not a demand for a new German predominance. It is largely because the victorious Powers have proved by their acts that they still believe in force that the Germans have been driven back to force as the only thing that counts in this world. To them it seems that all the Geneva talk of world federation, perpetual peace, international co-operation, is nauseating cant. Actions still speak louder than words. While the victorious governments have spoken of preparing for "Peace, peace," they have gone on preparing for "War, war." I could hardly wonder when a German in a brown shirt uniform, a silent man, of modest demeanour, quietly interjected into a discussion on religion and politics : "If Jesus Christ came to earth again to-day, he would be crucified at Geneva in the name of humanity." No doubt he would also be ejected from Germany on racial grounds. But *tu quoque* retorts do not help the situation.

I do not believe National Socialist Germany can do anything to redeem Europe until its leaders have learnt the necessity of true toleration, that "The nobler a soul is, the more objects of compassion it hath," and that "free minds make brave men." But it is likely that Britain and other countries may follow the road to dictatorship unless they can learn some of the lessons Germany is plainly teaching. First, we must learn to unite with our fellow-citizens of other classes, parties, faiths and races, in actual work for the common good ; such activities as Pierre Ceresole's international "*Service Civile*" indicate possible lines of advance. That is the true work camp, where world brotherhood takes root in the soil, and where freedom and discipline have kissed each other.

Then, in our representative institutions, the unreality of party conflict must be replaced by a conviction of the good faith of our political opponents, so that the maximum of effective co-operation can be achieved in tackling the urgent problems of the moment ; the Quaker method of " finding the sense of the whole meeting," instead of deciding by vote, might be commended to parliamentary assemblies. And again, if we want to escape from the international anarchy, we must be ready to subordinate national prestige and self-interest, whether in imperialist policy, or in armaments, or in other respects, to international welfare ; resurgent nationalism in Germany or elsewhere cannot be successfully fought by reasserting unjust treaties, but only by honest and whole-hearted internationalism. Liberty and toleration are vital principles ; but they are not enough. The youth of the nations to-day is ready to respond to a reasoned call to build a new world on the ruins of the old ; but they will not respond until they see that those who issue the call are themselves disciplined for the work : not ambitious to dominate others, but humble-minded experimenters with truth.

HORACE G. ALEXANDER.

WAR AND PEACE.

WAR is for the sake of peace. But what is peace for ? In practice it seems to be chiefly an opportunity for each man and each " interest " to pursue a separate gain, while the State holds the ring for the general scramble. And even in theory, men are supposed to serve their country in war ; but it is assumed that in peace each ought to look after his own advantage and that the common good will be the result, if no one works for it. But if that is the contrast between war and peace, enthusiasm and youthful ardour naturally support war. The suffering and destruction of war seem to be more than excused by the devoted service of a common good. And peace fails to attract, because it is mean.

The evils of war are admitted even by those who believe that heroism and self-sacrifice flourish nowhere more splendidly than on a battlefield. Pain and untimely death, panic fear, madness and the moral degradation of some men and women—even self-seeking and mean trickery—can be found in war : but war is still possible and the preparation for war continues among honest and intelligent men because they believe it to be the pursuit of a common good, in a fellowship more intimate and more inclusive than any outside the comradeship of arms. At the worst, war is regarded as a regrettable necessity : and the trained soldier is often less warlike than the half-educated civilian, because he knows how evil war is. There may be some who have an appetite for inflicting pain, either on others or on themselves : there may be hidden depths of atavism and abnormality even in the civilised. But war is not due to these abnormalities. It is an institution maintained chiefly because of the real good found in it ; and the advocates of peace miss their mark if they attempt to prevent war by dwelling on its horrors and its futility.

The idealism of service, traditionally associated with war, is misused by politicians who are reckless in the pursuit of power for themselves and by traders in armaments who make " patriotism " pay. But war would not occur at all if there were not stores of idealism to be so misused. In our day war is not supposed to be waged for glory or loot, as it was under Alexander and Cæsar ; and even the other great brigand of history, Napoleon, had to cover with the phrases of national

liberty the barbarism of "glory." But now war and the preparation for war are supposed to aim only at "defence." All armed forces are entirely harmless, unless attacked! And they cannot be attacked except by other armed forces, equally harmless except for defence! This form of mythology had its source in the historical fact that civilisation has spread from several centres. For each centre, the area outside, beyond the reach of its influence, was once a barbarism. The adventurous pushed out into this area "outside the law," extended the boundaries of civilisation and defended the sown lands from the desert and the wild. But after thousands of years, during which only a few ever crossed the areas of barbarism left unsubdued, between the centres of civilisation, each centre has now in fact pushed its borders outward until they meet the frontiers of other sown lands: and what is outside each frontier is not barbarism "outside the law," but only another type of law and civilisation.

But the imagination is slow. Language and the traditional fairy-stories, called "history," preserve the old attitude. The majority in every country still believe that "we" are civilised and "the rest" are dangerous barbarians. Every civilised nation, whose composite culture disproves the very hypothesis upon which the mythology of war is based, is still prepared at any moment to slip backward into the past enshrined in the imagination. In fact, all centres of civilised life now form parts of one system; but in imagination, at crises or when half-educated enthusiasts seize power, each State is struggling for the only civilisation that exists, against barbarians who are capable of any atrocities. The excuse for preparing for future war is that regression to primitive attitudes is always possible; and this regression does in fact support the primitive virtues, because "defence," the modern excuse for the old habits, is not for the sake of rich or poor, strong or weak, but for one community formed of all these—for a common good traditionally understood and deeply felt by simple and honest men. And therefore the elimination of war, like the dissolving of a pathological "complex" by psycho-analysis, requires not merely an exposure of the current mythology but also the provision of another satisfaction for the tendency to serve a common good which has so far had its chief outlet in war. War at any rate has emotional colour.

This is so obvious that two different appeals are now made by the advocates of peace, which seem to promise an escape from the evils of war by accepting its mythology in a revised form. One appeal is made in favour of a "Class War"; the other in favour of a "League War." In both cases all the old myths remain—the outer barbarians against "us" the virtuous, the non-aggressive struggle only for defence against aggressors, the regrettable necessity. Some therefore say that they will not fight in the existing war system, but only in a "Class" war; and it is a great advantage to them if one armed nation can be identified with a Class. The obverse of the same gospel is the fight of one "chosen" nation against Bolshevism. But this is only an appeal for civil war. Victory, not peace, is the end envisaged. The slaughter, destruction and fraud in all war are here excused as necessary for the sake of "the toiling masses" or for the defence of "*kultur*" in the German or the Italian version, against a barbarian rising. But the emotional appeal of the word "war" and the mythology connected with it can be used on either side.

Others say that peace involves being prepared to fight in a "League War." This is a new form of "the war to end war." It preserves the mythology of the "just" war, with the addition of a ready reckoner for discovering justice in the form of a treaty. The advocates of bombing and starvation blockades, in the name of the League, say that "aggressive" nations do not understand anything but force; but this sounds like the argument of some colonial planters, incompetent in any language, that "niggers understand only blows." The alternative to "League War," say its advocates, is international anarchy, as the alternative to "Class War" is said by the advocates of that method to be chaos of one sort or another. The primitive loyalties and the appetite for risks can indeed be mobilised, not for national war, but for "international" war, as Pierre Dubois in the fourteenth century argued for peace in Europe by advocating a crusade against outsiders. But it is war, all the same. In practical politics there never is only one way out of a difficulty; but other policies than a League war may require more imagination and greater administrative and diplomatic skill than is now devoted to peace. It is quite possible to establish methods for the revision of treaties, for the continuous consultation, about issues threatening to peace, between those who are not

directly concerned, and for rapid social amelioration ; but to assume that such policies are not practical alternatives to war, national or international, is to accept the old false identification of peace either with inertia or with a general scramble for gain.

It is impossible here to repeat the whole argument of T. H. Green, in his *Lectures on Political Obligation*, to the effect that the State is not characterised by the force at its command, but by the moral authority of the will for peace which it embodies and that, therefore, war between States is a violation of the very nature of the State. But many advocates of the League War seem to accept unconsciously the earlier theories of Hobbes and Hegel : they really believe that force is the distinguishing mark of government and, therefore, propose to confer that distinction upon the League before providing it with that universally recognised moral authority which alone can justify the use of force. They confuse a " police " force, which never assumes its possible opponents to be other police forces, with an army, which is always organised against other armies standing for other moral rights. But the fundamental fact is the survival, even among the advocates of peace, of the attractiveness of service of a common good in war.

Peace, on the other hand, is emotionally and intellectually ineffectual. It suffers from certain historical associations of the word. St. Augustine, for example, in his *City of God*, asserts vigorously that all war, even civil war, is for the sake of peace. But in his attempt to describe peace he confuses it with victory, that is to say " the peace that suits us," which is not peace at all ; and he is obsessed by a belief in an " eternal peace," conceived as rest after toil in a complete inertia. But his effort shows the difficulty of conceiving real peace in his day, in the general collapse of the Roman system of government. That system collapsed largely because it had been built upon the loyalties of service in war and could find no alternative loyalty when war became less attractive. When all the outer barbarians were subdued or driven to a distance, it became impossible for the Roman authorities in the third century to raise troops among their best citizens for war service ; and there was no alternative basis for service of a common good. The social bonds were loose, long before barbarian raids shook the whole structure into ruins. Indeed, all

through history peace has been treated as a mere opportunity for the pursuit of private happiness. That is the dominant attitude still; and an obsolete theory of democracy, as a mere balance of power between conflicting interests, confirms this attitude. Again, as between nations, peace is treated as an opportunity for each to "capture" trade or to acquire as much wealth as it can, while each Government acts as agent for "national interests" against other Governments even within the League.

Now once again we face the possibility of Dark Ages such as followed the collapse of the Roman war system. We have reached peace and can do nothing with it. War is now generally regarded as barbarous and futile; but to hate and despise war will not save us from it, unless we can establish another basis for civic patriotism—for loyalty in the service of a common good. Failing that, the more civilised may indeed refuse to serve in war, as happened in the third and fourth centuries of our era; but the necessities of the situation, left fundamentally unchanged, will be supplied by simpler and more barbaric types. And the new barbarians, with the noblest faith in themselves as instruments of virtue against decadence, will destroy once again the poor beginnings of civilised life which we have built up since the last great collapse. The world will go back into Dark Ages, to struggle again upwards, perhaps after some centuries, into a new Middle Ages; from which again the same collapse will follow the same incompetence to make peace anything worth having.

Indeed, it would be better to cease advocating peace and to advocate instead that civilised life for which peace is the necessary condition. No one advocates war, except as a means. The alternative, peace, is also a means. But only an end can move men deeply. Peace, therefore, must be made to be, and to be deeply felt to be, an opportunity for action, not an interval nor an eternity of "rest." Such action, as William James argued in his *Moral Equivalent of War*, must be difficult, strenuous and even hazardous. The younger generation in every age for the most part desires not ease of days, but difficulties and dangers to be overcome. For example, when life in the monasteries of the Dark Ages was hard and poverty-stricken, there was no lack of novices: but when monastic life became easy, then it was difficult to find recruits for it. The cynic and the sensualist misrepresent the

facts of history. Indeed, men would not be so easily gullible as they are if they were not generously idealistic. The danger of civilisation does not arise from the difficulty of maintaining it, but from its seeming security at certain times.

But James did not go far enough in his argument. There is no intrinsic value in compulsory work in coal-pits, for example. Not even the most idealistic of men desire compulsory or dangerous work for its own sake. It is the end that matters. Experience shows to the youngest of us that all noble and great things are hard to reach ; and effort is desired as a sign of a noble purpose. Therefore, peace must mean not merely hard service, but service of some purpose that will invigorate the mind and the muscles serving. Success in getting wealth and power may be enough for some. The nature of things, however, decides that only a few in any case can have such success ; and the admiration of the rest for those who have used their abilities for leaving others in the lurch, is not what it was in the age of economic faith, a century or only fifty years ago. Here and there a successful buccaneer of " business " whistles to keep his courage up, in the Press or at shareholders' meetings ; but he is beginning to feel that he is out in the cold. A general scramble for scraps is not good enough to excuse even the sort of peace for the sake of which warriors say that they wage war.

The purpose of peace must be a common good shared by all, as the end of war, called " defence " or " security " or even " victory," is supposed to be shared by all. This does not imply what is usually called " altruism." It is not that " I " work for " others " : but each works for a life that is in him as well as in others—the shared experience of effort, creative work and enjoyment. Our psychologists examine the remnants of the past in us and not the promises of the future ; but within the Nobodies who make the world there are, besides tendencies to relapse into barbarism, also impulses to civilised intercourse at levels higher than any so far reached. For that intercourse peace is essential ; but peace is itself only the bare opportunity for preparing something other than war—only the opening of a road never yet travelled and perhaps not yet built.

It is not necessary, however, to reorganise the whole of any community in order to lay the foundations of a common service in peace. Changed institutions do indeed change

attitudes ; but changed attitudes can also transform even ancient institutions. And at present the dominant attitude in civilised countries, almost as much as any obsolete institution, makes war likely ; for the attitude of the most influential persons even in the Churches to-day still implies admiration for a warrior's rather than any other virtues. In plain terms, it is assumed that a soldier serving in war deserves honour. He is a "hero" : he works not for gain, but for a community which, if he dies in service, he may never see. But the same person, leaving the armed forces and becoming a railwayman, a grocer or a business man, is assumed by himself and others to be seeking only his own gain. He is so far from being a "hero" that he is a danger to any other person who does not keep his eyes open for smart dealing. Women as war nurses or munition workers gain prestige enough to be awarded a vote ! But the same women, as textile workers or wives in poor homes, are regarded as predatory hussies or helps to "some good man" on the make. Again, our public ceremonies rightly honour the armed forces. But if the Churches bless arms, why do they not bless hammers and spades ? The flags of old battles are hung in chancels ; but there are no signs of the services of peace. The mental attitude expressed in our dominant habits is natural to that primitive imagination which was described above. We are still in the nursery of civilisation, "playing soldiers" !

The alternative attitude, by which the services of peace could be established, would give honour to all work by which civilisation is secured. Such work would be honoured as service of a common good ; and it would be only a secondary consideration that the worker "gets a living" by it. The railwayman, the clerk, the textile worker and the typist would feel the "honour" in their work as part of a larger life ; and each would pay honour to the other because, however seemingly unimportant, he holds his place in the line. The Spiritual Power, in the Churches, the Universities and the schools, would create the common life, raising it always to some higher level of shared work and intercourse ; and they would express the honour paid to the services of peace in their ceremonies. The Government in the State might even, in time, shake off its inheritance of armed force directed against other States, which it owes to ages before there was a State. It would be worth while to live in such a peace !

But such a peace can begin here and now, in the changed attitudes of Nobodies. These Nobodies have little enough influence upon the platform politicians who use "peace" as a meaningless flourish in a peroration. Even dictators love "peace," when they have suppressed their critics, especially if they cannot pay enough at the moment to the armament traders in order to obtain the only possible means they know how to use, for impressing opponents with their mission from on high. But real peace is based, deep down, in the normal habits and standards of Nobodies. The problem is one of the imagination. The first effort must dismiss from the mind the ancient fears of "demons," called foreigners, and the still more dangerous myth that we are at the end of civilisation and culture. We are still only very little higher than the pre-mediæval civilisation in Europe; and some of our prophets of doom assert that we can reach no higher but must now "decay," as that civilisation did. But this is to make a theory of civilisation out of the first efforts of barbarians. The way upward is still untried: from the level we have reached we can move higher, if the motive force is an operative desire for a common good less primitive than war can be imagined to secure. That common good must be felt in the work we do.

There is a place for such a desire, not only in the daily work of common folk, but also in public policy, if anyone in power politically could give as much attention and skill to the making of peace as General Staffs in all countries give to the preparation for war. Making peace is a whole-time job. It is quite impossible to pay spies in foreign countries, to "do in" foreign traders, to obstruct intercourse across frontiers and at the same time to make peace. It is futile to promise to use one's forces for a common good in a crisis, if we cannot work for a common good in normal times. Peace depends upon what other nations think of each nation; and others always judge by deeds, not words. But perhaps even our "leaders" will come in time to recognise that to postpone the facing of an issue is not the best way of avoiding the danger it may involve. Peace, for example, in Manchuria was lost, not in 1931 or 1932 among the futilities of our representatives on the League Council, but much earlier in the complacent promotion of the armaments trade by all the chief members of the League and one other Great Power. It was lost by the

irresponsible ignorance, among the "Powers that Be," of the sufferings of poor peasants in Japan as well as in China. And peace now is jeopardised much more truly by the indecision of our "leaders" as to which way to lead than by wicked "aggressors" of one sort or another.

But if it be true that nations do not work for a common good above their conflicting interests, who has ever tried to state and to preach that common good even in his own nation? Every politician in power and every dictator trembles in his shoes lest he should be mistaken for a civilised man rather than a barbarian dancing to the good old tune. There is no dominant and enthusiastic conception of the uses of peace. That is why, although we make war with increasing skill, we cannot yet make peace.

C. DELISLE BURNS. |

national socialism movement

THE ROMANTIC BACKGROUND OF HITLERISM.

"*The World must be Romanticised.*"—(NOVALIS.)

THE re-awakening of the German national consciousness of which the present régime is the logical and direct consequence is due in no small measure to the pre-occupation of post-war Germany with Romanticism. As the most typically German of all literary movements, its revival was the natural reaction to the spirit of internationalism and pacifism fostered by the lost war and represented by the extravagant claims of the Jewish authors of Expressionism to turn literature into socialist and pacifist propaganda. It was history repeating itself, for one hundred years ago the German Romanticists with Wackenroder, Novalis and the brothers Schlegel at their head had similarly turned against the foreign elements in German culture represented by certain aspects of the European movement of Rationalism or Enlightenment. They denounced the "*Aufklärung*" for its blind worship of reason and thought, for its democratic and demagogic tendencies in politics, for its pedantry and artificiality in art, and its dependence on foreign norms in life and manners. Romanticism was a plea for the claims of imagination, of emotion and feeling, of individualism, and above all for a synthetic expression of the national genius in its manifold aspects of literature and art, of religion and philosophy. Its purpose was to create in Friedrich Schlegel's famous words: "*eine progressive Universalpoesie*," which should express all the manifestations of the human spirit, convinced as he was that "man's highest aim was to comprehend the spirit of the Whole." Its counterpart in modern German criticism is the insistence on the philosophic values in literature, represented by the popular term: "*Geisteswissenschaft*," or the "humanities."

In the emphasis on the national aspects of its literature modern Germany has turned away from the great European movement of humanitarian culture of which first Lessing, and then Goethe, were the supreme representatives in Germany. Lessing may have been in Macaulay's phrase "the first critic in Europe," but he was also the friend of the Jewish philosopher Mendelssohn, the champion of religious tolerance and,

as the child of the cosmopolitan eighteenth century, had no use for such "heroic weaknesses" as patriotism. Goethe was also too good a European to be a good German. He was fascinated by the demoniac personality of Napoleon and could not bring himself to hate the invading French "because of their great civilisation." It must be obvious that, in spite of the lip service paid to his memory during last year's centenary, Goethe can mean little or nothing to modern Germany. His humanitarianism and internationalism, his Hellenism can have no appeal to German youth hostile as it is to classical culture, and impatient of the worship of beauty. Its spiritual leader is rather Hölderlin, the singer of "German Youth," and the champion of a national Fatherland. His was the Romantic conception of the Greeks as a national community founded on a common tradition and belief, the cult of ancient gods and heroes, and the cultivation of national games and festivals. It was an ideal with which he longed to infuse his own beloved Germany which should then become "the heart of the nations and the soul of the world." To-day it is Stefan George who is the seer and the teacher, not, indeed, the George of the *Blätter für die Kunst*, who preached the beauty and harmony of form, and whose Hellenism was as remote as Goethe's from the aspirations of his contemporaries; not the George receptive of cosmopolitan influences, but the later George of *Das neue Reich* in which, under the stress of war, the poet turned from the apartness from life which characterised his early work to the realities and problems besetting his people in their need. The message he proclaims in *Das neue Reich* is very close to Hölderlin's: Germany, as the heart of Europe, if it will but draw on the treasures of its glorious past, may yet point the way to the salvation of the world:

Er (der Sänger) holt aus Büchern
Der Ahnen die Verheissung, die nicht trügt:
Dass die erkoren sind zum höchsten Ziel,
Zuerst durch tiefe Öden ziehn, dass einst
Des Erdteils Herz die Welt erretten soll.*

"*Aus Büchern der Ahnen*," from the books of our ancestors. Here we have from the poet whom the movement has adopted

* From the book of our ancestors the bard derives the promise which cannot lie, that those are chosen for the highest goal, who first pass through the depths of the wilderness in order that the heart of the Continent may one day save the World.

as its leader the clearest indication of the sources that inspire it. In the year 1799 was written a little book, scarcely more than a pamphlet, *Die Christenheit oder Europa*, which was destined to have the most important consequences for both the religious and political life of Europe during the whole of the nineteenth century, and whose influence is with us yet. Friedrich von Hardenberg, or Novalis, as he is better known since Carlyle introduced him to us just over one hundred years ago, was the real begetter of Romanticism. He was already making a name for himself in Romantic circles as the author of "*Spiritual Songs*," and of a poetical novel, *Heinrich von Ofterdingen*. Like Herder before him, he had gone back to the Middle Ages in reaction to the glorification of the present. In this pamphlet he definitely opposes the Ages of Faith to the Age of Reason, he lauds their political unity in face of the prevailing discord. He decries the Reformation for its break with the past, and as the forerunner of the French Revolution which, for Novalis, was the "distant but logical conclusion of Protestantism."

This antipathy to the principles of 1789 found a ready ear among his Romantic friends. A. W. Schlegel had, unlike most of his fellow-poets, been inimical to the Revolution from the first. He was confirmed in his opinions by Burke's *Reflections on the Revolution in France* (first translated into German in 1791) in which the "extravagant and presumptuous speculations" of the French Jacobins are castigated as inconsistent with an ordered society. The chief civic virtues are for Burke "the spirit of a gentleman and the spirit of religion," religion, in particular, being "the basis of civil society." The state is, in the last instance, a moral community, and by virtue of its social continuity was independent of each succeeding generation. "It is a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born." And again: "People will not look forward to posterity, who never look backward to their ancestors." Before Novalis, Burke maintained the connection between Reformation, Rationalism and Revolution, and he had sung the praises of the Middle Ages. But though he repeated the Tory slogan of "Church and State," he had no wish to see the supremacy of the former, and would have had no sympathy with Novalis in his championship of the papacy or the Catholic religion.

Novalis became acquainted with Burke's *Reflections* early in 1794, and its influence on him and his fellow Romanticists can scarcely be exaggerated. It was for them "a supremely revolutionary book against the Revolution," and its force is borne out by the constant references to it, or even literal borrowings from it, in the works of all the later political theorists of the movement. Friedrich Schlegel characteristically emphasised the religious arguments of Novalis and Burke, and would have turned the state into an ideal theocracy. He ended by accepting both the organic feudalised political system of the Middle Ages, and the social unity represented by the hierarchy of the Catholic Church. He was convinced of the spiritual mission of Germany "to shed the light of religion over other countries." He had, meanwhile, come under the influence of the French theorists Bonald and de Maistre. But to the last Friedrich Schlegel insisted on three fundamental ideas which go back to the essay of Novalis: the conception of the state "as an organic and individual whole," the combination of monarchical and republican principles which he found incorporated in the constitution of the medieval empire, and the necessity of the intimate connection of church and state.

The feudal system of the Middle Ages as advocated by Novalis and Friedrich Schlegel with its sharp distinctions of class, was also the political ideal of the romantic philosopher Adam Müller, as expressed in his *Elemente der Staatskunst*. The state does not consist of an aggregate of masses or a "bundle of egoists," but is an organic community made up of "guilds, corporations, communes, families, cities, which form its living members." They alone are worthy of political representation, and not the individual by any virtue of citizen suffrage. The state is, as it was for Novalis, a marriage between the middle classes and the nobility, each with their own duties and privileges. Freedom consists, not in independence, but in the fullest development of the individual according to his nature, within the framework of a community of citizens mutually interdependent, and so restricted in their several spheres. "Inequality is the fundamental reality of all politics." At the head is a king as the symbol of the spirit of national unity, and as the representative of all past and future generations, and to him his people are bound by ties of love and devotion. All these speculations culminate

in the doctrine of nationality: "that divine harmony, reciprocity and interdependence between private and public interests."

As a consequence of this identity of interests it follows that capitalism and industry are harmful as destructive of individuality. The dispersion of human efforts in the factory is "a sinful division of labour," for a man's joy is the product of his work rather than its reward. Similarly the profits of the employer must be strictly limited, or it will lead to the accumulation of wealth in a few private hands and this, again, is detrimental to the authority of the state. "The exclusive striving for material gain at the expense of human personality is shameful." Hence the hostility to the Jews, whose interests as the representatives of international finance must be, if not opposed, at least indifferent, to those of the common weal. Burke had already expressed similar views of "these usurers, the Jews." They were developed by later Romanticists like Achim von Arnim, who held the Jews responsible for the industrialisation and commercialisation of trade.

The other Romanticists Gentz, Görres, Baader, Eichendorff, Steffens merely develop the political theories of Novalis or Adam Müller: all are united in their loathing of Western democracy, "this English sickness," as Friedrich Schlegel mocks; all are in favour of the organic community as opposed to the individualistic mechanised state of "Rationalism." A political constitution is something that has grown as the individual expression of a definite people. It is a living product of history, not an artificial scheme of universal application. It must be based on the co-ordination and subordination of all classes. "*Volksgemeinschaft*," or community, of the people, and the "*Ständestaat*," or corporative state, were the political ideals of Romanticists, as they are those of present-day Germany. National socialism is nothing more nor less than Romantic socialism.

The notion of "*Das dritte Reich*," with which so much play is made in Germany to-day, is similarly the invention of these same Romanticists, the development of Lessing's prophetic announcement of "the third kingdom." The idea proved particularly attractive to Fichte and Schleiermacher in their *Addresses*, and to Novalis in the *Europa* essay. Friedrich Schlegel, too, was filled with enthusiasm for the golden age which the Romanticists placed, not like the Classicists in the

past, but in the future: "*Es wird das neue Evangelium kommen,*" wrote Friedrich Schlegel:

Es wird das neue Evangelium kommen!
So sagte Lessing, doch die blöde Rotte
Gewahrte nicht der aufgeschloss'n Pforte.
Und dennoch, was der Teure vorgenommen,
Im Denken, Forschen, Streiten, Ernst und Spotte,
Ist nicht so teuer wie die wen'gen Worte.*

It was again the later Romanticists Arnim and Adam Müller who gave the idea its national, political modern twist: "The great federation of European peoples shall come some day, as I live," wrote Adam Müller in 1809, "and it will fly the German colours; for all that is great, fundamental and eternal in every European institution is German."

In the above-mentioned essay *Die Christenheit oder Europa* Novalis had advocated the foundation of a new church based on the coalescence of Catholicism and Protestantism. Friedrich Schlegel once more improved on his friend's idea and, with his usual enthusiasm, set himself to create an entirely new religion, based on Christianity, it is true, but in which dogmas and traditions were to have the force of a mythology. He determined to write a new Bible and incorporate in it the spirit of the Eleusinian mysteries, Oriental philosophy, Schelling's "*Naturphilosophie*," Jakob Böhme, Romantic poetry, physics and mathematics, an idea which is not more grotesque than its modern counterpart of re-writing the Bible without the Jews! This Romantic mythology was destined to have a more fruitful influence in turning the Germans back to those rich sources of legend and myth in their own past. It resulted in the great collection of *Chap Books* of Göres, the *Fairy Tales* of the brothers Grimm, and the splendid poetry of the *Wunderhorn* of Arnim and Brentano. But the revival of the *Edda* gave a consciously Nordic twist to the movement, which found its culmination in the Romantic belief that the elaborate mythology of Scandinavia could be assumed for the whole of primitive Germany. This fiction was crystallised in the deliberate attempt of Richard Wagner to combine the myths and legends of the Germanic nations into a great

* "There shall come the new gospel," thus Lessing spake, yet the foolish rabble heeded not the opened gate. And yet whate'er the dear one hath undertaken in thought or search, in strife or earnestness or mockery, was not so precious as these few words.

synthesis of religious tradition, which should vie with the mythology of the Greeks. And his friend Nietzsche lent his aid in this glorification of myth as against history, when he developed the consciousness of Germanic race superiority. Into his vision of the "blonde beast lustful of booty and victory," there has entered in distorted form a measure of Carlyle's "hero" and of Emerson's "representative man."

Nietzsche, like his Romantic predecessors, had declared that men were fundamentally unequal; that equality must come, not by levelling downwards, but by raising them gradually to the heights of the superman. It is this idea which is present in the modern call for leadership: Hitler is "*der Führer*," the leader, the *duce*, the "*Volkskönig*," or to give him his Germanic appellation: the "*druhtin*," the Old German word signifying the relationship of the leader to his loyal thanes or *druht* or "*Gefolgschaft*." It is founded on unswerving loyalty and implicit obedience, on the belief that man is master of his fate, and on the pagan glorification of heroic death on the battlefield against unequal odds.

Such are some of the beliefs of Germany's Romantic past which help to explain the present. To our older, more stable, Western civilisation the mental attitude of modern Germany may savour of arrogance, of megalomania and aggressiveness. To the Germans it is an article of faith, a religious conviction, a spiritual awakening, a return to ideal values after the materialism of the post-war years. The Germans claim to have laid the ghost of Bolshevism which was threatening Europe—they like to think of the "glorious revolution" of April as a second, spiritual Tannenberg against the encroaching Russian enemy. They expect recognition and gratitude, and are frankly amazed at the hostile attitude of the West in the face of their achievements. Their claim is no longer for equality in the comity of nations, but for leadership, a belief deliberately fostered, as we have seen, by a century-old intellectual and spiritual propaganda, and enshrined in some of their noblest poetry. "Our call it is to civilise the earth," Novalis had cried, and the proclamations of their present leaders are not couched in humbler language: "It is our task to be the watchmen upon the threshold of values," are the last words of Moeller van der Bruck's *Das dritte Reich*, and similar pronouncements may be read in every political speech. It is a claim to which neither France nor England can ever

subscribe. The most precious legacy from the Middle Ages, the conception of chivalry, was the invention of the brilliant courtly society of Southern France, and its traditions have lingered longest in England. To the ideal of the "noble savage" (a Romantic fiction of Rousseau) we would oppose that of the "gentleman" who, while taking for granted the pagan values of bravery and loyalty, of fearless endurance of fate, has learned to consider as even greater, if only because they are so much harder to practise, the Christian virtues of charity and humility, of gentleness and tolerance, who rejects force as an answer to conviction, and abhors brutality and cruelty as the basest and most savage of human passions.

L. A. WILLOUGHBY.

2 Pol. + Govt.

IRELAND IN 1933: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT.

THE last few months have seen the attainment of another stage in the political evolution of the Irish Free State. When that State was established by the Treaty of 1921 it had as its first task the suppression of a rebellion. This it is that has chiefly decided the course of Irish politics in the succeeding years. I remember Major William Redmond saying to me, very shortly before his death at Messines, that there would be no peace in Ireland until every protagonist in the old fight for Home Rule should have passed away. That consummation has now nearly been reached ; for all the old chiefs are gone, and of the rank and file three only (Mr. Devlin, Sir Thomas Esmonde and the present Lord Mayor of Dublin) are left in public life. Yet the end of strife seems no nearer ; since far more bitter memories of mutual injury stand between the political opponents of to-day than then divided Irish nationalists from Irish unionists. Time has not healed but inflamed the wounds of the Civil War. Nevertheless, there has gone on in other quarters a silent process of appeasement.

Until the other day the Dáil contained, in addition to the two main parties which derived from the Sinn Féin split of 1921-22, a number of separate groups—Labour, Farmer, National League, Independent. Many people have regarded these as the undesired and undesirable offspring of Proportional Representation. It would be far truer to say that they sprang from historical and legitimate variations in Irish thought and sentiment. The special interests of Labour and Agriculture call for no explanation. But there were other sections of the Irish nation which, while loyally accepting the *fait accompli*, were not altogether happy under the new régime. First, and most obviously, there were the Southern Unionists, of whom it would be difficult to determine whether they were men more resentful of their abandonment by Great Britain and by the Ulster Covenanters or apprehensive of ill-usage by those to whom the government of their country had been committed. Hardly more happy were the constitutional Nationalists, supporters for the most part of the old Parliamentary Party. The terms of the Treaty had, indeed, surpassed—save on the sore point of Partition—their highest

expectations. But in Ireland personalities count for even more than in other countries; and they had seen their leaders driven from public life and themselves ousted from local administration. It is not surprising if they were disposed to sulk in their tents, or if relations between Mr. Cosgrave and Captain Redmond, for several years their sole representatives in the Dáil, were far from friendly. Captain Redmond's onslaught upon Cumann na nGaedheal at the first General Election of 1927 and subsequent effort to oust Mr. Cosgrave in favour of Mr. De Valera (though at the last moment defeated by the defection of one of his followers and by the abstention of another) certainly did nothing to heal the breach between the older and younger schools of Irish Nationalism.

Nevertheless, this year (1927) can now be seen to mark the beginning of a united front against republicanism. On the one hand, now that Mr. de Valera and his followers had entered the Dáil, the Government was faced by an Opposition more numerous and more widely assured of popular support than it had hitherto encountered. On the other, many of its former critics were becoming progressively reconciled to a Ministry which, if they did not altogether like some of its tendencies, had shown itself unmistakably desirous of holding the scales even between all classes and creeds. Thus the Farmers' group, while still claiming separate representation in Dáil and Senate, came to a working agreement with Cumann na nGaedheal. So, too, a majority of ex-Unionists, in and out of Parliament, have ever since 1927 given steady support to Mr. Cosgrave's party; one of the ablest of their representatives, the late Major Bryan Cooper, actually exchanging his status as an Independent deputy for that of a pledged member of Cumann na nGaedheal. A year or two later Captain Redmond took a similar step, and on his death the ancient borough of Waterford, the only constituency south of the Boyne to hold out against Sinn Féin in 1918, showed its approval of what he had done by electing his young widow in the same interest. Even so, however, the gap between constitutional Nationalism and the right wing of Sinn Féin had been but partially closed; and in 1931 the effort of Mr. MacDermot and Mr. Dillon to create a new Centre Party (much on the lines of Captain Redmond's National League) threatened not only to re-open the breach,

but to revive a separatist policy among the larger farmers. It has needed the bitter experience of the past two years to teach all three sections the necessity of closing their ranks. Negotiations to that end were, it will be remembered, cut short by the sudden dissolution last January. They have now borne fruit in the new party of United Ireland (or Fine Gael) with General O'Duffy as organising chief and with Mr. Cosgrave, seconded by Mr. MacDermot, as its Parliamentary leader.

This brief retrospect I have thought useful, because of the tendency observable in some English newspapers to treat what has happened as merely a re-shuffling of cards between politicians eager to obtain or recover office ; whereas, as I have tried to show, it is something much more honourable and significant : the last stage in a ten-years' progress towards the consolidation of all those forces which stand for maintenance of the Treaty and good fellowship between Ireland, Great Britain and the Commonwealth. To turn now to the future. In the present Dáil, beyond the tactical advantage of a united command, no change is to be looked for. There Mr. de Valera's majority remains intact and even strengthened by closer alliance with Labour. But in the constituencies there is hope for those who, like myself, desire the ending of this silly and disastrous quarrel with Great Britain. If, during the past five or six years, the pro-Treaty groups have lost ground, it is because neither singly nor collectively were they able to gain the ear of the young. We all know how difficult it is, as we grow first middle-aged and then elderly, to realise that the little boys and girls whom—but yesterday, as it seems—we watched trotting to and from the elementary schools, are now grown men and women, with their names on the Parliamentary register. Still more difficult is it to realise that their outlook on the world of politics, whatever it may be, is certainly not that of our own generation or even that of the generation that has just followed ours. To us, conscious of many things with great risk and difficulty accomplished, of many more vainly attempted, time appears to rush past in a flood, threatening what we have so painfully achieved. But to them time seems to stand still. They neither fear nor know the hazards of the game ; no more than our former selves are they disposed to let well and ill alone.

Moreover in Ireland there is a factor which augments this inevitable dissonance between the generations. Even those who have now reached the not very great age of forty, though inured to war and revolution, can at least recollect a time when the words security and stability were not without meaning. But what of those—ere long to be a majority of our electors—who were born, say, between 1906 and 1914? Of what political events did they hear when they began to listen to the talk of the grown-ups? Of Ulster's determination to resist Home Rule in arms; of Ulster and National and Sinn Féin volunteers; of gun-running at Larne and Howth; of the Great War; of the Easter Rising; of the Black and Tans; of Civil War following hard on the Treaty of 1921. Little wonder is it that young people formed in such a school should be more than commonly impatient of the tedious processes of Parliamentary democracy or averse from appeals to reason and political common sense. Nor, it must be admitted, was the policy of Mr. Cosgrave's Government of a kind to appeal to the youthful imagination. When your mind is eager for adventure and your head stuffed with romantic stories, it is disappointing to be told that the war is all over and that your job is not to fight, but to till your father's farm or attend to some other of the humdrum duties of a citizen in a civilised state. Reduction of income-tax will not appeal to you, for you are not an income-tax payer; nor abolition of tea duty, however it may please your mother. In theory you will approve the blending of orange and green in the national flag; but you will at the same time lend a credulous ear to anyone who points to the reconciliation of ex-Unionists as proof that the Government is under the thumb of the "Freemasons," or to the good relations with Westminster as evidence that its members are tools of England. Moreover, even if you did not fall a victim to the blandishments of Fianna Fáil or to the threats of the I.R.A., you would find—or would have found until recently—that, except during the few days immediately preceding a Polling day, Cumann na nGaedheal had no special work for you to do, nothing, that is, particularly suited to your age. Henceforth it will not be so.

True: the fusion of Mr. Cosgrave's followers with the Centre Party and with General O'Duffy's "blue-shirts" neither implies nor portends any major change in policy,

though more stress may be laid on social and economic reconstruction, and though something may be done, as General O'Duffy and others desire, to set up some sort of vocational council, side by side with, perhaps partially superseding, our existing Parliamentary institutions. For good or evil, the idea of a state-planned economy is everywhere becoming fashionable; and the examples of Italy, Germany, Great Britain and, above all, of the United States of America, are being watched with interest in this country. For the rest, United Ireland, like Cumann na nGaedheal, stands steadfastly by the Treaty; for the sufficient reason that Ireland's own interests require it. "Ireland is more to us than Republic, Kingdom or Commonwealth" is the motto of the party, as set forth in its official organ. Only such as think forms more important than facts will cavil at this declaration. Quite apart from the implications of the Statute of Westminster, few people anywhere now either expect or desire that any portion of the Commonwealth shall be kept within it by other constraint than its own free will. Elsewhere loyalty to the Crown may suffice; but unhappily, for reasons rooted in remote and recent history, that traditional loyalty cannot, save among a small number of her people, be looked for in Ireland. The more courageously the leaders of United Ireland declare this principle, the more plainly they demonstrate to our people that our own liberty and prosperity are not merely compatible but indissolubly bound up with membership of the Commonwealth, the better it will be in the long run for all concerned.

Nor can Ulster, which yearly celebrates the shutting of the gates of Derry in the face of an anointed King, reasonably quarrel with a policy so closely resembling her own. It is true that Lord Craigavon, like Mr. de Valera, has banned the "blue-shirt" organisation. This action must surely have been based on misconception. To the Northern Government all Nationalists are suspect; and this Government may perhaps have supposed that General O'Duffy was preparing to head a movement for the forcible incorporation of the Six Counties in the Free State. But General O'Duffy has since been at pains to make it perfectly clear that he, like Mr. Cosgrave, looks upon the ending of Partition as only possible or desirable through such wise and prudent ordering of the Free State itself as shall some day convince the people of the

North East that it will be to their own advantage to throw in their lot with the rest of their fellow-countrymen.

It is, then, not in the Dáil but in the constituencies, not in policy but in organisation (to which General O'Duffy, being, perhaps fortunately, without a seat in Parliament, is giving all his time), that a notable change may be expected. For the first time since 1922 the young men and women are being invited to play a definite and special part in public life. And what they are asked to do is something more to their taste, as well as very much more dangerous, than listening to political orators or attending occasional meetings of political clubs. It should be remembered that the Army Comrades Association, the precursor of General O'Duffy's National Guard, was reorganised some two years ago by Dr. O'Higgins (brother to the murdered Minister for Justice) for the express purpose of insuring, if necessary by physical means, the right of free speech to members of the Opposition and of a free vote to members of the Electorate. Right well did the young men of the A.C.A. perform this honourable and perilous duty which they have now handed on to their successors. The wearing of a blue shirt is of itself (as has of late been often proved) enough to mark these out for concerted attack when proceeding on their most lawful and innocent occasions. For their very existence is a challenge to those republican and communist bodies which, until lately, were able to spread their doctrines almost without hindrance among the young people of the Free State.

One other thing it is necessary to say, lest the spirit of the organisation be misunderstood: In this Youth Movement, with its flags and uniforms, its insistence on sport and games and physical training for both sexes, we can of course see the influence of continental models. Yet it would be a mistake to think of it as merely an Irish counterpart of Fascism or Hitlerism. It is not from United Ireland or from any of its constituent sections that danger to personal or civic freedom is to be apprehended. It is the leaders of the I.R.A. and their associates who, now as always, pour contempt upon Parliamentary democracy, and who, by over-insistence upon the Gaelic element in the nation, threaten to bring about a racial conflict. Even if General O'Duffy's character did not itself reassure us, his close association with Mr. Cosgrave, who throughout his political career has stood for the plain people

against both casuist and gunman, is a sufficient answer to those who profess to see in the new movement an attempt to establish a dictatorship.

To sum up : In Ireland, as in other countries, the centre of interest has shifted from politics (as commonly understood) to economics. The suffrage has been extended to the utmost limit, unless children and certified lunatics are to be added to the register. Liberty, as nineteenth century reformers conceived it, has been achieved. But neither individual enfranchisement nor national self-government is seen to be enough. We must be prepared to solve new problems, and it may be that, to this end, some modification of our political institutions will be required. But I have no reason to think that such modification need be very considerable, or that there is any widespread desire for fundamental change in our constitution. The recent passage, practically unopposed in Dáil and Seanad, of the three Bills affecting the Governor-Generalship and Privy Council appeals does no more than bring the letter of the law into conformity with already established practice. The first task of United Ireland, when returned to power, will certainly be the conclusion of economic peace with Great Britain. The second and even more important (though without the first it cannot be achieved) is to rebuild the social and economic life of the Free State on stable foundations, so that those forces which make for the reunion of Ireland may again work unhindered. These two objects being attained, the problem of Ireland's relations with the Commonwealth will have solved itself; and this the more easily, since all those features of the Constitution of 1922 which seemed to deny (in word though never in fact) the right of Ireland to choose her own path will have disappeared. Even Mr. de Valera, with his mathematician's love of abstractions, and his quite singular contempt for work-a-day realities, might find it difficult to explain—he has never attempted it, so far as I know—just why a twenty-six county Republic is to be preferred to a reunited Ireland freely associated under the Crown with the other nations of the Commonwealth.

HUGH A. LAW.

THE SITUATION IN PALESTINE.

THE recent disturbances in Palestine have served to call attention again to the problems involved in the administration of the Mandate over that country. The unhappy memories associated with the Arab outbreak of 1929 were being gradually effaced by a steady and gratifying economic development in which all sections of the population have benefited, and hence this latest eruption was all the more astonishing and regrettable. It differed, however, from the outrages of four years ago in one important respect, for it was directed, not against the Jews, but against the Government itself, though the avowed reason for the demonstration was the extent of Jewish immigration and the sale of land to Jews. It is, therefore, desirable to examine whether there was any justification for this outburst of hostility, and also whether it may have any repercussion upon the general development of the country and particularly upon that of the Jewish National Home; for the policy adopted by the Government for some time after the previous riots was so contrary to the letter and spirit of the Mandate, and aroused such world-wide protests, that the question of its reaction to the latest display of Arab opposition is of no little importance.

The disturbances were not the outcome of a sudden ebullition of wrath on the part of the Arab people, but the result of an agitation systematically fostered in the Arab Press for several months past, and for which the "Istaqlal" or Independence Party was largely responsible. They were a violent expression of the feeling that had already been shown in a milder form during the visit of the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, to Palestine last spring, for the Arab leaders declined to meet him and absented themselves from all functions held in his honour. Unfortunately, no steps were taken by the Government to stem the growing agitation in the Press, which poisoned the minds of the credulous populace. The demonstration that was arranged to take place in Jerusalem on Friday, October 13th, was decided upon at a meeting of the Arab Executive on October 8th, at which only twenty-one out of the forty-eight members were present—a fact showing that the extremists are in the minority. The meeting resolved to call "a general strike on land, sea, and in air," and to hold a demonstration

through the streets in order to manifest its opposition to Government policy on the two questions of immigration and land sales. The Government announced that it would not permit any such parade, and published notices that any persons who took part in it would be subject to the law. Despite this warning the Arab leaders attempted to carry out their plan, with the result that the police had to intervene in order to disperse a mob of 2,000 people, and in the ensuing clash a number of policemen and civilians were injured. Had the Government immediately arrested and punished the Arab leaders who took part in the illegal assembly, as the warning which it had issued would have justified it in doing, there might have been no further trouble. But its forbearance acted only as a further incentive to the Arab leaders who, smarting under their failure in Jerusalem, met again on October 13th and decided to repeat their efforts on October 27th in Jaffa.

This subsequent demonstration, which was likewise prohibited by the authorities, was a far more serious affair, in which the police had to use their firearms to defend themselves against a mob that fought with stones, clubs, knives, and daggers; and the trouble was aggravated by similar disturbances breaking out, as though in sympathy, at Haifa and Nablus, as well as at Jerusalem again, where revolvers and home-made bombs were also used. Fortunately the police, British and Palestinian, were able to quell the riots without any military assistance, and the courage and discipline displayed by the Arab police were a welcome contrast to their conduct on similar occasions in the past. Only after the Jaffa riots did the authorities arrest some of the Arab leaders and imprison them at Acre, though they released them again pending their trial. In order to ensure the complete restoration of order the Government proclaimed the Palestine Defence Order in Council of 1931, which invested the High Commissioner with the powers of martial law. The troubles immediately died down and the "general strike," which was not at any time extensively observed, ceased on November 2nd, the anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, which passed off quietly. The Arab leaders who were responsible for the wanton exhibition of violence and the shedding of blood (the casualties including the deaths of twenty-four civilians and one policeman) will be put on trial

in due course, and the punishment meted out to them will, it may be expected, act as a deterrent to further demonstrations of a similar nature. That they were much more concerned about their waning political influence, which they wished to revive, than about the alleged adverse effects of Jewish settlement upon the Arab population will become clear enough from an enquiry into those effects. The motives underlying their policy are the same as those described by the Prime Minister when, after a visit to Palestine in 1922, he wrote in an article in the *CONTEMPORARY REVIEW* :*

The "Moslem-Christian" deputations that come to state the case against the Jews always, at some point, attack the British Government even more than the Jews. They rally the Arabs in their own sectional self-defence rather than in that of the Arab people or of Moslemism. The winds of Europe are blowing in upon them and they cannot stand the cutting blast. They see the coming shadow of a cultivator protected in his labour and property, they see the end of unjust exactions, they see their power vanishing, and they are fighting for their lives.

The immigration of Jews into Palestine is strictly controlled and regulated by the Government in accordance with the country's capacity to absorb new arrivals. Every six months the Administration decides how many Jews of the working class may be admitted during the ensuing half-year, whilst in addition to this so-called Labour Schedule persons with means, ranging from £250 in the case of a skilled craftsman to £1,000 in the case of a so-called "capitalist," besides persons whose maintenance is assured and dependents of permanent residents, may also be admitted. The Labour Schedule is decided upon after recommendations are submitted to the Government by the Jewish Agency (embodying the Zionist Executive), which, according to the Mandate, has the right "of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish National Home." The recommendations drawn up by the Jewish Agency are based upon a careful investigation of the opportunities of employment that will be available in Jewish agricultural and industrial undertakings during the next half-year, as well as of the Jewish share of prospective employment in public and municipal works, and

* *Contemporary Review*, April 1922.

they are supported in every case with detailed figures. But although the Administration is required by the Mandate to "facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions," it invariably grants a much smaller Schedule than that submitted by the Jewish Agency. The comparative figures during the last few years have been as follows :

	1929		1930		1931		1932		1933	
	Apr.	Oct.	Apr.	Oct.	Apr.	Oct.	Apr.	Oct.	Apr.	Oct.
Number of immigration certificates applied for	2,857	5,844	3,143	2,095	1,413	1,721	3,720	6,760	12,750	24,000
Number of certificates granted	2,400	2,300	950	1,480	500	350	2,000	4,500	5,500	5,500

Thus, during the last four years and a half, the number of Jewish immigrant workers admitted has always been less than the number for whom application has been made, the proportion approved having been even as low as 20 per cent. There is no ground, therefore, for the allegation made by some of the Arab leaders that Jewish immigration has been excessive. Heedless of the facts, they seem to have been responsible for the dissemination of fantastic stories about arrangements being made with a shipping company for the landing of many tens of thousands of Jews in Palestine within the next few months, and thus aroused the fears of their gullible followers.

As for the immigrants with means, who are outside the Labour Schedule, they cannot reasonably be said to have given ground for Arab complaints, seeing that they have brought capital with them for the improvement of the country, in which the Arabs are bound to benefit just as well as the Jews. An investigation that was carried out by the Jewish Agency into the means of 553 families (1,741 persons) who entered Palestine in 1926-32 showed that they possessed an aggregate capital of nearly £2,000,000, and it is interesting to add that they included 193 immigrants from the United States with a capital of £696,320, 146 from Poland with £372,210, and 57 from Russia with £108,910.* The money brought by these settlers, as well as by others of the same category, has been invested mainly in agricultural and indus-

* Report of the Zionist Executive to the 18th Zionist Congress at Prague, 1933, p. 262.

trial undertakings, and in building operations, and large sums have also been transferred to Palestine by Jews still living abroad. The total amount of Jewish capital invested in Palestine during 1932 is estimated at £3,252,000, of which 42 per cent. has been sunk in agriculture (mainly citrus plantations), 43 per cent. in building, and 15 per cent. in industry and handicrafts.* It is inevitable that a certain proportion of this money must have found its way into Arab pockets.

The oft-reiterated complaint that the incoming of Jews is ousting the Arabs is disposed of by the fact, revealed by the Government Census of 1931, that whilst the Jewish population, from the year 1922, increased from 83,794 to 175,006, the non-Jewish population rose from 673,388 to 860,148. Thus the increase of the non-Jewish population, who are predominantly Arabs, was twice as great as that of the Jewish population. It is, moreover, important to note that the increase in the Arab population was most marked in those districts where the greatest progress has been made in Jewish settlement. Thus, in three principal centres of Jewish development, Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa, the non-Jewish population has increased by 43, 61 and 85 per cent. respectively, whilst in districts unaffected by Jewish development, such as Nablus and Hebron, the non-Jewish population has increased only by 9 and 8 per cent. respectively, and in Gaza there has even been a decrease. Nor has recent Jewish immigration caused the removal of Arab labourers from the Jewish settlements in which they have been employed. In five Jewish settlements there are 551 orange groves employing 753 Jewish labourers and 1,505 Arab labourers, and in the same settlements there are 255 groves employing 602 Arab labourers, but no Jews.†

The Arab complaints about the sale of land to Jews have really less substance than those in regard to immigration, and played a much smaller part in the recent disturbances. For the land that is bought is acquired from Arab owners, and hence if the Arab Executive are anxious to diminish such sales the remedy is surely to bring influence to bear upon their own people and not to organise violent demonstrations in the streets. It is doubtful, however, whether some of the Arab leaders are really serious in their complaint on this score, as they are themselves interested in the sale of land (which

* Report of the Zionist Executive to the 18th Zionist Congress at Prague, 1933, p. 262.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 277-278.

always means a handsome profit for the vendor). The legend about the "displaced" Arabs, which figured so prominently in the controversy that followed the riots of 1929, seems now to have been given its quietus, since the official investigations have shown that the total number of Arab tenants who have had to leave their holdings in consequence of a transfer to Jewish ownership, and who, despite the compensation they received from the purchaser, have been unable to find a holding elsewhere or some other occupation, is comparatively small. Besides, the amount of land that has passed into Jewish possession in recent years has been on the decrease. In 1925 it was 101,000 dunam (about 25,250 acres), and in 1929 it was 64,500 dunam, whilst since then it has remained below 20,000 dunam in each succeeding year.*

If we now consider the reaction of the Palestine Government to the Arab agitation we find that it betrays a tendency to give way. The Jewish Agency applied for 24,000 immigration certificates under the Labour Schedule for the six months beginning on October 1st, and was granted only 5,500. Of this number 2,000 had already been given in advance for the benefit of Jews anxious to escape from persecution in Germany, and 500 were retained by the Government to be used for tourists who might apply for permission to settle, so that only 3,000 are available for the six months. It was admitted by the Government that, according to its own estimate, there was room for another 6,500 immigrants during this period, but it had deducted 1,000 certificates because of the number of Jews who had entered the country with tourist visas during the past year or so and had settled without the requisite permission. The fact, however, that these tourists had found opportunities of employment or business in the country showed that the Government had repeatedly underrated its absorptive capacity, and thus the best way in which the Government can check the tendency to ignore legal formalities is to provide a schedule large enough to meet the requirements of the labour market.

So far from recognising this situation, however, the Government apparently proposes to penalise many of those who wish to come into the country on account of the transgression of those who are already settled in it, even though the latter may have brought thousands of pounds with them and pro-

* Report of the Zionist Executive to the 18th Zionist Congress at Prague, 1933, p. 262.

vided employment for others. It intends going farther, for it has enacted new regulations requiring from all, except first-class travellers, a deposit of £60 or a guarantee from a reputable bank, and introducing a system of surveillance to prevent those who enter as travellers from remaining as settlers without permission. This tightening of the regulations is surprising enough in view of the Mandatory's obligations "to facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions," and of the statement in the Churchill White Paper,* that "for the Jewish people . . . it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance." It is all the more surprising that such rigorous vigilance should be exercised against the Jews wishing to enter their National Home when no corresponding concern is shown regarding the large number of Arabs from Syria and Transjordan who are attracted into Palestine by better employment and higher wages (though Jews are not allowed to settle in Transjordan). And it is most surprising that such an illiberal attitude should be adopted at a time when Palestine is passing through a period of unparalleled expansion and prosperity, and when the tragedy of German Jewry imposes a special obligation upon the Power responsible for the Jewish National Home.

The glaring disparity between the latest Labour Schedule recommended by the Jewish Agency and that granted by the Government cannot be explained away merely on the basis of a mathematical miscalculation. Assuming even that the Agency may have erred to the extent of 10, 20, or 30 per cent. in its estimate of opportunities of employment, it is inconceivable that it has erred to the extent of 75 per cent. It is all the more regrettable, therefore, that the Government has not vouchsafed any explanation of its decision, apart from that relating to the docking of 1,000 certificates. The omission of such an explanation seems to suggest that it could not be made on purely economic grounds, and the suspicion, therefore, arises that the Government has been influenced by political considerations—or, in other words, by the Arab agitation. If such should be the case, then the Government is violating the principle clearly laid down in the Prime Minister's letter of February 13th, 1931, to Dr. Weizmann, that "considerations relevant to the limits of absorptive capacity are purely economic considerations." That important

* *Command Paper* 1700 (1922).

letter was published in Hansard, it was laid before the League of Nations, and it was embodied in official instructions to the High Commissioner for Palestine. There is the strongest reason, therefore, for demanding a more just, not to say a more generous, attitude, towards Jewish immigration, and the substantial part which the Jews have played in the development of Palestine—apart from the obligations embodied in the Mandate—surely entitle them to such consideration. Although forming only 20 per cent. of the population, they contribute more than 40 per cent. of the public revenue, and to them, therefore, is due in more than a proportionate degree the handsome surplus of over £1,000,000 by which Palestine is distinguished from the States that are burdened with national debts. The rapid growth of the city of Tel-Aviv, the great increase in citrus cultivation, the steady multiplication of industrial enterprises, the extension of the electrification system, the successful exploitation of the mineral resources of the Dead Sea, the improvement in the country's trade, the accumulation of deposits in the banks to the extent of £6,000,000, and the opening of the Haifa harbour with its limitless possibilities—all these point to the desirability, nay, the necessity, of a progressive instead of a reactionary policy in the matter of immigration.

The Prime Minister's letter of nearly three years ago, which was intended to explain away the objectionable passages in the Passfield White Paper of October 1930, foreshadowed the evolution of a land development scheme that "would result in substantial and lasting benefit to both Jews and Arabs." So far that scheme has not materialised nor even emerged into any definite documentary form. But the spirit that prompted its suggestion could now find a fitting outlet for its expression in causing the gates of Palestine to open wider for the Jewish people, who are the victims of persecution—social, economic and political—not only in Germany but in other lands too. The Balfour Declaration came as a ray of hope to millions of Jews enshrouded by the gloom of the War. Its realisation in a liberal-minded spirit, and with due regard to the relevant economic considerations, would once again revive their hopes in a world in which it is their fate to continue battling against injustice and intolerance as they have done for centuries past.

ISRAEL COHEN.

QUO VADIS?

THE words may seem hackneyed, but no others could express so concisely and clearly the question which now demands an answer, and the future may depend on clear thinking and the right spirit in making it. The changes within living memory, economic, social, political, ethical, intellectual and above all in the domain of religion, the conditions of unrest and the new problems which have arisen for solution have been made more difficult and urgent by the Great War and its catastrophes, but many of them were in existence before. Strange as it may appear to the younger generation, there is good ground for thinking that it is the very old, who have been acquainted with people of five or six generations, and have taken a keen interest and possibly some slight active part in the life of their time, who can give the most useful help in answering the question. Even though younger men may possess more intellectual power, there is profound truth in Milton's words :

“ But old experience may attain
To something like prophetic strain.”

The old stand outside of the rushing stream and the currents in which younger people are immersed, and can watch their eddies and judge what their true meaning is, and whither the main streams are really tending. Though for them personal ambition would be absurd, and there is nothing to hope for and little to fear, their sympathies with others are keen as ever, but the range of those sympathies is wider.

It would require a library of volumes rather than a short magazine article to give even the outline of an answer in each of the branches above indicated.

The important subject of currency and international exchange we must leave untouched, not only for want of space but because of a deep ignorance which the majority of those who speak of it fully share, though usually unwilling to confess it. When financial experts themselves agree—if they ever do so—we are ready to accept their guidance. As to politics, our experience does not make us pessimists, though it is impossible to share the sloppy, easy-going optimism which pretends that things will go right without careful thought and vigorous well-directed action. We can remember how, more

than sixty-five years ago, after a large extension of the franchise, Carlyle, who was taken by so many of the generation then young as a prophet, talked of "shooting Niagara," and of the disaster which would follow. Far greater political changes have been made since and sometimes passed almost unnoticed. We could see our country becoming a "gynæocracy" without wringing our hands in despair. It is, indeed, highly probable that the wholesale admission of women to the franchise will not have an evil effect, in spite of the fact that women are so often far too logical, too ready to regard any person or course of action as either black or white, whereas usually they are grey, and generally the real question is, which of the courses is the least bad. It is a good rule in public life to recognise that what is called logical is almost invariably wrong, and the history of our nation shows the triumph of practical sense over supposed logical consistency. The real mistake was in admitting as voters, when the change was made, either women or men under the age of twenty-five. It is not a question of sex or class. I have rarely known anyone who took a more keen and intelligent interest in politics than a cook of mature years long in the service of one family. At the same time are the wearers of "Oxford bags," if they still exist and have not been replaced by a small group who pose as enlightened because they do not care for their own country or the Empire which their fathers have built up with so much benefit to mankind, more competent to form a sound judgment? Still we may feel assured that the majority of them will by and by render useful service to their country and make sacrifices for it. Some really well-bred dogs suffer from a fit of distemper in early life, from which they emerge later completely cured.

Those who have had the good fortune to enjoy the companionship of the young men and young women of the two generations which have grown up in this century, will refuse altogether to believe that there is not splendid material in existence. They will feel that if there is cause for anxiety as regards the attitude and character of the young, it is due rather to lack of sane and earnest leadership than to any degeneracy in the young people themselves. Those who have known, for example, the students of a University in a great city have learned how loyal and considerate they were, and to-day we see what brave and splendid work is being done by

a still younger generation in all parts of the world : in the troubles in India, cheerful among all the hardships on the disturbed frontier, amid chaotic conditions in the wilds of Central America, or the anxieties which exist in Africa. It would be hard to speak too highly of the influence these young people exercise, especially among those of different race and brought up under different traditions. Day by day, too, as we grow older, we are struck more and more by the essential goodness and wonderful kindness of the ordinary people we meet around us in our daily life. We find it in all classes, and not only in our own country but when we travel abroad. Meanwhile I take off my hat to the patient omnibus driver or conductor who keeps his temper, the constable who so quickly gives his directions and considerate help, the devoted and skilful nurse—and all the crowd of ordinary folk we cannot but admire.

But where are the great leaders ? Where is a voice to be heard now like that which thrilled us sixty years ago, when Ruskin gave those inaugural addresses at Oxford which opened to us a wider view of politics, using the term in its broad and original meaning ; and of Empire and its obligations and possibilities ? We do not deny that there are clever writers whom we will not name, whose habit is to mislead, and there are many artists whom it is the fashion to admire, some of whom could do work of value if they were not obsessed by an unnatural love for what is distorted and ugly. In politics we may accept without serious misgiving the widest extension of a democratic franchise, but we must preserve intact, or rather restore, the great constitutional safeguards against sudden or perhaps irrevocable changes and the " swing of the pendulum " making consistent policy impossible. One of these safeguards must be the maintenance of an effective Second Chamber, the other to secure the independence of the judges or the administration of justice open to all, and not subject to the orders of anyone else, whether of the Crown or of the majority of the popular representatives in Parliament.

Whatever our individual opinions may be, a fair survey of the state of our own country or others to-day leads to the conclusion that by far the most important influence, unless we are to give up hope for the future entirely, is that of religion. It is sometimes alleged that its influence is decaying, but those who watch what is going on with such calmness as they can

command, but with keen interest, are convinced that in all the troubles of the present time, seeing the misery there is in the world, the tortures of disease, the injustices that are done even where goodwill exists, the want and the squalor, the loneliness and hopelessness of many lives, but for the message of Christianity there would be forced upon us the conclusion of the old Roman writer when he said: "*Justis indiciis approbatum est non esse curae deis securitatem nostram, esse ultionem*"* ("The signs prove clearly that the gods have no care for our safety—they have for vengeance").

Happily, the ground has been cleared by the practical disappearance of the old antagonism between science and religion; the materialistic dogmatism which characterised utterances of many scientific men two generations ago has almost disappeared. The view, common amongst scientific men now, was expressed long ago by one whose clear thoughts on such matters were combined with extraordinary practical sagacity in their application. He urged that valued statements as regards the so-called laws of nature simply as working hypotheses be retained so long as they were fruitful and be discarded when they ceased to be so.

At the same time what for want of a better word we may call fundamentalism has also practically disappeared. Not many now regard their whole religion as shaken by doubts as to the actual existence of a sea-monster with a gullet big enough to swallow a man and eject him uninjured. Old people remember how in their childhood, sixty or seventy years ago, it was usual to look on all the works which were gathered together under the name of the Bible as literally and verbally inspired. Now it would probably be difficult to find intelligent children who would regard the stories of Adam and Eve, of Balaam's Ass and Jonah as actual fact. Probably most children are too wise to care much now whether such good stories are or are not literally true, and yet may appreciate their value all the more and understand Schiller's lines:

" tiefer Bedeutung
Liegt in dem Märchen meiner Kinderjahre,
Als in der Wahrheit, die das Leben lehrt."†

One of the best signs of the times is that, as is shown by the record of the Bible Society, the sale of the Bible has increased enormously, and that in spite of much that is hard to under-

* Tacitus.

† Wallenstein. Part I, Act II, Sc. 4.

stand, at times unintelligible and in places repulsive, the Book as a whole makes its appeal to all mankind now as it did centuries ago to people of all classes, of all ages, and of all countries—"its sound has gone out into all lands and its words into the ends of the world."

What people to-day, especially the young, are consciously or unconsciously crying out for is truth and reality. They do not want fancy pictures of something which never actually existed, not mythology, nor some compromise with deep-rooted pagan ideas of magic. They want to know and realise as fully as possible what actually occurred in Palestine 2,000 years ago, to have a true picture. From those representations in which we see a feeble figure with some impossible garments and the conventional plate or aureole they turn with pain. They try to realise that cold morning when the coal-fire was kindled by the side of the Lake of Galilee, with food prepared ready for the tired and shivering fishermen, and all that followed. How true is Ruskin's comment on Raphael's cartoon of the charge to Peter—"Is it not a piece of infinite monstrosity and hypocrisy?" Is not the "simple truth that the moment we look at the picture we feel our belief of the whole thing taken away? There is visibly no possibility of that group ever having existed in that place or on any occasion. It is all a mythic absurdity." It is no use to pretend that there will not be intellectual difficulties in fully accepting the Christian position, and still more practical difficulties in giving what J. H. Newman calls "real assent" to it, but does not a candid view of all the evidence lead clearly to the conclusion that the facts of individual life and of history make any other position clearly irrational? Whether we look at the matter as pragmatists, testing everything by what works well or not, or as those who are in the habit of looking at *all* the evidence and seeing what it proves, instead of being dominated by some preconceived theory, can it be denied that the Christian position, frankly and fully perceived and followed, will to-day justify all the claims made for it by St. Paul when he first proclaimed it in the western world?

What really matters is the attitude of mind and the feeling which, whether openly expressed or not, is probably as intense and more general than it has ever been. Let it be frankly recognised that the only approach to a rational way

of accounting for the facts and the only hope for mankind is in the Christian religion, taken not so much as a statement of ethical maxims or as a guide in social progress, but as a stimulating force in every life. A rational belief in a beneficent deity must be based on something substantially equivalent to what is comprised in the old orthodox evangelical faith and expressed in certain words in a creed like the Nicene. On this matter no compromise is possible, having regard to the claims made again and again as reported by the Gospels and recognised by the earliest disciples. The conclusion "*aut deus aut non bonus homo*" is inevitable. The great need is to understand and realise the character and the life as vividly as possible.

For those who are pragmatists the claim of Christianity freed from the shackles of certain Pagan religions and of magic worked by medicine-men is irresistible. It is independent of Institutions, however convenient and practically useful they may be. Such a Christianity is the great hope for India, which is crying out for a religion based on an Incarnation, and not troubled by sectarian differences which really mean little there, though regarded as important here. The appeal is universal and is fundamentally the same, whether made by the Carmelite monk whom one may hear preaching to a score or two of cattle-drovers in some Norman village in Holy Week, or in a barn on a Westmorland hillside, where an itinerant Primitive Methodist preacher, standing among the haystacks, may address a small gathering from the neighbouring farms, or in the quiet of an old Meeting House, where no sound is heard except the stirring of a gentle breeze blowing where it listeth among the leaves outside, until someone feels he has something to say which may help his hearers to go forth to relieve suffering and distress, wherever they may be found, and to do it sanely and as men of business, inspired by enthusiasm.

We are constantly hearing a desire expressed for union amongst Christian bodies, but it may well be doubted whether such a union as is contemplated is at present possible or even desirable. An institution—a church organisation—may be suited to one country or one type of mind and may be the best means of helping some people to do efficient work, but many things helpful to some are repugnant to others. What is wanted is hearty co-operation and goodwill between different bodies rather than a patched-up compromise by which

to secure union, one group giving up something it regards as valuable and useful in exchange for similar surrender by another. It is "unity in spirit," the bond of peace and righteousness of life which secures a real union and useful co-operation. What is the use of calling that a "Catholic" Church which would exclude the heroic Christian work of such a body as the Salvation Army* or the Society of Friends, with their absolute fearless devotion, perhaps at times almost too rigid, to what they believe right, and the sanity and businesslike ability with which they deal with questions such as unemployment? No doubt important steps have been taken towards corporate reunion, as has been seen among the Presbyterians in Scotland and amongst the Methodists. These appear to be entirely good, but there was no really important difference between the various bodies which have just become officially united. Similar developments amongst other bodies where they have common ground may shortly be seen.

There is ample room without corporate union for joint action in social work, from time to time in religious services, and for a training such as has been given in the free theological faculties of universities and in the religious instruction that can be given in schools whether provided or not provided. In some districts a syllabus of such instruction has been introduced which shows how large is the common basis of agreement. Finally, we may call in evidence the prophetic words of one who has sometimes been regarded as an ardent opponent of Christianity.

When faiths and empires gleam
Like wrecks of a dissolving dream.

* * * *

A Power from the unknown God.
A Promethean Conqueror came ;
Like a triumphal path he trod
The thorns of death and shame.

* * * *

The star of Mahomet
Arose and it shall set
While blazoned as on Heaven's immortal noon,
The Cross leads generations on.†

ALFRED HOPKINSON.

* So well described recently in a book which should be read by all, *God in the Slums*.

† Shelley. *Hellas*.

THE OBJECTS OF LIFE.

OF a man who has lost his way it is reasonable to ask : Where were you going ? A society has lost its way. Where was it going ? Where does it want to go ? What are the objects of human life ? No answer.

As for the objects of life, priests and philosophers have had their definitions in all ages : and these have involved a great deal of intuitive wisdom by which later definitions may very well be checked or justified. But hitherto the formal definitions have been of a kind too other-worldly for present-day purposes, or too vague and abstract for the average man at any time.

And hitherto we have been too deeply absorbed in the means of life, in the mere struggle for existence, to require any exact definition of those ends of life which nevertheless, up till recent times, we have instinctively recognised. We have only been quite sure, on the strength of these instincts, that we should realise the nature of the good life very easily so soon as we were in a position to do so : and now that we are in a position to do so these instincts have decayed, and this assurance has completely left us.

Surely the modern prophets, standing, as they have told us, on the shoulders of Plato and Shakespeare, should be able to help us in this dilemma. But many years ago Chesterton very justly replied to *Mankind in the Making* that the object of a hammer is not merely to make more hammers : and Mr. Wells is not the only social philosopher who was, or should have been, discomfited by this truism. Chesterton himself is a lost leader who may yet in a roundabout way be able to help us ; but Shaw, with his Life Force, like Bergson, has made it almost the first article of his faith that man does not know where he is going (which ought to be true only in so far as it is true that Columbus did not know where he was going) : and Clutton Brock, whose own solution we shall notice presently, made short work of *Methusalem*, if that was a laboriously playful attempt to define the goal. Bertrand Russell, who, as a mathematician, philosopher, aristocrat and social reformer, might well speak with greater authority than any other living man, defines the good life as one that is "inspired by love and guided by knowledge" : but whether it is, or should be, thus inspired and guided he does not tell us.

For D. H. Lawrence sex looms very large indeed, but he will not let the new sex-psychologists have things all their own way. His alternative to sex is "purposiveness"—again, how vague! "You have got to keep your sexual fulfilment . . . subordinate to the great passion of purpose : subordinate by a hair's-breadth : but still by that hair's-breadth subordinate." And again, very truly, "We have got to get back to the great purpose of mankind, a passionate unison in actively building a world." But what sort of a world? This is Mr. Wells over again, fortified by that other new psychology which finds the meaning of life in co-operation. And here we ask : Co-operation, not only for what, but with whom?—equally important.

It is strange that the moderns, even the most typical of the moderns, should have no clearer answer to these questions : no answer, indeed, except that of the sex-psychologists, which would not have been heartily endorsed by the most Victorian of the older school. For half a century we have been told to leave the world just a little better than we found it, but as to the difference between better and worse we are still not very clear.

And now a well-known artist, Will Dyson, in the *New English Weekly*, enters the arena with two very healthy propositions : that we are living under the régime of an effete Business Philosophy which is falling from world dominance : and that the next step in our progress is the "emergence into dominance of an Artistic Philosophy of life." And he pauses to state that there is "a tragic folly and an irony in the fact that the artists of the world are full of a faintness of heart and a meanness of spirit and all sorts of witty cowardices."

This philosopher uses the word "artist" in a generous sense—hence the loop-hole he has given here to an artist of very low degree. He uses it to include scientists, craftsmen, and all those makers and users of tools who have done their jobs so well and thoroughly as distinct from the mere makers of the Money Machine—of the distributive system that works so badly. This is a very natural distinction at the present juncture, but it encourages a widespread modern tendency to confuse the means with the ends, and the functions of the engineer with those of the artist, which an artistic philosophy should surely correct. If it does not correct this tendency the

artistic philosophy will almost certainly degenerate into a refined sort of hedonism, as it actually proceeds to do in this instance.

This is unfortunate : it reminds us of Chesterton's great comment on modern philosophy, that it is its " outer ring that is obviously artistic and emancipated : its despair is within. And its despair is this, that it does not really believe that there is any meaning in the universe." It is doubly unfortunate, because the business philosophy in its higher flights has already seen the fallacy of hedonism, and laid the foundations of something better.

We are now able to produce all the material good things of life in fabulous abundance, but we are not able to enjoy them. We have taken every step but the last in our material enfranchisement, and we might perhaps have taken this last step had we been content with a hedonistic philosophy ; to this extent our artist philosopher is possibly right. But in dismissing hedonism we have also taken every step but the last in the production of a philosophy which shall be worthy of an enfranchised people.

Though it committed intolerable crimes against humanity, it was not a brainless, nor quite a faithless, race that solved our problems of production. Hear a well-known late-Victorian philosopher, and judge of his quality from a single sentence. " Can the knowledge of nature be itself a part or product of nature, in that sense of nature in which it is said to be an object of knowledge ? " * This is a subtle question which it is difficult to answer in the affirmative if you have really understood it. And answering it in the negative, we admit a " spiritual principle in nature and knowledge " : we admit, that is to say, a meaning in the universe. This meaning may be for ever unintelligible to man, and probably is. We have been taught by relativity and quantum theories to understand more clearly than ever the great saying of Schopenhauer that " the actual, positive solution of the riddle of the world must be something that the human intellect is incapable of grasping and thinking : so that if a higher kind were to come and take all pains to impart it to us, we should be absolutely unable to understand anything of his expositions." But if we admit the possibility that there is any sort of spiritual principle in the universe, or meaning, however unintelligible, we admit an

* T. H. Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 11.

equal possibility that the human race may have objects other than that of self-preservation, and that in that case it presumably has, or has had, natural (or spiritual) instincts to the pursuit of these objects.

Now to ascertain the absolute objects of human life, if there are such, it is only necessary to observe those activities of the human race in which the maximum of enthusiasm combines with the minimum prospect of material gain. As distinct from the useful arts, it is almost the definition of the fine arts that they contribute nothing to the material welfare of society as a whole. They must, therefore, be amongst the absolute ends of life: and pure science, however incidentally useful, is in exactly the same category as fine art. But what about the average man? The nearest approach in modern times to a philosophy at once sound and popular is probably that of Clutton Brock's *Ultimate Belief*. According to this excellent little book, the spirit has three activities, the moral, the intellectual, and the æsthetic: "man lives so that he may exercise these activities of the spirit, and for no other reason": and thus "the problem of civilisation is to give every man the chance of being a saint, a man of science, or an artist."

There is the assumption here that if a man is not qualified to excel in science or art, he is not capable of any enthusiasm or any thrill other than those—alas, how rare!—which are associated with the pursuit of virtue. This assumption, if he could be made to understand it, the average man would at once repudiate. It derives from that business philosophy which, having discovered a spiritual principle in the universe, decides on the pursuit of "moral perfection" as the proper alternative to hedonism. By the late-Victorian philosopher already quoted, an exponent of this philosophy at its best, art and science are very reluctantly ruled out as irrelevant to the moral aim: but the philosopher is uneasy, and expects his reader to be uneasy, at this decision. He promises to return to the subject: and it is a striking testimony to the predicament in which he finds himself that he never does so!*

The fact is, of course, that morality does not run comfortably in triple harness with art and science just because it is not an end in itself, as they are. It is a means to ends which may or may not be of absolute value: the sanctity of the moral law is that of the compass and sextant, which seem

* T. H. Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, p. 312.

equally sacred to either the mariner or the buccaneer, wherever he is going, and on whatever errand. To understand the relative nature of many of our so-called virtues it is only necessary to consider how their status will be affected by the solution of the economic problem.

Nevertheless, there is one virtue, that of courage, manliness, the Roman *virtus*, which is of absolute value ; which will not, or should not, lose status even with the coming of universal peace. For the third, or rather the first term of the required trinity—that in which the average man comes to his own—is Adventure. The adventure may often, or indeed usually, be a means to some practical end : but it is also, and sometimes purely, an end in itself : it is a spiritual activity : in the born adventurer it inspires an enthusiasm which is out of all proportion to the prospect of material gain. The objects of life are : to do adventurous things, to make or enjoy beautiful things, to understand wonderful things : either directly in your own person, or by proxy : as when a mother rears an adventurous son, or a successful business man helps a struggling artist.

To do adventurous things, to make beautiful things, to understand wonderful things—these are the ultimate aims of human life. Any man who has known that moment of ecstasy which is experienced on the crest of any such achievement, however modest, will admit the validity of this definition : and we all admit its validity in our instinctive homage—still instinctive, though so carefully suppressed by the cynical modern—to the poet, the artist and the scientist, the explorer and the soldier. This definition will appeal to the natural instincts of every unsophisticated person : to just those instincts the satisfaction of which has been the main business of every great religion. It is exactly these instincts to which every great religion has appealed in its authoritative solution of wonders and mysteries else insoluble : in its making of graven or painted images, its building of temples and churches : in its often paradoxical calling to crusades and holy wars, and even in the opportunities it has given for heroic martyrdoms.

Equally, this more comprehensive formula resumes those partial definitions of the objects of life by the new psychologies which we have already noticed. To find the meaning of life in co-operation is vague and not very inspiring : like the altruistic morality of the recent past, it suggests a state of

society in which everybody is helping everybody else to do nothing in particular. But co-operation in the doing of adventurous, the making of beautiful, or the understanding of wonderful, things—this is an ideal which covers the greatest and healthiest activities of mankind in all ages. And to find the object and meaning of life in sex—if there were no other adventures or beauties or wonders or ecstasies under the sun than those of sex, this might be all very well : but the more comprehensive formula is clearly the sounder and the more desirable, since it sufficiently explains the glamour of sex and the violence of the sexual passion without granting to these the too exclusive interest which they so often have for the modern mind.

To find the object and meaning of life in love—that is a more specious proposition. But, whilst morality is a means rather than an end, so love should be regarded as a result rather than an end : it is the sentimentalist who regards love as an end in itself. Love is the inevitable attraction to one another of people who love the same God—who recognise the absolute ends of human life, however unconsciously. And it is doubtless for this reason that “when iniquities abound, love waxes cold.”

But it is not every reader who will be convinced by the appeal either to old religions, or new psychologies, or even to the wide prestige of art and science, of the soldier and the sailor. Other activities are so clearly useful, so necessary to the mere maintenance of individual and social life, that nine men out of ten may well be too deeply absorbed in these ever to ask themselves whether their generation has any other aim in life than that of producing another such aimless generation. If they do pause to ask themselves this question, many no doubt will still be content to reply that the ultimate aim of every man should be to serve and to know God, “to enjoy and glorify him for ever” : in which case their answer is only an abridged and conventional form of that which I wish to make more articulate. But those who are too sophisticated for this answer will be hard put to it to find an alternative to my definition. They will then perhaps grant a conventional assent to the claims of science and art : but what about those of mere adventure ? They will say that the adventures of the soldier and the sailor, the aviator and the explorer, are always means to some particular end : but the adventurers know

better, as does every healthy boy. It is one of the most characteristic mistakes of the practical man similarly to regard science as a mere means to practical ends : but the man of science knows better, and in recent years he has occasionally said so. And it is another of his characteristic mistakes to regard art as a mere superfluity, simply because it can seldom be regarded as a means to any practical end. This, of course, is a reduction to absurdity of all such mistakes. It is just because art is amongst the ends of life that it seldom serves a more immediate purpose—unless it is that of providing incidentally a living for the artist.

In the applied arts and sciences, and in many kinds of adventure, such mistakes may seem to be justified because a means of life is provided, as well as an end fulfilled, say by the slaying of a dangerous animal or the making of a beautiful chair. It is this possibility of simultaneously supplying the means and fulfilling an end of life which is largely responsible for our difficulty in defining the ends : though the wide realisation of this possibility is so characteristic of a healthy society as to be almost the definition of social health. Even to-day it is just as important, and should be just as natural, for the manufacturer, the farmer, the doctor, the teacher, to be an artist or a scientist as it is for the soldier and the sailor to be adventurers : and they sometimes are, and sometimes, alas, they are not ! But in such a utilitarian and commercial age as ours we may generally take it for granted that we are most nearly approaching the ends of life whenever we are doing with real enthusiasm just those things for which it is most difficult to assign an ulterior motive : whether it is reading astronomy, planting a flower bed, or merely sailing an open boat. It is, of course, generally possible to justify such recreations on the ground that they are good for our health, with the implication that such health is good for our business : but it is just the typical business which is most purely a means of life rather than an end, and which is, therefore, most effectively justified as a means to such recreations. Let us admit then that reading astronomy is good for our health, but decline to admit that that is our reason for reading astronomy : congratulating ourselves only in a murmured aside that “all things work together for the good of them that love God.”

To do adventurous, to make beautiful, to understand wonderful, things—in a true artistic philosophy the first term

of this trinity is no less important than the second, whilst all are essential to the solution of our social problem. Odysseus and the Trojan wars were as truly responsible as Homer for the making of the great poems: the Viking age for the sagas, the adventurous Elizabethans even for Shakespeare. Let our artist philosopher speak for the painters, but, coming to the applied arts, the first term of this trinity is indeed their father. The greatest of human adventures, not even excepting the conquest of the air, has been that of the sea: and the culminating types of canoes and sailing-vessels of various times and races, Maori war canoes, Viking longships, the tea-clippers of yesterday, the fishing boats, yachts and battle-ships of to-day, are amongst the greatest works of applied art produced by man, not even excepting his temples and churches. Ruskin himself, though he was no sailor, was very certain and very eloquent in according this honour to the "bluff bow of the common beach boat laid aside in its furrow of sea-sand." The stem and stern posts of the Maori war canoes of the stone age, executed only with sharp pieces of flint or shell, are masterpieces of strong and delicate wood-work with which the ribband back of the eighteenth-century chair will very seldom bear comparison. And if to-day the business man is not only a yachtsman but a true sailor, as he so often is, his yacht will be much more truly a work of art than is his American roll-top writing-table or any other piece of his office or even of his drawing-room furniture: and this is because he himself really knows, and the people who make the yacht know that he knows, that his sailing is more important, that it is in a mysterious way more nearly associated with the ends of life, than anything that is likely to happen in his office, or even in his drawing-room.

To go to sea in a small boat is to seek the kingdom of heaven very truly, however unconsciously. And if the artist or the scholar still hesitates to admit, what every man of action knows, that adventure is a spiritual activity on an exact equality with those of art and science, let him remind himself of the proposition of the third great craftsman-philosopher, the grinder of lenses, who assures us that "he who has a body capable of the greatest number of activities has a mind the greatest part of which is eternal."

In the same way the adventures of sailing and flying are responsible for some of the greatest achievements of applied

science : the perfection, for instance, of the nautical almanac and of the internal combustion engine. The weapons of all ages, with their chased or jewelled hilts and handles, their wonderfully welded and tempered blades or barrels, are further testimonies to the stimulating effect of adventure on the applied arts : and even the modern engineer can sometimes produce a beautiful thing, whether a motor car or a battleship, with the adventurer behind him : or when he himself is an adventurer in the building of a Sydney harbour bridge. But the architect and the artist make a great mistake in therefore concluding, as they often do, that decadent arts may be saved by apprenticeship to the engineer, who is incorrigibly concerned with the means of life rather than the ends, and vilifies accordingly any art not his own that he touches : the proper moral is that they should learn from the adventurer, as he does : or, more strictly speaking, that the artist is only at his best when he is working, not for a commercial and comfort-loving, but for an adventurous, people.

This definition of the ends of life is frankly exoteric. But by any one of these three routes a man may be initiated into the great secrets of religion. And one of the most serious mistakes of the last century or two has been the too exclusive preaching of the esoteric doctrine to people who have not been properly initiated. If an able and energetic man is brought up to believe that he sufficiently fulfils the ends of life by being kind to his family and honest in business and going sometimes to church or chapel, he does these things with more or less enthusiasm, and then feels himself at liberty to become completely absorbed in the means of life : perhaps in inventing some wonderful machine which is only used for the production of the ugliest or shoddiest goods, and leads only to a frightful problem of unemployment and poverty instead of to the wide diffusion of wealth and leisure. And thus he and his kind gradually produce a state of society in which most people have lost sight of the ends of life altogether, and have substituted the ideals of money-making and of luxurious living.

Now to tell such a society that its economic problem is immediately soluble—that everyone might be rich to-morrow—is as much as to tell a sporting society that the races are off : that the various groups of competitors will cover their respective courses in motor buses, and that all will be suitably

rewarded with cups and honours. How unpopular this announcement would be with ninety per cent. of the competitors, and with all the spectators from the veteran athletes to the very women and children!

This parable may sound frivolous and far-fetched, but what better apology is it possible to make for a society of men and women, otherwise apparently sane, who continue to believe that grinding economy is the natural and only possible reply to the "problem" of over-production? He who would save his life shall lose it. Let wealth be regarded by any society as an end in itself, and that society shall be cursed and paralysed alike in its wealth and in its poverty from top to bottom. Our own society is only not cursed so completely as it might be because there are luckily a considerable number of people of all classes in whom the instincts for a better life persist. But these are not sufficiently numerous, nor their instincts sufficiently strong and self-conscious, to form a determining factor in the philosophy and politics of the nation. Let wealth be regarded by some society of the future as a mere means to the proper ends of human life, and whether it is rich or poor on the whole, its wealth will be fairly distributed, and that society in the pursuit of those ends will be happy and healthy.

A. ROMNEY GREEN.

THE MINORITIES IN ROUMANIA.

THE peculiar emphasis laid by its promoters on the purely economic character of the Danube plan is an unmistakable sign that there are issues between the Danubian States which exercise an unfavourable influence on their good understanding. M. Fontenelle, the President of the Conference summoned by the International Chamber of Commerce to Innsbruck to discuss the plan, had the frankness to declare in his inaugural address that "it would be presumptuous . . . to imagine that such a plan could be stripped of all political preoccupations." Had he used the word "prejudice" instead of "preoccupation" it might be a legitimate demand that such prejudices should be disregarded or that at least an effort should be made to wipe them out. But the political "preoccupations" which still linger on the borders of the Danube are facts, real difficulties waiting for a solution, and no useful purpose is served by either concealing or denying them.

Hungary's demand for a revision of the Treaty of Trianon is to-day a part of European politics, while the continued existence of the Little Entente shows that embarrassing antagonisms exist between Hungary and the States which have succeeded the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. Take, for example, the question of the racial minorities. It is to mislead European opinion to say and to write that the Minorities in the Succession States are happy and contented when their complaints to the League of Nations, their yearly Conferences in Geneva and Vienna and the publication of a bulky volume filled with their grievances such as that published two years ago,* show how unbearable is their situation, and how legitimate are their complaints.

This is one of the questions which poison the good relations of the States concerned, for it is too much to expect that Germany, Hungary or Bulgaria should complacently look on at the denationalisation of their kinsfolk by the Governments of the Succession States. It is a question which, instead of being shrouded under misleading statements, ought to be treated with frank openness; and every endeavour ought to be made to remove the causes of the present unsatisfactory situation. This should be all the easier since the question has

* *Die Nationalitäten in den Staaten Europas.*

not been without preliminaries in international agreements.

During the Peace Conference in Paris M. Clemenceau stated with precision the aims of the victorious Powers in regard to the future situation of the national minorities in the newly established States. "Unluckily," he wrote in the covering letter addressed to M. Paderewsky, then President of Poland, "the races [of those States] are divided by bitter hostilities of past years. We believe that they would the more easily get accustomed to their new situation if they knew from the beginning that they are protected and guaranteed in an efficient manner against every possibility of being oppressed or unjustly treated. The simple fact," he went on, "of their being aware of the existence of such guarantees would, we hope, achieve the reconciliation which we all desire."

In this spirit the so-called Minorities Treaties came into existence, the stipulations of which, in order to become effective, had to be incorporated in the legal system of the States concerned. Article 1 of the Treaties lays on the minority States the obligation that "The stipulations [of the Treaties] . . . shall be recognised as fundamental laws and that no regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations." It would seem that on such strong foundations the rights of the minorities are unassailably safeguarded. But this is far from being the case. At a time when the sanctity and the unconditional execution of the Treaties is a slogan of European politics, none of the Succession States respects or fulfils the provisions of the Minorities Treaties.

Take for example the case of Roumania. We can all remember the attitude taken at the Peace Conference by the late Jon Bratianu, Roumania's leading statesman for forty years and the founder of Greater Roumania. He refused to accept the Minorities Treaty and withdrew from Paris. When later on the Treaty was signed under pressure from the Powers by the Vajda Government, Bratianu declared in Parliament that "Roumania cannot accept a Treaty which establishes a foreign control." The opportunity to fulfil Treaty obligations occurred in 1923 when the new Constitution was framed, but the provisions of the Minorities Treaty were not enacted in it. On the contrary, instead of recognising the fact that Roumania is a country with the largest national and religious minorities in Europe, Article 1 of the new Constitution

declares that : "The Roumanian Kingdom is a national, unitary and indivisible State," and at the end of the debate on the Bill, M. Bratianu, the then Prime Minister, stated that "we regard the minority peoples as Roumanians and only minorities in regard to their numbers."

It is evident that this is not the spirit of M. Clemenceau's letter, but rather that of pre-war nationalism—that nationalism which the Peace Conference wished to combat, since it opens the door to unlimited possibilities for the persecution and denationalisation of the minority peoples, possibilities which have been realised in Roumania. The personal persecutions of the leaders of the Hungarian minority ceased, of course, after the first few years, but only to give place to the systematic destruction of the cultural existence of that minority. There is in Roumania a relentless denationalisation going on by every possible means, the most obvious being an educative system which tends more and more to deprive Hungarian children of the possibility of gaining tuition in their national tongue. Increasingly the Hungarian schools are being swamped by Roumanian, not only as a subject but also as the language of instruction ; increasingly Hungarian children are being forced to attend Roumanian schools. Obeying the slogan "the minorities have too many schools" emitted by M. Octavian Prie, former Under-Secretary for Education in Transylvania, the Roumanian Government has seized and turned into Roumanian institutes not only the Hungarian State schools, but also those denominational—mostly Calvinistic—schools which the impoverished Churches had been unable to maintain and had, therefore, handed over to the Hungarian State on the understanding that they should remain Church property and keep their Hungarian character.

In 1918, at the time of the change of régime, there were in the transferred Hungarian territories 1,088 denominational and 1,497 State-maintained Hungarian elementary schools ; in 1928 there were 818 denominational schools, a great number of which had been newly founded, and 360 State schools, whose Hungarian character has been extremely dubious. The Roumanian Government seizes every occasion to point triumphantly to these latter schools as Hungarian institutes maintained by the State, the fact being that the great majority of teachers in these schools are Roumanians from

the Regat. This is especially the case in the so-called "cultural zones," i.e. districts with an overwhelmingly large Hungarian, Russian or Bulgarian minority population, in which the teachers, specially selected for their national zeal, receive higher salaries than in other, less precarious, districts; "for," as was frankly stated in Parliament, "there is more cultural and national work [i.e. Roumanisation of the minority children] "to be done in these districts." In the Transylvanian counties of Csik, Udvarhely and Háromszék, in each of which over ninety per cent. of the population is Hungarian, there are more than 500 Regatean teachers who do not understand Hungarian. It may be added that tuition is bi-lingual even in the denominational minority schools, since not only is the teaching of Roumanian obligatory in them, but also the so-called national subjects such as literature, history and geography must be taught in that language, whereby tuition in Hungarian is reduced to a minimum.

It would be impossible to enumerate all the obstacles put in the way of Hungarian children obtaining tuition in their own language. Let one strange and peculiarly arbitrary measure stand for all the rest. A provision of one of the education Acts runs as follows: "Nationals of Roumanian origin who have lost their mother tongue must send their children to schools in which the language of instruction is Roumanian." This provision furnishes a handle to the authorities for prying into the "ethnic origin" of the pupils and for subjecting them to a process termed "name analysis," the purpose of which is the Roumanisation of all minority children who, on however slight a pretext, can be claimed for the Roumanian race. It is enough for a child to bear a Roumanian-sounding name; to be a member of the Orthodox or Uniate Church; or to have had a Roumanian grandmother or great-grandfather, for the authorities to declare it of Roumanian origin. It is not easy to convey to an English reader all that this process implies. There are Transylvanian families with Roumanian- or German-sounding names which regard themselves as Hungarians and can furnish documentary proof that they have been so regarded for centuries. Yet they are not allowed to send their children to a Hungarian denominational school.

Nor, as has been intimated, is it only Roumanian-sounding names which carry with them this danger. In Cluj, the capital

of Transylvania, there is an old patrician family named Straub. One of its members is headmistress of the Presbyterian Girls' *Lycée*, which up till 1928 was attended by her niece Judith. In that year the Roumanian school inspector suddenly declared that, Straub being a German name, Judith Straub could not be a Hungarian and consequently could not attend a Hungarian school. There was no German *Lycée* in the town, so it was decreed that she must be sent to a Roumanian school. The family protested and produced a document signed by the mayor attesting that the Straubs had been Hungarian and Presbyterian* for centuries, and that Mr. Straub, Judith's father, did not even know German. In vain; Judith Straub was declared to be a German and ordered as a natural consequence to attend a Roumanian school.

Take another case. Little George Gyüttö was the only son of a poor Hungarian widow. As he was intelligent and industrious the priest of the parish advised his mother to send him to the Roman Catholic *Lycée* of the nearest town and let the Church train him for a priest. Accordingly George Gyüttö and a little friend, Peter Kádár, were entered in the *Lycée* of Csikszereda. But a few days later the Roumanian school inspector descended upon them, and, armed with the fact that in the boys' certificates *Gyüttö* had been distorted to *Ghitiu*, which has a Roumanian sound, although it means nothing in that language, while *Kádár*, which in Hungarian means *Cooper*, had been translated into the Roumanian *Dogar*, he gave orders that both boys should immediately leave the Hungarian *Lycée* and enter the Roumanian State school. Thus the hope of little George Gyüttö and his mother, that he would one day become a Roman Catholic priest, vanished, together with his honest family name; and instead of becoming a novice he became a shoemaker's apprentice. Not content with this, the Minister of Education ordered an inquiry into the matter, as a result of which the *Lycée* was forced to dismiss its headmaster, Dr. F. Jénáki, for having dared to admit the boys to his school.

In the districts where the majority of the population is Hungarian, no middle schools have been established by the Roumanian State; the Churches, on the other hand, are deprived of the power to maintain their own schools—established, most of them, centuries ago—because the land

* There are no Presbyterian Germans, only Lutheran Saxons, in Transylvania.

destined for their support has been expropriated under the new agrarian law. The Calvinistic Church alone lost over 24,000 acres without any compensation, while the Unitarian Church has been bereft of the Berde-fund, about 1,400 acres, on the income of which 200 middle-school pupils were kept.

The over one and a half million Hungarian inhabitants have no university of their own. The fine university of Kolozsvár, founded eighty years ago by the Hungarian State, was seized and appropriated by the Roumanians, who thus have four universities, while the minorities have none. The Hungarian Churches wished to found an inter-confessional Hungarian University, but were unable to obtain the necessary permission. The result is that in the school-year of 1928-9, for instance, only 610 Hungarian students remained in Transylvania to brave the immense difficulties of acquiring a degree in a foreign language, while over 900 went to Hungary, fully aware that the degree obtained there would not be recognised as valid in their native land.

The process which is swiftly and surely destroying the cultural existence of the minorities is paralleled by that which is bringing about their economic ruin. The legitimate craving of the masses to be supplied with land has been used in Transylvania to seal the doom of the Hungarian landowner class. Over two million acres in all have been expropriated from Hungarian landowners, the compensation tendered being so paltry that the loss of the Hungarian minority has been reckoned at more than 30 milliard lei. That vindictiveness and corruption accompanied the execution of the Land Act cannot with any show of truth be denied. Even the Roumanian paper *Indreptarea* confessed that "there is no end to the scandals connected with the application of the agrarian law." To-day it is generally acknowledged that more harm than good was done by the reform. M. Mihalache and M. Argetoianu, both of them Roumanian ex-Ministers, have declared, one in the *Matin*, the other in the *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, that it has been a failure, and that it could not but be one since its aim was more political than social or economic.

The situation of the minorities in their contacts with the law and with the civil authorities also leaves much to be desired. For what impartiality may be expected of a judge before whom you may not plead in your mother tongue? Or what trust may be placed in a civil administration in

which only members of a hostile race take part? In these circumstances what can the minorities do? The obvious course would be to seek redress through parliamentary action. But this way is barred by Roumanian electioneering methods. In proportion to its numbers, the Hungarian minority is entitled to at least thirty-six representatives in Parliament; it never had more than half that number. At the general elections of 1922, the nomination of thirty-four out of thirty-eight Hungarian candidates was refused by the returning officer, and only two were elected to represent a population of 1,500,000. The other expedient would be to appeal to the League of Nations; but this, too, is unavailing. For one thing, the Roumanian Government, perhaps not unnaturally, regards every application to Geneva as an insult, a hostile act towards the Roumanian State; for another the Council of the League of Nations, being a political body, can never rise to absolute impartiality, and more often than not is led by political motives. This, at least, was the conviction expressed by the representatives of 48 millions of minority people, assembled at the Conferences of Vienna and Berne.

Were it only the Hungarians who are dissatisfied with Roumanian rule, it might be contended that they grumble because, after being members of a powerful majority in Hungary, they have been turned into a minority in Transylvania. But the German-speaking people in Transylvania and the Bukovina; the Russians of Bessarabia and the Bulgarians of Dobrudsza are no less discontented. Nay, the Transylvanian Roumanians themselves resent the domination of Bucharest, so different from what they were accustomed to.

It is a favourite method of propaganda-writers to compare the pre-war Hungarian régime with the post-war minority policy of the Succession States and to declare that the latter is more enlightened and more tolerant than the former—that, in fact, “the Roumanians are returning good for evil.” Such writers wisely shut their ears to the clamour of the Transylvanian Roumanians for autonomy, their repeatedly expressed desire to be freed from the influence of Bucharest, in fact, to all the implications of that “regionalism” which has sprung from the discovery, made very soon after the union, that the Hungarian administration was cleaner, honester and more liberal-minded than the present Roumanian rule.

ELIZABETH SÁRVÁRY.

AN ORNITHOLOGIST'S NOTES.

DURING one's observations of British bird-life, scattered over several counties of England, one comes across many experiences out of the general routine habits of birds that one wonders at in passing, and then notes down, along with a heterogeneous collection of other experiences and researches, in one's journals. It is only when an ornithologist comes to review his gleanings from many fields, over the many years he has devoted to his study, that he realises the interest of the collection. One's own bird books are a jumble of facts and little cameos of wild life, which, when strung together, contain some very strange and unusual happenings of English birds.

The habits of birds are often full of mystery. How do birds die? One might almost presume that very few birds die a natural death in the wild. One might almost say it is natural for a wild bird to die as the result of some tragedy, some drama of the wild, some stage in the constant struggle for existence. But occasionally birds do meet their allotted span in life, whether it be the three or four years of the common brown wren, the five or six of the swift, the twenty or thirty of the seagull, or the fifty or more of the eagle and the swan. Have you ever seen a bird die? One afternoon my friend and I had spent the hours carp-fishing with no success, and a sudden downpour necessitated our seeking shelter beneath a spreading oak on the bank. A few minutes later we noticed one of a flock of lapwings in an adjacent field leave the other birds, and flying over the railway embankment that separated them from us, dive down into the damp, marshy land by the pits. Settling down ever so quietly, its head sank back upon its shoulders and remained motionless. It did not move for quite ten minutes, and our curiosity became aroused when its position was seen to be quite different from a sleeping bird. I went forward and picked it up. The bird was dead. It was an old female lapwing, and one could find no trace of disease. One presumed she had died of old age.

In the severe frosts one frequently comes across dead redwings and blackbirds in the country lanes, killed not so much by the frost as by the lack of insect food and open water which a prolonged frost always brings. Observations conducted in a census at our Liverpool Cathedral Wild Birds'

Sanctuary, in the city slums and some eight miles from the open country, have shown that it was a need for water, not food, that drove the flocks of missel-thrushes, chaffinches, and other birds into the sanctuary in a prolonged frost. An albino blackbird found dead in the last great frost had its crop full of manure which it had eaten in its search for food, ere it died from lack of nourishment.

The story of the swan-song is one of the most beautiful that has come down to us through the ages. Does a swan really sing a beautiful song when it dies? If one can approach near enough to a herd of wild swans in winter, one can hear a low, sweet murmuring kept up amongst them, "like the soft humming of women's voices" as one naturalist has described it, quite different from the normal calls of these birds. Few naturalists are inclined to believe in the swan-song, but the late Prof. D. G. Elliot, one of America's most respected scientists, in his *Wildfowl of North America*, relates that he and a friend were shooting in Currituck Sound, North Carolina, when one of a passing flock of swans was hit :

On receiving his wound the wings became fixed, and he commenced at once his song, which was continued until the water was reached nearly half a mile away. I am perfectly familiar with every note a swan is accustomed to utter, but never before or since have I heard any like those sung by this stricken bird. Most plaintive in character and musical in tone, it sounded at times like the soft running notes in an octave. And as the sound was borne to us, mellowed by the distance, we stood astonished and could only exclaim : "We have heard the song of the dying swan."

Elliot, upon questioning the wild-fowlers of the area, found men who had also heard this song of the dying swan.

I know only one case of such an incident in England, and that occurred quite recently. In April 1933 a drama occurred on the lake at Rivenhall Place, near Witham, Essex, where for twenty years a couple of mute swans had raised their offspring on the waters. Recently, however, a stranger had appeared at the lake and begun to pay court to the wife. There was trouble between the rival suitors, and the usurper drove off the original husband, who retired to a lonely pond in the vicinity and there led a moping existence. One night, when a house-party was assembled at the house, a curious mournful cry penetrated the air. Investigation showed that

the cry came from the old swan, who continued "sobbing" for an hour. In the morning the swan was found dead.

Last winter a wild-fowler, shooting on the coast in the north, came upon a gaggle of wild geese which immediately took wing, but he was lucky enough to shoot one of the birds as the flock arose. The bird fell dying on to the slobland. The gaggle had almost winged its way out of sight when one of the birds was noticed to leave the rest and, after making a wide detour, to return to the shooter and, landing on the shore, walk up to the dying bird which was undoubtedly its mate. The relation of birds to their own dead is often puzzling. An absolutely unparalleled incident occurred in Cheshire last year. A song-thrush was seen with a dead bird on the ground. The thrush was making a hole in the ground with its beak. Suddenly it picked up the dead bird, flew to the stream, washed the feathered corpse, flew back again, and put it in the hole and tried to cover it with earth. It found it could not quite cover the dead bird over, so it took it out again, put it on the ground at the side of the hole, made the hole deeper, flew again to the stream with the bird, washed it, flew back again, put it in the hole and covered it all over this time, and then flew away.

During recent years the toll of feathered victims on the roads has increased at an alarming rate, and in the summer months, particularly during the week-ends and at the Bank Holidays, one comes across numbers of birds dead or dying from collisions with vehicles. They are usually young birds of the year that have not become sufficiently strong on their wings, or roadside-feeding or haunting birds, as swallows, thrushes, flycatchers and wrens, that get up as a car comes along, then sweep low over the road to be struck down without the driver being conscious of the little tragedy. A few years ago a motor-cyclist told me he found his engine would go no further, and on dismantling it he retrieved in odd pieces and feathers the remains of some bird that had become so mixed up inside that it was impossible to recognise it.

Returning home from an early spring ramble on the edge of Liverpool, I came across the pitiable sight of a beautiful cock hawfinch fluttering in the gutter beside the main road. The hawfinch, one of our handsomest and rarest British finches, is usually an inhabitant of the dense woods, and we rarely find him in these parts. He bore every visible sign of collision

with the car that had preceded me. His huge beak, Nature's limit in her seed-crushing devices in British birds, was broken through on the upper mandible, his right wing was broken at the wrist-joints, and his head had been completely scalped. Yet he was alive and had a right to live. He was too beautiful and rare to be killed, nor did his suffering justify such action. Making a temporary ambulance out of my field-glasses case, I brought him home, and after a dose of brandy-and-water, and a night in a warm room, he had recovered sufficiently to feed with comfort ; a few days later he was hopping about in the old cage we discovered in the cellar and fitted up for him. He took nearly two months before he was fit to be released ; but in the meantime he afforded many an interesting sidelight on bird habits. The hawfinch is easily recognised by its huge, bluish-grey beak, and the orange, white, and ruddy browns of its plumage. The huge beak has horny pads inside to add to the powers of the mill that crushes the seeds and kernels of the wild fruits. The throat and lores are jet black which, when the hawfinch faces one, makes it not unlike the waxwing. The primaries and some of the tail feathers are also black, with glossy blue tips. The rest of the tail, which is slightly forked, is white, as is the rump and a broad patch down the wing.

The hawfinch has no song, but an often repeated, sharp, metallic "whit" or whistle, which he uses as a call note. During his stay in convalescence, our hawfinch constantly uttered the "whit" sound, but on many occasions when he was left to himself he uttered another and much queerer sound. Standing on the bottom of the cage—and he would not do this for me if he saw me, I had to hide myself to watch him—he would look to the top of the cage with his bright eyes, and from the very bottom of his throat came a weird, guttural sound, not unlike the distant cawings of a passing flock of rooks, or the harsher "cars" of carrion crows. He would warble this deep note in gushes, and there was no doubt of the fact that at times he could be a ventriloquist and make this noise come from a tree some yards to the left, or as quickly from as many yards to the right. In fact, it was not until he had performed the feat for some time that we noticed it was he who was the culprit.

The harbouring of birds in convalescence until they are able to be released has provided many an interesting, some-

times tragic, experience. A corn-bunting rescued from the bird-sellers in the terrible orgy of the bird-market behind St. John's Market, Liverpool, on a Saturday morning, was fed and released, but within two days was shot and brought back to us. A number of dirty, one-eyed, and other suffering birds, wild birds caught in the English countryside, birds given to all of us in trust for all, and that God never intended to be subject to vandalism when He enriched our green fields and woods with their deliciously beautiful songs and their gorgeous colours, have been retrieved from this dismal alley called Market Street, where they were being offered at three shillings and sixpence or seven shillings and sixpence each; they have been brought back to strength and beauty and released in the open countryside and pure free air of the Cheshire lanes. There was Bully, as beautiful a cock bullfinch as ever graced an English thicket, snared and bungled into a horribly small cage and offered for twelve shillings and sixpence, because he had only got one leg—the other was torn off by the bird-snarer. Twelve-and-six went over the counter for him, grimy hands dipped his panting beak into a pot of filthy water, pushed the dazed bird into a little brown-paper bag—which was immediately changed for a more roomy cardboard box by the purchaser—and Bully left his prison. A few weeks later he was a different bird. Like a one-legged Israel Hands, this red-waistcoated chappie piped merrily from the top of the mantelpiece, then flew over the picture frame to sing another roundelay of joy, and so on from one piece of furniture to the other. He was not only the pet of the house, free to roam where and when he wished, but he was the bosom friend of the whole neighbourhood. He would fly through the open window to join the birds feeding on the bird-tables in the garden, or even down the lane and into the other houses. His was a different life.

A starling purchased in such a case was given up as lost, but two or three nights spent wrapped in flannel in a warm basket beside the fire, with frequent sips of brandy, soon put him in form. He became an almost impossible friend. He would smother one with kisses and cheeps of delight every time he could perch on one's shoulder or arm, indoors or out, for he had full liberty. Then one day he vanished. Weeks of search failed to find him, and he was given up as lost. Months later two starlings appeared in the adjacent trees. One was

Blackie. He had not forgotten. He was in through the door, and in his excitement seemed to go frantic with his desire to snuggle up against his old friend's cheek, to whistle and chatter with delight, to fly back to tell his wife—for there was no doubt about the other starling's identity—to dance ungainly jigs as of old, and a hundred other things, all at the same time. He was a comic to see.

The intelligence of wild birds is often fascinating. One has known three or four cases, of the great tit or ox-eye tit giving a remarkable example of "putting two and two together." The incidents all occurred on bird-tables where a piece of suet was suspended by a thin cotton for the little blue tits to come and swing on, and feed in all sorts of upside down positions. The less skilful great tits found they could not swing upside down on the suspended suet, so they perched upon the edge of the bird-table, and reaching down with their beaks, took hold of a portion of the thread and pulled it up, fixed it with their feet, bent down for some more, and so on until the suet had been pulled on to the table.

A gamekeeper I knew in Northamptonshire always took his lunch hour at one o'clock each day. One day we kept him talking a little later than usual. It was ten minutes after normal time when he was about to go to his house, and we were in a field full of coops of young pheasant chicks. A kestrel appeared on the scene, seemed disappointed at the sight of the keeper and his gun, "hung on" a few moments, and then retired to a nearby tree, puzzled at the unusual change in curriculum. We thought the incident interesting and set a watch. Next day the bird came again at the same time, and we soon found it was a habit of this bird to visit the chicks at the time the keeper took his lunch. Experience had taught it to visit only in his dinner hour, and it had learned that so well that the keeper was unaware of the visits.

More remarkable have been the examples of intelligence of profiting by experience, shown by the little owls on a certain game farm in Sussex. These little owls were reported by the gamekeeper to be destroying the game chicks, but the owner would hear none of it. Finally, after repeated assertions, a watch was set, and a pair of little owls was seen to attack and kill the chicks and carry them off. Still not fully satisfied, the owner pursued the matter further, and it was found that the alien owls deposited their booty in a gap at the bottom of the

hedge and left them there. They did not return for some time, and in the meanwhile the dead birds began to decompose, and numerous carrion-feeding beetles were attracted by their odour and began devouring them. It was thought the owls had forgotten them. Then, when the beetles were fairly numerous around the dead chicks, and then only, the little owls returned and devoured, not the game-birds, but the beetles.

The human characteristics of birds are always impressing themselves upon one's memory, though the bird student who assumes that birds act under similar impulses and responses to those of human beings, who looks at bird habits and actions from the human point of view with the human mind, instead of trying to look at them from the bird's point of view, to try and put himself in the bird's mind, is apt to get some very misleading ideas. However, human-like characteristics do crop up from time to time. A fine young female goshawk we used for the ancient sport of falconry had a peculiar dislike of nurses and perambulators. This goshawk was, like so many young ladies, very highly temperamental, and always became agitated in strange company, but when she was being used for rabbiting in the fields and a nurse appeared with her charges in the nearby lane, the goshawk became so agitated and annoyed that it was impossible to work her for fear of losing her, despite her bells and jesses.

There are petty thefts and quarrels going on constantly in a bird's life, as in human civilisation. Who has not watched the petty thefts and, on discovery, the punishments of the lazy builders amongst a colony of rooks at nesting time in March? A couple of pairs of long-tailed tits were once building their beautiful mossy nests in a group of furze bushes. One pair was particularly industrious, the other hen bird seemed particularly lazy. On the day that the framework of each nest was completed, and the birds seemed to have some difficulty in finding sufficient feathers to make that cosy bed within, the industrious builder had to travel far in search of her feathers for the lining. This necessitated her and her husband being away from the nest for fairly regular intervals. It presumably gave the idler an idea and a chance to reveal her shady character. When the other nest's owners were away, this bird slipped into the neighbouring nest and stole the hard-earned feathers and tucked them into her own lining. It was

most annoying to see the hard-working pair bring a feather and carefully tuck it in and fly off for another, when no sooner had they vanished from the gorse than the rascally neighbour landed on the nest, gave one or two tugs within, and retreated with the feather to its own nest. Then, when the workers made a sudden change of decision and returned, the idle capitalist was caught in the act and severely punished. But the other birds were not intelligent enough to retrieve all their stolen bedding from the idler's nest!

The question of how the long-tailed tit packs away its very long tail when in its domed nest seems to have puzzled most naturalists. It solves the problem in the same way as does the magpie in its domed nest. The tit enters head first, then turns right round, and in the act its tail folds neatly over its back, so that when it sits down upon its clutch of nearly a dozen wee, pink-spotted eggs, its long tail is folded back as neatly as could be wished for.

The erring wife is no uncommon thing. The courtship of the great crested-grebe on the larger inland waters is a thrilling affair, particularly when the birds dive and bring up long, trailing pieces of water-weeds in their beaks and, bill to bill, face each other. They rise up out of the water, their white breasts gleaming in the sunshine, till they are almost erect, and their feet placed as far back on their body as possible to enable them to make their wonderful dives, make foam of the surface of the water, while meantime, with their tippets expanded, their beaks and the dangling water-weeds are violently agitated up and down till the birds' heads look like animated chrysanthemums. This courtship may go on after the birds have commenced nesting. In one case, however, the male and female birds used to relieve each other after long periods of brooding on the nest. It so happened that when the male bird relieved the female after a long spell, she swam out into the middle of the reservoir and there came across a young bachelor grebe who began displaying to her. She, the flirt, returned the courtship, and this went on periodically when she was relieved off the nest for exercise. At last the male bird saw what was going on. He kept his temper. When her time came to return to her charges he was waiting for her. He waited until she reached the nest, then he gave her the severest thrashing of her life.

ERIC HARDY.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

THE BLUER EAGLE.

MR. ROOSEVELT'S difficulties had not decreased by the middle of November. The strikes had spread. On October 13th there arose the ironic climax of three labour unions—*et tu, Brute!*—sending out strikers to march upon the headquarters of the National Recovery Administration in New York. There was a fight with the police, who arrested sixty of them. On October 20th the National Farmers' Holiday Association, which represents 2,000,000 farmers and more than half the States, decided to call a farmers' strike, to begin on the following day. Agricultural discontent had grown apace because the N.R.A. attempt to raise wages before raising prices, though it could never succeed in its own object, did succeed in maintaining the cost of agricultural produce above its sale value. The farmers, therefore, decided to withhold their products from the market until "farm products bring in the cost of their production," and until the foreclosing of mortgages was stopped. Mr. Roosevelt, having of his own will attempted to do the impossible by means of political impositions upon commerce, was now invited to do something else that was impossible by the same means.

At that moment bad luck was added to bad management. Herr Hitler's action on October 14th had the effect of sending back to New York in a panic American capital which had formerly left New York in a panic. The dollar rose. Wall Street prices and commodity prices therefore fell. Mr. Roosevelt, watching the dollar rise when he wanted it to fall, had the further discomfiture of hearing the views of the Governor of Nebraska, who said that currency inflation was the farmers' only hope. And Mr. Roosevelt had set his face against currency inflation.

In his embarrassment, on October 22nd, he broadcast an address to the nation. Broadcasting is not an unmixed blessing to politicians. On this occasion Mr. Roosevelt announced that he was going to try gold as a factor in his "managed" currency. The only thing he contrived to make clear was that he would buy gold, partly, but not wholly, with the object of raising prices at home. The existing price

of gold mined in the United States at that time was \$29·80 an ounce. On October 25th the first purchase of such gold under Mr. Roosevelt's new scheme was made at \$31·36. On October 26th the price paid was \$31·54; on October 28th, \$31·82; on November 1st, \$32·26. On October 28th Mr. Roosevelt announced that gold would also be bought abroad. Now why? He said in his broadcast address that prices must be raised before the dollar was stabilised; that the dollar must be stabilised, not on exchange values, but on the internal price level; that internal prices must be raised, not by currency expansion, but by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation's buying and selling of gold. He had a bad Press—a striking change in his prestige since March—and was criticised by farmers, Conservatives and inflationists impartially. Did he deserve it? He had been consistent in postulating that prices be raised before the dollar could be stabilised, and in postulating higher costs, that is higher wages, before prices were raised. His new theory was that he could deliberately use the exchanges as a lever to raise prices. Did he really imagine that exchange prices, such as could be “managed” by the R.F.C.'s gold operations, were the same thing as internal prices, based on commodities, in such a country as the United States, whose internal prices are peculiarly independent of imports and exports? For four days the purchase price of home-mined gold was progressively raised. No effect was, or could be, thereby produced, either upon the dollar's exchange value or upon internal prices. The flight from the dollar, occasioned by domestic panic about the future of the United States, did bring down the dollar; and for that achievement Mr. Roosevelt could fairly have claimed some responsibility. But that was hardly his boast. Having failed in the experiment with home-mined gold, he boldly plunged into the world market for gold, with no better effect. Meanwhile the farmers were still on strike, to the number of a round million. On November 2nd the Governors of Iowa, North and South Dakota, Minnesota and Wisconsin and delegates from Indiana, Illinois, Nebraska and Kansas, presented a petition to Mr. Roosevelt demanding that a N.R.A. code should fix minimum prices high enough not only to meet costs but to give a profit, and, secondly, demanding currency inflation. On the next day, November 3rd, the Chamber of Commerce of New York State passed a sweeping

resolution condemning Mr. Roosevelt's whole financial and economic policy, and demanding that prices be not artificially raised, nor currency inflated. *Tu l'as voulu, Georges Dandin*. When a politician bites off more than he can chew, he has a mouthful.

Caught between the two opposites, sound money and greenbacks, the gold standard and inflation, he tried to have it both ways, and hoped to be rescued by the chance that dollar depreciation abroad would do the trick of inflation at home. Yet Mr. Roosevelt had the presence of mind to tell the Bank of England that he abhorred the possibility of a currency war. He saw no doubt that other currencies were not likely to remain inactive against an unlimited dollar fall.

Seldom has the world seen so odd a spectacle as that of the contemporary United States and of its dollar, backed by the greater part of the world's gold, yet "off" gold, and rapidly sinking, as it sank in the first half of November. It is true that Mr. Roosevelt "planned" such a fall by buying gold at increasing prices. It is not true that he produced the fall. It was produced by the unplanned distrust by Americans of America. The cynical words "No Recovery Allowed" came to be heard more than the original slogan they bitterly parodied. Blood was shed in street fights between the police and strikers, both sides armed. Has any author of imaginative fiction ever conceived anything more absurd than the "cracking down" on Mr. Ford by Mr. Roosevelt and General Johnson? Mr. Ford submitted the lowest tender for the provision of motor trucks wanted by the Government. General Johnson refused the tender, and Mr. Roosevelt approved the refusal, on the ground that Mr. Ford had not signed the Automobile Code. Thereupon the Comptroller-General, who is responsible to Congress for not wasting public money—Congress being supreme over President—overruled N.R.A. on the ground that Mr. Ford was not in practice violating any of the provisions of the code even though he refused to sign it. The eagle and its politics grow bluer.

THE WAR DEBT.

Another consultation has taken place between the British and the United States politicians about the war debt prob-

lem. The problem itself is now somewhat mellowed and has lost some of its bitterness. It is constituted by the fact that a British Government, led by Mr. Lloyd George, sixteen years ago, incurred a debt to the United States Government, which a later British Government, led by another Prime Minister, cannot pay. The real difficulty of the problem consists in the fact that what Mr. Lloyd George's Government did sixteen years ago cannot now be undone, nor can the present circumstances be changed, which make the continued service of the debt a nearly unbearable and, in one sense, an unfair burden to the British people. The only alternative solutions so far recognisable are: either that the United States Government should forgive a debtor who has been proved to have been guilty of bad finance and happens in addition—or is not this the normal attribute of bad finance?—to be unlucky; or that the unwise debtor should follow the example of some thirty-odd other contemporary governments who, in the like predicament, have simply defaulted upon their obligations. Neither the one party nor the other is so far willing to take the course that is open to it, although, if one be honest, one must subject that statement to the qualification that the British Government is attempting the gymnastic feat of combining the reality of default with the form of solvency. By making "token" payments each half-year, substantially smaller than the amount that falls due, the British Government is taking refuge in an exercise of finesse such as is not likely to cause much satisfaction to the simple folks who still regard formal obligations as unalterably binding. On the other hand there are few honest people in any country who feel proud of their country's politics. At the present moment nearly every "civilised" country in the world has a government which, either formally or by means of exchange restrictions virtually, is in default. That is another way of saying that the peoples of those countries cannot meet the expenses of government left as a charge upon them by former governments.

The people of Great Britain belong to that category, although in their case there are points peculiar to themselves. At the Lausanne Conference of 1932 the British Government agreed to remit Germany's war debt, and made known its hope that the United States would thereupon act in the like spirit towards Great Britain. That hope seemed to have a

sporting chance, because it was the United States herself who, by proposing the "Hoover" moratorium in 1931, had taken the initiative in the movement for a general cancellation of war debts. But the event revealed the curious circumstance that the United States, while approving and even suggesting that war debts be annulled, so far as other creditors were concerned, was resolutely unwilling to annul them so far as she herself was concerned. The British Government earnestly argued the case for an application to America of the American doctrine, so well expounded by Mr. Hoover in 1931: but Mr. Hoover, on November 23rd, 1932, dismissed that argument with the curt observation that "it does not appear to me to carry much weight." On December 15th, 1932, therefore, the British Government paid the amount that then fell due, but paid it in gold, and stipulated that the payment be not regarded as "a resumption of the annual payments," but as an "exceptional and abnormal" procedure designed to "increase the prospects of a satisfactory approach to the whole problem." At the same time the British Government urged the necessity of reaching a final understanding before June 15th, 1933, "to obviate the risk of a general break-down of existing inter-governmental agreements." The United States Government accepted the payment, but rejected the condition on which it was made. ("The sum so received must be credited to principal and interest, as provided therein [in the schedule of 1923] . . . great importance is attached by our Government and people to the maintenance of the original debt agreement in force." Mr. Stimson, to Sir Ronald Lindsay, December 11th, 1932.) None the less, a basis of hope still remained that another temper might prevail before June 15th, 1933. Mr. Hoover, who was responsible for America's policy in December 1932, had been heavily defeated at the Presidential election (November 8th) and was, therefore, due to be superseded in the following March by Mr. Roosevelt. Now, in the course of the election campaign which brought him to the White House, Mr. Roosevelt had made certain statements about the debt. On July 30th, 1932, he declared that "The Republican position has been the absurd one of demanding payment, and at the same time of making payment impossible." On September 29th, 1932, he said: "Billions of dollars of debts are due to this country from abroad. If the debtor nations

cannot export goods and services, they must try to pay in gold. We started such a drain on the gold reserves of the principal commercial countries as to force practically all of them off the gold standard. . . . I say to you, in all earnestness and sincerity, that unless this process is reversed throughout the world, there is no hope for full economic recovery or for true prosperity in the United States."

Mr. Roosevelt duly became President on March 4th, 1933. With the least possible delay Mr. MacDonald crossed the Atlantic and discussed the matter with him (April 21st-25th.) Maybe he expected that Mr. Roosevelt after his election would say the same sort of thing as he had said before his election. It was not so. On June 9th the United States Government laconically informed Sir Ronald Lindsay that "\$ 75,950,000 interest is due and payable on June 15th, 1933, on account of your Government to the United States, pursuant to the debt agreement of June 19th, 1923." It was at that point that the British Government showed a first sign of impatience. Sir John Simon (June 13th) wrote to Washington to express his view that the payment of the June instalment "could not be made at this juncture without gravely imperilling the success of the conference [The World Monetary and Economic Conference], and involving widespread political consequences of the most serious character." What, therefore, the British Government did on June 15th last was to "make an immediate payment of \$10,000,000 as an acknowledgment of the debt pending a final settlement." What the United States Government did was to accept that payment, to remind the British Government that the President could not alter the schedule of payments ("Such power rests with Congress") and to suggest that negotiations about the debt should be held in Washington "as soon as convenient."

For that purpose Sir Frederick Leith Ross crossed the Atlantic, and with Sir Ronald Lindsay started such negotiations in Washington on October 5th. The results were chronicled in Command Paper 4448, published in London on November 7th, and containing three short documents. The first was a letter signed by Sir Ronald Lindsay, addressed to the United States Secretary of State and dated November 6th, 1933. It recorded H.M. Government's disappointment "that it has not been possible during recent negotiations

to reach an agreement for a final settlement of the debt question," recognised "the difficulties in the way of reaching a final agreement at the present time by reason of the unsettled economic and financial situations," and made this announcement: "... they [His Majesty's Government] are accordingly prepared without prejudice to their position in the future, to make a further payment on December 15th next, as in June last, in acknowledgment of the debt pending a final settlement. His Majesty's Government understand that it is no longer in the power of the President to accept payment in silver at a price of 50 cents an ounce, and they accordingly propose to make a payment of \$7,500,000 (£1,500,000 at par) in United States currency on December 15th next." The second document, bearing the same date, was addressed by Mr. Cordell Hull to Sir Ronald Lindsay, its only effect being that the American Government shared the British Government's regrets and "noted" the British disposition to resume negotiations at a later date. At the end of his letter Mr. Cordell Hull again reminded the British Government of the American Note of June 15th, in which was explained the incompetence of the American President "to reduce or cancel the existing debt," such power resting only with Congress. The third document was a statement issued by Mr. Roosevelt on November 7th to record his personal view that a final settlement could hardly be reached "until certain facts in the world—commercial and monetary—become more clarified," and to give his personal testimony to the honesty of British intentions: "I have no personal hesitation in saying that I shall not regard the British Government as in default."

The combined diplomacy of Washington and London, therefore, projected itself six more months into the future, content in the meantime to allow June 15th, 1934, to remain where it was.

THE EUROPEAN UNCERTAINTIES.

Certain strong currents of propagandist activity have revealed themselves in Europe since the deplorable day, October 14th, when Herr Hitler's Government decided to withdraw from the League of Nations. The real seriousness of such a situation is to be found in the engagement of

intellectual prestige in diagnosing it. Everyone who comes into contact with diplomatists knows that there are men in Paris, London, Vienna, Berlin, Warsaw, working hard to prove that war is inevitable, not immediately, but, say, in twelve months' time. Many of them are well-informed. What is worse, they are sincere. Whatever be the truth about Herr Hitler and his colleagues, whether they genuinely, although lop-sidedly, want peace or not, there is charged to their account the big responsibility for having started the fear of war, than which there is no more fatal cause of war.

The old bogey of Pangermanism stalks in Europe. It has already made of Austria a political battle-ground in which the fascism of Prince Starhemberg and his Heimwehr is exposed to the temptation of taking, and would probably not be averse from taking, any dependable opportunity of turning Nazi in order merely to oust Dr. Dollfuss. In that event the Pangerman bogey would be substantiated. Already a Panslav movement is afoot in the east of Europe, called into being by the unmistakable motive of organising resistance to Pangermanism. The Little Entente States of Central Europe have begun to show impatience over what they regard as the irrelevance of Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon in talking about French fears and German claims, when the real point, in their view, is the danger of German aggression, not against France or Great Britain, but against the small States on the German border. Italian propagandists have not been able to conceal the embarrassment caused to them on the one hand by the opportunity they see of humiliating France by encouraging Germany, on the other hand by the jealousy they feel towards Germany in the field of South-eastern Europe. French propagandists are concerned mainly with the thesis that British interests coincide with the denial of equality to Germany. The Deutsche Club (formerly the Herren Club) in Berlin uses its influence to acclimatise German opinion to the notion that the enemy is not France, but Great Britain, and the pious refrain "Gott strafe England" is again taught to German children.

Those who prophesy war stake their name upon the outcome of war. Looked at from a detached point of view, as one of Lucian's gods might look at it, the scene is senseless. Probably not one single politician in Europe, not excepting General Göring, wants war. Yet collectively, those politi-

cians—in which category, for the present purpose, one includes the commentators who write or speak about politics—have the effect of producing the danger of war.

The one month's history that followed October 14th changed the face of Europe. Those of the British people, and they were many, who since 1919 had sympathised with Germany, especially when German feelings were interpreted by Herr Stresemann or Dr. Brüning, were now driven to wonder if there was not after all something to be said for the destructive people who preached the doctrine that Germany was the incorrigible disturber of European peace. For the behaviour of the German people after October 14th came as a shock to normal healthy people who distrust the mass emotionalism of politics and who retain a taste for personal liberty and the decency of individual life. It looked as if the perverted German quality of stupid discipline had again been mobilised in the cause of nationalist arrogance. The whole people were jerking their arms in an endless Nazi salute, were strutting about in an exalted, uncontrolled frenzy of defiance against the whole world, were willing to submit gladly to the impositions of a ruling clique who refused to allow them even to know the effect they were producing abroad. The journalists all betrayed their trust and became the trained parrots of Dr. Goebbels. Foreign news was distorted before it was published, or was not published at all; and the authority who decided upon distortion or suppression was Dr. Goebbels. One is ashamed for those German journalists one counted as friends, that they could consent, at a politician's bidding, deliberately to falsify foreign news, to write what they knew to be untrue and to see it, unmoved, emerge into print. In all countries politics are a degrading thing. In Germany, where politics are still further vitiated by a traditional quality of nationalist patriotism, they seem to rob their victims of the simple motive of human goodwill. And as for humour, there is no humour in a country which massacres Jews, imprisons foreign journalists for writing, not false, but true news about Germany, and which holds an "election" for no other purpose than to measure the extent to which the German people have been disciplined by their politicians. That election had some incidental value as a political curiosity. It was held on November 12th. The electors were asked to vote yes or no to the silly question,

officially published in these words on October 19th : " Do you, German man, and you, German woman, approve the policy of your Government, and are you ready to recognise it as the expression of your own view and your own will, and solemnly to pledge yourself to it ? " A good 93 per cent. obediently voted " ja."

How is one to understand a national mentality which boisterously quits Geneva and a disarmament conference and then proclaims that its only object is peace ? There is an odd strain in the German character which makes it sensitive to foreign criticism, even while it gives the ground for it. That peculiarity no doubt is one reason why the German politicians so quickly started their chorus of peace after their other chorus of October 14th.

On November 6th, Freiherr von Neurath addressed the Deutsche Club. He said that " they, the Germans, were making the other Powers an honest and trustful offer, with the demand that they should approach problems from another fundamental conception. . . . Let the foreign Governments, conscious of their responsibility, take the hand Germany stretched out to them."

On that same day General Göring arrived in Rome to begin certain prolonged consultations with Signor Mussolini. The coincidence of the two events perhaps naturally led to some general speculation about the possibility of Germany's being given a method of resuming the disarmament negotiations without resuming her membership of the League of Nations or her membership of the Disarmament Conference. The Four-Power Pact became the obvious focus of such speculation. Thereby was started a seven days' wonder of high diplomacy. Few informed people felt confident that Signor Mussolini would not lend an ear to such suggestions, if they were made. Yet it was probable that there could not be any meeting of the Four Powers, for the simple reason that France would no doubt refuse to take part in it. It was the adamant principle of French policy that Germany could resume the disarmament discussions only by returning to Geneva.

Such, also, had been understood to be the British principle. But on the very day following Freiherr von Neurath's statement, Sir John Simon spoke in the House of Commons in a foreign affairs debate. He said : " . . . the German Foreign Minister declared that the Germans were making to the other

Powers an honest and trustful offer . . . We most earnestly trust that these statements may lead, in some form or other, to the renewal of contact, and that this object will be pursued by whatever method is found most useful and appropriate. . . . We have never been sticklers for method if we can help in the result." That part of his speech suggested that Sir John Simon was prepared to encourage Berlin to resume the discussions even if the League of Nations was to be set aside.

In another part, however, he said : " We shall go on using every effort, whether Germany is at Geneva or not. There is the most urgent national reason for doing so, if only because the present inequality in armaments affects not only Germany but ourselves, and the last thing we want to see is a process of rearmament, either here or elsewhere. We stand, as we believe the vast mass of our fellow countrymen stand, for international co-operation with a view to firmly establishing peace, and at a time like this, when the international system set up since the war is in jeopardy, we declare ourselves without any qualifications believers in and upholders of the League of Nations as the best available instrument for international peace."

Whatever was Sir John's purpose, it became quickly clear that his effect was to encourage the Nazi leaders to believe that Great Britain might be induced to support any initiative that might result in a resumption of the discussions, whether at Geneva or elsewhere, whether within the framework of the League of Nations or outside it. French opinion was puzzled and alarmed. The matter became one of general concern, because the question of form might become important.

The Lord Mayor's Banquet was held at the Guildhall on November 9th, two days after Sir John Simon had spoken. The diplomatic interest excited in Berlin, Paris, Rome, Prague, Warsaw, Moscow, by the question of the method to be used in the recapture of German collaboration, was at its height. Nobody knew whether the British Government was disposed to meet the Germans outside Geneva. Mr. MacDonald spoke at the Banquet. The report of his speech was read on the following day in every European capital, with the first objective of seeking in it an answer to the question of method. What did they find ? " It is deplorable," said Mr. MacDonald, " that just at the moment when another attempt was to be

made to meet German claims, Germany not only withdrew from the deliberations of the Disarmament Conference, but gave notice of her intention to leave the League of Nations itself. Her act almost amounted to a repudiation of the peace machinery of the world. That almost amounted to a repudiation of peace. . . . The situation needs to be studied in all its aspects. The British Government is not going to commit itself to one course of proceeding, but to study it in all its aspects. . . . What is to hinder Germany, even now, from coming in and putting her case before us? She will address a tribunal of men who want peace, and men who want to be able to meet her in every way." Thus Mr. MacDonald. The uncertainty was hardly thereby lessened; but British, as distinct from French or German, students of British Governmental style could guess what was in the mind, although not on the lips, of Mr. MacDonald and Sir John Simon. It might be paraphrased thus: "Both Freiherr von Neurath and Herr Hitler have lately said that they want peace. If they are sincere, we want to encourage them. That is why we refrain at this point from saying bluntly to them that they must first return to Geneva. Instead we invite them to suggest the method."

In the evening of November 10th an official announcement was made from Rome containing these phrases: "In Italian responsible quarters it is believed that the situation has not yet reached a point which will permit of re-examining the disarmament problem and the problems resulting from the exit of Germany from the League of Nations. What is important—according to Italian responsible quarters—is not to aggravate the international atmosphere with investigations or manœuvres. . . ." After that announcement was made the people who thought they understood Signor Mussolini's temperament were encouraged in their belief that it was not his way to make his countenance shine upon projects which had little chance of success. But he made the confusion worse confounded on November 14th, by publicly stating that "This League of Nations started from one of those principles which, when enunciated, are very beautiful, but when considered and dissected, reveal themselves as absurd." Where did Signor Mussolini stand? No man knew.

GEORGE GLASGOW.

November 15th, 1933.

LITERARY DEPARTMENT.

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GOD AND THE ASTRONOMERS.*

The Warburton Lectures by the Dean of St. Paul's are, in a sense, the necessary supplement of what the distinguished lecturer calls "the fine Gifford Lectures of Bishop Barnes," entitled *Scientific Theory and Religion*, which was reviewed at some length in these pages in June 1933. The Warburton Lectures for 1931-1933 are, however, entirely independent of the Gifford Lectures. Dr. Inge is a philosopher and a theologian, with a mind as capable as the mind of the late Lord Balfour to estimate the significance of modern discoveries in physics; Dr. Barnes is a theologian and a mathematician, with expert knowledge of the physical problem. The two minds supplement each other, as these Warburton Lectures show. There are differences of outlook. Apparently Dr. Inge does not make the distinction between physics and the psychical realm which Dr. Barnes emphasises so emphatically.

Both Lord Balfour and Dr. Barnes assume that God is a Person, that is, a Being who has designed the physical and psychical universe. Lord Balfour, in his Bampton Lectures, says plainly to the mathematicians, "We must hold that

* *God and the Astronomers: Containing the Warburton Lectures, 1931-1933.* By William Ralph Inge. Longmans.

reason and the works of reason have their source in God ; that from Him they draw their inspiration ; and that if they repudiate their origin, by this very act they proclaim their own insufficiency." Dr. Barnes apparently holds similar views and convinces the student by the entire reasonableness of his complex argument. He holds that space is finite, containing a finite cosmos which obeys the fundamental laws of Nature, including the degradation of energy which involves the ultimate destruction of this finite universe. Does God expire as well as His universe in one fearful tragedy, which we may look forward to but shall not ever record ? If there is Purpose in the creation of the universe there is Purpose in its destruction. Purpose whether in God or Man is not a physical factor. The great mathematicians admit this, and say that free-will lies beyond the realm of physics. Dr. Barnes says that the things that lead to the inevitable vanishing away of the physical universe, matter, energy, radiation, are physical entities. " Mind and spirit belong to the psychical realm." Purpose and Design, with their accompanying values, therefore, seem to belong to some region where the second law of thermodynamics and the doctrine of entropy involving the eventual destruction of the physical universe by the cessation of the functioning of heat, have no place. There is a Purpose in the fashioning of this law, and because there is a Purpose the law itself is an attribute of a Purpose which must survive when the finite universe has departed. Dr. Barnes says plainly, on the evidence that the stoic doctrine of universal immanence is clearly wrong, that God is what he calls transcendent, and is only immanent " in so far as His creatures share His nature and serve His plan."

Therefore, the one thing to understand is not the technical difficulties of the mathematicians and physicists, but the nature of the personality of God and man, and the problem of the presence of evil in the heart of man. The problem of evil is partly explicable, at any rate, by the necessity of free-will. Man must be free if his personality is to be free and competent to share the nature of God. If Christ is God the problem of evil is soluble, though man can only very slowly solve the problem by discovering the only partly revealed laws of the moral being. But all this is impossible if personality does not survive physical death. The personality

is something other than the physical man, though personality is associated with him. The difficulty is to disentangle personality from the things of the flesh. But Purpose is in man as well as in God and it would be an unreasonable universe if the personality of man did not survive physical death.

How does Dr. Inge deal with these many problems which form, in fact, only one problem? He argues, to quote the preface to his book, that "the law of entropy, if it holds good of the entire physical universe, points to a creation in time by some Power outside the degenerative process which science observes proceeding to an inevitable end." On the other hand, Dr. Inge avoids the free-will controversy, but he maintains that "the unseen spiritual world, the 'kingdom of values,' is . . . no mere ideal or aspiration, but a fact, an existing reality, which can only be pictured symbolically and poetically under the forms of time and place." This "kingdom of values," and the conception of God as primarily transcendent, is common to Lord Balfour, Dr. Barnes and Dr. Inge. None of these believe, and no great thinker could believe that God will disappear with His creation. Certainly, the greatest mathematicians of our time do not believe that the physical universe contains the secret of all things. Dr. Inge says :

We must recognise that reality is ultimately a kingdom of Values, and that the ultimate and eternal Values, which it has been agreed to classify as Goodness (or Perfection), Truth (or Wisdom), and Beauty, are *given* to us as much as the facts of what we call existence.

It is unnecessary to follow the Dean in his attack on the conception of a purely mathematical universe. No one now thinks that the God of the cosmos is a mathematician intent on destroying Himself. It seems, in fact, like a Scottish joke. But Dr. Inge is undoubtedly right in reasserting that "events in Time are relevant to eternal order is the belief of Christianity. Things of lasting moment really happen; souls are saved and lost." But for this very reason it is surprising that the author does not face the question of free-will. Souls are saved or lost by the exercise of purpose and free-will in the temporal sphere, whatever fate that sphere may have. The *results* of free-will are eternal.

The Dean of St. Paul's shows the working of "God in History," and comes to the conclusion that we cannot, with any confidence, "trace the hand of God in the development of merely material civilisation." Again, the criticism must be made that the presence of evil is necessary for the exercise of free-will and, therefore, to neglect the problem is to neglect the purpose of God in human history. "The world of values," on the other hand, is necessary to the entire argument, as was found by Lord Balfour and Dr. Barnes. In the chapter on "God and the World," Dr. Inge concludes, and rightly, that "the fate of the material universe is not a vital question for religion." He turns to "the Eternal World," and the doctrine of eternal life which "we can enter, at least in a measure, before we pass through the gate of death." Thomas à Kempis is a better guide than even Plotinus or Spinoza in that question. The following of Christ eventually eliminates evil and makes the individual personality share the nature of God. But for this purpose memory of earthly life and earthly sorrows and earthly joys are surely necessary if the purpose of man is akin to the Purpose of God. If the Purpose of God involves (as it must) a continuous picture of the scheme of things, the personality of man does not forget.

J. E. G. DE M.

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INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENT.*

The growth of a world order suited to the needs of society is the most important topic of the times. The interdependence of national states is an accepted axiom of post-war politics. A form of international authority which satisfies the growing international needs of national peoples is the ultimate and necessary corollary. The most ardent form of nationalism cannot deny and cannot alter the nature of our present civilisation. The precise character of such authority has given rise to the most varied speculations. In two recent works, however, two distinguished writers have discussed the question and have reached important and, in some fundamentals, similar conclusions.

In the first edition of his work *The Bulwarks of Peace*,

* *The Bulwarks of Peace*. Methuen. *The Progress of International Government*. Allen and Unwin.

published in April 1918, Dr. Heber Hart considered the "essential conditions of an effective League of Peace," which were later largely embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations. In a new and completely revised edition of this book, Dr. Heber Hart attempts "to provide a compendious statement of the material facts and guiding principles" when considering "what ought to be done by the governments and peoples of the various states of the world with the object of preventing the outbreak of wars in the future." The immediate problem is not the creation of a world-state, which is a theoretical conception wholly outside the realm of practical politics. Dr. Heber Hart, while believing in the world-state as an ultimate goal, declares that :

meanwhile the practical reformer has to work out a different solution—a form of international organisation intermediate between the League of Nations in its present stage of development and the ideal conception of the world-state.

It may well be doubted whether the ultimate issue is between the nationalism as we understand it and the world-state. The individuality of racial culture and institutions will inevitably continue. Dr. David Mitrany, in *The Progress of International Government*, which comprised the substance of four lectures delivered before Yale University in 1932, supports this compromise as an end of political society. Our political speculations

present us with the corresponding alternatives of a world-State or an association of State-units, still compact in their structure and authority. Most of our present difficulties are caused by that conceptual stagnation. . . . Human progress might be served best by a combination of the two lines of political organisation which hitherto have been applied rather in opposition to each other. A functional integration of technical services upon the largest possible international scale would seem to be as indispensable, as a more liberal devolution of cultural activities, which should free the individual genius of each regional or national group, would seem to be desirable as a more rational approach to the ideal ends of political society.

The ultimate character, if such be possible, of international society, will be determined rather by the uncertain course of future events than by the logical perfection of a theoretical conception.

The immediate question is the strengthening of the col-

lective system as the only guarantee of permanent peace and international progress. Dr. Heber Hart advocates the creation of a Supreme Executive Force drawn from the Great Powers and controlled by the League.

A supreme Executive Force, *ex vi termini*, would be capable of coercing any of the Powers which had been parties to its constitution. . . . A coercive power compelling obedience to the decrees of the body by which it was directly wielded and to the system of law which it applied would involve the exclusive sovereignty of this body and the operation of the law over all who were subject to its power.

Dr. Mitrany, while considering that the question of "the instruments of enforcement" is a "secondary issue" and "a matter of detail," supports the theory of the collective enforcement of the law between States by an international body. It is but

the progressive corollary of the renunciation of individual enforcement. . . . The unchanging principle must be that when States surrender to an international authority their traditional right of using force for their own protection, that authority should take upon itself the function of protecting law-abiding States. The two aspects are inseparable and represent logical, continuous stages in the transition from anarchy to law.

It is extremely doubtful whether the creation of such an international authority is at present a practical proposition. The members of the League have refused to exercise against Japan the sanctions given them by the Covenant, though unanimously agreed as to Japanese guilt. The nations are still afraid of collective action, though agreed in principle as to its necessity. In these circumstances an international force or other sanction is less likely to be created. Towards the end of his book Dr. Mitrany asks the vital question, "how to create acceptance for international authority." The answer rests in the education of world opinion towards greater international trust and good feeling with its logical consequences of disarmament and security. An international authority will evolve very much like the British Constitution. That is to say it will grow in proportion as the peoples of the world are able to work and appreciate it. Until that time approaches, written constitutions such as the Covenant of the League will fail to be implemented by the necessary collective action.

THE SOCIETY OF FRIENDS.*

It is a very hard task for one who is not a Friend, however friendly and sympathetic, to review Miss Fry's able and fair estimate of the famous Society of Friends, of which she is a notable member. Having been asked by a member of the Society to undertake the task, and having read Miss Fry's book with undiminished interest from cover to cover, the writer had to inquire what qualifications were required for such a task. A purely objective review was possible, but that is not enough, since to understand the position of the Society and its members in modern life, it is necessary to understand once and for always the subjective aspect of the Quaker's view of life. Probably the book could only be reviewed fairly by a Friend. But there is one hope. However one may disagree with certain Quaker tenets if pressed to some great emergency, still the Quaker is a mystic, and one who adopts the theory of mysticism as the only solvent in a world where materialism and objective phenomena tend to swamp psychical realities, may be able, as mystic speaking to mystic, to criticise and also to realise the Quaker attitude. From that point of view the present writer writes, keeping in mind the conclusions he had come to in a long-forgotten volume on *Thomas à Kempis : His Age and Book*.

Miss Fry sees in the history of Christian mysticism what she calls "the Background of Quakerism," and indirectly refers to Walter Hilton's famous *Ladder of Spiritual Perfection*. Hilton was an English Augustinian who died in 1395. Miss Fry writes :

There are various types of mystic, ranging from those who have followed in its every detail the elaborate ladder of perfection leading to rapture and ecstasy, to the normal person who yet has seeing eyes for the unseen, a sensitiveness in finding God everywhere and above all in his own soul. Quakers have never been "elaborate" mystics, but have rather assumed the possibility of the inner vision, to which we shall recur, using it to inspire their work. As Rufus Jones says, Quaker humanitarian and relief work "is as much a part of the Quaker mysticism as the Meeting for Worship is."

* *Quaker Ways*. An attempt to explain Quaker beliefs and practices, and to illustrate them by the lives and activities of Friends of former days. By A. Ruth Fry. Cassell.

Now a work which was not a manual for elaborate mysticism, but exactly answers the Quaker ideal as set forth by Miss Fry, was current in England in the mid-fifteenth century. It was called *Musica Ecclesiastica*, and was also attributed to Walter Hilton. It had for centuries a great vogue and it was only early in the eighteenth century that the work was identified with three of the books of the *De Imitatione Christi* of Thomas à Kempis. The work was in English as well as Latin (as indeed were all the works attributed to Hilton), and it is more probable that such a work, in its mystic simplicity, would have a more direct influence than the writings of the German mystic, Jacob Boehme, which were more akin to the *scala perfectionis* than to the simplicity of Thomas à Kempis. In the case of both the Quaker and Thomas Hammerlein the hypothesis of mysticism is the only true solution of the mystery of the spiritual life. I ventured to write in 1906 :

Faith begins by an experiment which leads to an hypothesis and concludes with an experience which is a demonstration. It may be said that the demonstration is not complete, inasmuch as the following of Christ is a counsel of perfection to which no man can attain. The reply to such a criticism is that the perfect following of Christ would in fact be a complete demonstration, since experience shows that the nearer the approximation of the individual to the life of Christ the more nearly is the hypothesis confirmed. . . . Therefore the imitation of Christ throughout the darkness of the Middle Ages was the fundamental idea of the invisible and mystical Church, and therefore Thomas à Kempis, in his four books concerning the imitation of Christ, lays down the rules of human conduct and human thought that made the growth of the experience which is a demonstration, possible.

Now that, it is submitted, exactly describes the Quaker movement ever since George Fox, in the mid-seventeenth century, founded the Society of Friends. There was nothing new in the doctrine. What was new was the effort and the slow gathering together of a Society which laid down rules of human thought, human conduct which inevitably leads to an experience coincident with faith.

The Society speedily produced at the end of the seventeenth century a great statesman, William Penn, son of Admiral Penn. James, Duke of York, and his brother King Charles II, generously helped him to form the Quaker State of

Pennsylvania. Penn formed his State on the basis that "Liberty without obedience is confusion; and obedience without liberty is slavery." It was a great conception, and Penn's "Holy Experiment" was a noble and practical attempt to carry out the creed of the Society of Friends. There was no army or navy and Penn's relations with the Indians showed that there was no need for such internal defences. Indeed, the Indians, as was proved by the famous Iroquois Confederacy which was in force from the fifteenth century, were only too ready for a peace-abiding world. But Penn insisted upon education and law and order, capital punishment being reserved for wilful murder and treason, and prisons being workshops, where prisoners could be reformed and work out the debt due to their wrongdoing. There can be no doubt that Penn was a great statesman as well as a true Christian. He did not abolish slavery, but he regulated it, and entire religious freedom was accorded to every citizen. For thirty years the Holy Experiment, partly as the result of the efforts of the widow of the statesman, was an entire success. That it failed in 1756 was not the fault of the Society, but of the world as it then was. The principles of the Holy Experiment are as much alive to-day as in the time of William Penn and Hannah Penn, but in fact the Quaker, as Quaker, does not now interfere in politics, and does not directly determine, or try to determine, the policy of the State.

Mysticism and statesmanship incorporating the simpler outcomings of mysticism have justified themselves, but the Society of Friends, after the apparent failure of the Holy Experiment, have confined themselves to rules of conduct and experiments in social responsibility which work out both an experience and a demonstration of the following of Christ. They have not again aimed at the founding of a Quaker State.

J. E. G. DE M.

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A PRINCE OF THE CAPTIVITY.*

Colonel Buchan's political, social and international drama entitled *A Prince of the Captivity* is much more than a fine novel or piece of inspired fiction. It is a subjective treatise on

* John Buchan. Hodder & Stoughton.

the forces that are making up or tearing down the world as the Great War of 1914 left it. Most historical work on a great period—for this is a great period—is objective, written from documentary evidence and reminiscences, dealing with the period, and that is the weakness of all history since it rarely deals with the souls of men and women. Great drama, from the times of Æschylus to the times of Shakespeare, it is true, uses the subjective method, but it deals for the most part with events that cannot be identified with actual objective events with any historical accuracy. In Colonel Buchan's book we have a drama, too discursive perhaps in parts, which is based upon actual events, and deals with personages who are typical of actual personages playing current parts in actual or recent life, and the whole construction of the drama is subjective, written from within and not merely from without. In order to achieve this feat Colonel Buchan conceives and constructs an almost Christ-like character who dominates the whole book in its many phases, from the initial tragedy of the death of his little son and the second tragedy of his conviction for an offence of which he was absolutely innocent to his heroic death, a death which makes possible, after years of ceaseless social effort to construct a better world, the conversion of an enemy of terrific intellectual power to a friend who could carry on his work.

Adam Melfort, as the result of his imprisonment, never chooses to emerge into public life, though the social stain of his imaginary crime of 1912 was swept away by his miraculous conduct as a secret agent during the war. He is all through a mystic, clinging with a deathless hope to the ultimate reunion with his little son. At every turn he emanates and begets love, and never loses hope while his efforts register failure after failure. The pictures of the Labour leader and his wife, of the peer who turns Socialist, of the parson in the slums, are all pictures of men and women who were noble and who failed, while the men who ultimately answer the call were a German whom he had fought and an English financier who seemed anything but noble.

The drama (for it is a drama) is as discursive as Shakespeare's *Antony and Cleopatra*, and characters who appear and disappear have sometimes no obvious place in the plot save as figures in the world as it is to-day. The opening scene, as indeed are all the scenes, is vivid and striking, with the news

of Melfort's conviction for forgery drifting through to the smoking-room of a town club where his friends were gathered. But in any final edition of this book the scene should be rewritten, since on the facts as stated a conviction was impossible. The fact that he had admitted that his wife had forged the cheque under his orders would have put both the prosecution and the defence on the *qui vive*. It is a very common thing for a man to plead guilty to an offence that he has never committed. Adam was a rich man. After the conviction "he had settled upon her most of his income, leaving himself one thousand pounds a year" and a Scottish estate. The prosecution, with the fact before them of the admission that the wife, notoriously extravagant, forged the document, and the fact that the prisoner could have, with ease, met all her debts, would never have pressed the case. The English law, after the careful investigation of such a case (including the evidence of the lady's bankers) would never have allowed the husband to sacrifice himself. Another legal point is the alleged fact that the wife divorced him for desertion after he came out of prison in March 1914. He was convicted in June 1912. The Scotch law on the subject is that divorce can be had after malicious desertion for four years. In all the circumstances of the case it may be doubted whether, apart from the question of time, any Scottish court would have granted the worthless woman a divorce. The true facts of the case were well known in Scotland—and the husband had settled a fortune on her at the very time that malice was alleged. Scots lawyers are not fools. This criticism is made, as it is a pity to have a technical flaw in a drama which will long haunt the reader by its purity of tone, its vividness of action and its fine estimate of contemporary life.

J. E. G. DE M.

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SOCIAL THINKERS OF THE VICTORIAN AGE.*

These ten lectures which seek to put forth the leading social and political ideas held by certain pioneers in the

* *The Social and Political Ideas of some Representative Thinkers of the Victorian Age : A Series of Lectures Delivered at King's College, University of London, during the Session 1931-32.* Edited by F. J. C. Hearnshaw. George G. Harrap.

Victorian Age do not limit their scope to English thinkers, though Dr. Gooch, in his searching introductory essay on the period from 1837, when the young queen succeeded to the throne, to 1901, when the old queen, "full of years and honours," died, restricted his brilliant analysis of a great epoch almost entirely to English personalities. The present writer, in dealing with "Sir Henry Maine and the Historical Jurists," had perforce to include the ideas of many continental and American thinkers. If the introduction of the subject of the theory of Law into a volume dealing with social thought could be justified, the Editor was forced to tolerate its inevitable references to foreign jurists. Perhaps the same excuse in its entirety could not be advanced in the case of some other essays. It is true that Professor Laski, in his fine essay on "Alexis de Tocqueville and Democracy," links the great French essayist with Lord Acton, traces his thought back to that aspect of Burke which owes so much to Montesquieu and declares that to understand temperamental liberalism it is necessary to know de Tocqueville. Yet he was essentially a logical French thinker, and does not seem to be representative of the Victorian Age as understood in England. Nor can Karl Marx, a German writer of Jewish stock, be called a representative thinker of that age, despite the fact that he lived in exile in England for many years. He was a German thinker basing all his thoughts and his communist ideas on a desperate perversion of the individualistic philosophy of Hegel, the perversion known as Left Hegelian.

Mr. J. L. Gray, in his very interesting but too lengthy essay on Marx, says comparatively little of Friedrich Engels, and only quotes Marx's attack on Ferdinand Lassalle. Yet Engels and Lassalle, as thinkers, have the same rather confused status as Marx, and the fact that "a social revolution has been waged" in the name of Marx does not make him a thinker of the Victorian Age any more than his German and French co-perverters of Friedrich Hegel. Nor (despite his love of England and his famous *History of English Literature*) can Hippolyte Taine be regarded as a Victorian thinker, unless that term can be applied to all social and political thinkers who lived and worked between 1837 and 1901. It is probably true, as Mr. R. A. Jones says, in his very valuable essay on "Taine and the Nationalists," that Taine did much to reconstitute the French nation after the disasters of 1870,

and to lead the way, and not only for France, "to a broad nationalism, a wider and enhanced conception of patriotism." This essay on Taine is a necessary counterblast to the essay on Marx, and therefore shows skilful, judicious and judicial editing, but neither figure plays any leading part in Victorian social and political thought.

The essays on Thomas Carlyle by Mr. Robert S. Dower, and "Herbert Spencer and the Individualists" by the Editor, Professor Hearnshaw, on the other hand go to the very root of the social and political ideas that were destined to stir the thinking powers of at least two generations of social reformers and political workers. Mr. Dower defines Carlyle fairly :

He was paradoxical in many ways—a Scottish peasant who became one of the greatest writers of English, an idealist who turned pessimist, a brilliant talker who preached silence, a hero-worshipper who despised most of his contemporaries. He founded no school of thought, and had no disciples except Ruskin and Froude, but he profoundly influenced the political and economic thought of his age. His Gospel of Work, Duty, and Self-denial is not as popular now as it was in his day, but there are elements in his teaching that are needed in our time.

Mr. Dower aptly quotes Dr. Edward Caird's estimate of Carlyle : "No English writer of the nineteenth century has done more to elevate and purify our ideals of life, and to make us conscious that the things of the spirit are real, and that in the last resort there is no other reality." That is the significance of John Ruskin's worship of Thomas Carlyle, and it is a great omission in this book that Ruskin's political and social philosophy, carrying great force to-day, is not dealt with at length. Professor Hearnshaw in his brilliant essay on Spencer contrasts the apparent differences of Carlyle and the scientific thinker and individualist thinker whom Carlyle, in a fit of indigestion, called "an immeasurable ass." Spencer was doomed to the same fate as Hegel in the appropriation of his dialectic by his chief enemies the Socialists and Communists. It is a tribute to his wide-minded outlook that Left Spencerianism has been used by enemies who are responsible for the starting of the present craze of dictatorship in Europe. The fact gives rise to one more criticism of an omission. John Austin, the apostle of the doctrine that might is the source of law, who died in 1860, has a current influence in Europe in the shape of the doctrine of dictatorships that is positively

appalling. Austin was a great thinker, as Maine admitted, and the contrast of thought between him, Carlyle and Spencer was worth bringing out, especially at the present time. That he was wrong (he never lived to appreciate the doctrine of evolution and its influence on the growth of law) and that both Carlyle and Spencer were right there can be no doubt, but the case needs arguing.

Space does not allow of comment on the learned and noteworthy article on "T. H. Green and the Idealists," by the Master of Balliol, the very brilliant essay on "Matthew Arnold and the Educationists," by Professor Dover Wilson, and Mr. C. H. Driver's lecture (with a notable Appendix) on "Walter Bagehot and the Social Psychologists." These last three essays bring out into the light of common day three men who have had, perhaps, more subjective influence on the social thinking of the present generation than any other of the great Victorians.

J. E. G. DE M.

SHORTER REVIEWS.

Captain Liddell Hart has written nothing more arresting than *The Ghost of Napoleon*.* War, as he grimly reminds us, concerns us all, for history is filled with its ravages, and no one can be sure that its day is done. The theme of this little volume, which contains so much knowledge and wisdom, is not the history but the methods of warfare. Omelettes, as the saying goes, cannot be made without breaking eggs, and battles cannot be fought and won without the shedding of blood. But it is the author's profound conviction that in many wars blood has been needlessly shed, and that this extravagance in the most precious of all commodities is directly traceable to wrong ideas. His championship of the element of mobility and surprise against the rival theory of mass attack is familiar to readers of his earlier works, and it dominates the whole argument of his latest book. His survey of military thought opens with Marshal Saxe, whose astonishing originality marks him out as a creative thinker. Napoleon owed much to his predecessors; but his earliest campaigns were best, and in later years he sacrificed surprise to costly head-on attacks. It was Clausewitz, however, "the maker of mass and mutual massacre," who dominated the practice of the nineteenth century, and, through his disciples such as Moltke and Foch, was responsible for oceans of blood.

* Faber and Faber.

Captain Liddell Hart's message is that if wars there must be, they should be conducted with the minimum instead of with the maximum of slaughter, with the rapier, so to speak, not with the sledge-hammer.

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Nearly two years ago Mr. Hector Bolitho published *Albert the Good*, a Life of the Prince Consort which was based on letters written to his brother. They are in the archives of Coburg and had remained there unread for sixty years until Mr. Bolitho obtained access to them in connection with his book. He has now edited and published them under the title *The Prince Consort and his brother: Two hundred new letters*,* and they form a very interesting background to the life of a man who never obtained much popularity or acknowledgment for the work he did for his adopted country. Prince Albert was undemonstrative, and old for his years, both by nature and by reason of his position, with the result that he was a cautious letter-writer. Yet, in spite of that, these letters to the one person to whom he could write with full candour and frankness are full of real affection and deep concern and interest for his family's welfare. His brother's interests were as important to him as those of his own children, and with him he had no reserve, with the result that his strong character and philosophy of life stand out clearly against the background of politics and family affairs with which the letters deal.

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Lady Stephen has written an interesting short history of *Girton College*, 1869-1932,† which in certain respects she has based on her earlier book, *Emily Davies and Girton College*. In the middle of the nineteenth century the seed for the proper education of woman was being sown very slowly but very surely. The antagonism which met the small group of its promoters and supporters strengthened their resolutions, and perhaps in the case of the women, showed the quality of their despised minds. All the would-be female emancipators were not of the militant type, outwardly at any rate, and they were not by any means the least zealous members of the feminist movement. Miss Emily Davies, one of the principal founders of Girton, hid her amazing energy and will under a conventional Victorianism, a manner most misleading wherever the question of women was concerned. She and Madame Bodichon and their friends built firm foundations and it is not only Girton College that owes them thanks, but all institutions working for the education of girls. Yet those pioneers who started the College could have made little headway without students, and perhaps Girton owes even more to those parents who allowed daughters to improve their profound ignorance for no apparent reason, and thus made plain the need for girls' schools as well as colleges. The earlier efforts of

* Cobden-Sanderson.

† Cambridge University Press.

Queen's College, London, and the Cheltenham Ladies' College, however, counted much in the struggle for the intellectual enfranchisement of women, and Newnham at Cambridge followed close on the lead of Girton at Hitchin and Cambridge, while early efforts at Oxford must not be ignored.

NOTICES OF BOOKS.

The Chatterbox Company Ltd. have now issued their 66th, 68th and 43rd annual volumes of *Chatterbox*, *The Prize* and *Leading Strings*. They are books with reputations of long standing and well deserved, since they have not rested on their laurels, but have moved with the times in keeping their material up-to-date with the best of its various kinds. Stories for young children are among the most difficult to write, but parents can still rely on the good tales of the Chatterbox company. The current volumes are well illustrated as well as being full of lively and various stories appealing to many kinds of children, but all written with simple directness.

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Mr. Laurence Housman and Mr. C. H. K. Marten have collaborated with great success in their book for children, **The Long Journey: The Tale of our Past*. It is definitely not a history text-book, but a book of stories gathered from the world's history of all times and places which will delight the child who loves stories. They are written simply and briefly; with the result that there are no wearisome descriptions, but instead immediate local colour and effect. There are tales of the ancient world, tales of mediæval and modern times from many lands; stories of soldiers, monks and prophets, kings and queens, travellers and investors, and all the types of people who have helped to make the world throughout the centuries. It is a book of both peace and war, as indeed it must be if it would show the evolution of civilisation; but as the book closes with the story of The Christ of the Andes, the reader is left with the feeling that history should teach that progress and peace must walk together. The book contains short poems as well as stories, and numerous delightful illustrations gathered from many divers sources.

* Blackwell.